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Abstract
In this thesis I present a rights-based theory of exploitation. I argue that successful concep-
tions of exploitation should begin with the ordinary language claim that exploitation involves
‘taking unfair advantage’. Consequently, they must combine an account of what it means
to take advantage of another with an account of when transactions are unfair. Existing
conceptions of exploitation fail to provide adequate accounts of both aspects of exploitation.
Hillel Steiner and John Roemer provide convincing accounts of the unfairness involved in
exploitation, but because they fail to provide restrictive ‘advantage taking’ conditions, their
theories of exploitation include cases that we would not ordinarily describe as exploitations.
Ruth Sample and Robert Goodin provide accounts that place a stronger emphasis on the
attitudes involved in exploitation and the processes that bring it about. Unfortunately, these
theories do not properly incorporate the unfairness aspect of exploitation. Consequently, they
are either self-frustrating or incomplete.
I provide a conception of exploitation that combines both aspects. I claim that a bilateral,
strictly Pareto improving, and voluntary transaction φ between A and B is exploitative just
in case (1) there exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in the history
of exchanges leading to φ that (2) reduces B’s bargaining power by altering her status quo
point, and (3) the degree to which B’s preferences are satisfied in φ is less than it would
be had B’s bargaining power not been reduced (by the alteration of her status quo point).
Further, (4a) A’s egoistic preferences are better satisfied in φ because B’s bargaining power
is limited, and (4b) if the previous conditions also hold for A, then the reduction in A’s
bargaining power is less than the reduction in B’s bargaining power. Finally, (5) A truly
believes the previous conditions hold.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: The Paradox of Exploitation
1.1 Chapter 1 Introduction
Many transactions are deeply unjust. Some, like sweatshop labour, seem to be unjust be-
cause they are unfair; others, like the renting of one’s body, seem—if not unjust—at least
morally amiss because they are demeaning or dehumanising. We often call these transactions
exploitative and, at least in most cases, this label reflects our belief that there is something
wrong with them.
Yet, attempts to identify what, exactly, is morally amiss in cases of exploitation—and
indeed which transactions should be counted as exploitation—are often frustrated. At least
part of the difficulty of determining the extension and properties of exploitation lies in the fact
that its boundaries are vague and ill-defined. Exploitation is a ‘family resemblance-like’ con-
cept1 that we use in various ways, in various contexts. But concerns about scope are not the
only complication for accounts of exploitation. The concept also brings many of our deeply
held moral intuitions into conflict, embodying both process-based (non-consequentialist) and
consequentialist moral concerns. These conflicts make it difficult to articulate just which
moral principles are violated in cases of exploitation and what our response to exploitation
ought to be. Exploitation presents us with a difficult moral paradox.
When someone steals my wallet, they take it without consent and make me worse off than
I was. Conversely, when I buy an apple from the fruit stand on my street, the transaction is
consensual and beneficial to both the seller and myself. Some accounts of exploitation allow
its scope to include non-consensual and/or harmful transactions, while others limit the scope
to consensual and “mutually advantageous exploitation.”2 At least regarding normative
analysis, it matters little whether we extend the term beyond the consensual and mutually
advantageous cases, for it is easier to say what has gone wrong when consent is lacking
and harm has been done. Rather, the paradox of exploitation arises in its sharpest form in
those cases in which we have strong intuitions that exploitation has occurred, yet consent
has been given and benefits accrue to all parties. Here, defending the claim that something
impermissible has occurred becomes more difficult. It seems, at least prima facie, that if the
parties in the transaction are all better off and each freely consents to the transaction (and
no one else has been harmed), then there can be no wrong done. The conflict is especially
troubling for liberals, since their commitments to anti-paternalism and a subjective theory of
value block some of the more obvious resolutions to the paradox. The paradox of exploitation,
as we often confront it, concerns the claims that engaging in a consensual, Pareto improving
1Wittgenstein (1953, §66)
2Wertheimer (1996, p.14)
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transaction cannot be worse than not transacting, since everyone gains,3 and yet. . . some
consensual, Pareto improving transactions (such as those involved in sweatshop labour) seem
to be wrongful, or in some way morally amiss.
Although these claims appear contradictory, note that the impermissibility of sweatshop
contracts (for example) does not conflict with the ‘non-worseness’ claim that transacting is
better—not worse—than not transacting. Consider three possible acts χ, φ and ψ. We may
say that both φ and ψ are impermissible (and χ is permissible), but still endorse the non-
worseness premise. The non-worseness premise claims only that if φ is Pareto improving and
consensual it is the better of the two impermissible options, not that φ must be permissible.
Thus, as we ordinarily confront it, the ‘paradox of exploitation’ does not really involve con-
flicting claims. However, if the premises are recast in terms of permissibility, a contradiction
can be generated:
The Paradox of Exploitation
1. In transaction, φ,
(a) (Consent) to φ rather than to not φ is consensual and
(b) (Pareto) to φ rather than to not φ is a strict Pareto improvement.
2. (Impermissibility) φ-ing is impermissible.
3. (Non-worseness as permissibility) It cannot be impermissible to φ, provided:
(a) (Consent) to φ rather than to not φ is consensual and
(b) (Pareto) to φ rather than to not φ is a strict Pareto improvement.
In this form,4 the paradox concerns a tension between two claims. Premises 1 and 2,
taken together claim that there exist Pareto improving and consensual transactions that
are impermissible, while premise 3 claims that Pareto and consent are sufficient for the
permissibility of a transaction. For exploitation to be possible, one of the three premises
must be false. The paradox arises from a three-fold tension between the ‘factual’ claims
about the nature of a particular transaction in premise one, the normative claim in premise
two that some of these transactions are impermissible, and the inferential principle connecting
the two in premise three, namely, that if the factual claims are true, the normative claims
cannot be.
3This claim, often called the “non-worseness premise”, is outlined in Wertheimer (1996, pp.289–93.)
Wertheimer also includes a prohibition against negative externalities in his formulation of the non-worseness
condition. Although this clause is important in real-life cases, the presentation of the paradox is simplified
by assuming such concerns are covered by an implicit ceteris paribus clause. Many resolutions of the paradox
rely on more detailed specifications of this condition; it is, therefore, not to be read as complete, but rather
as a prima facie intuition. Additionally, some interpretations of Pareto conditions read the condition as
normative. In this presentation Pareto is purely descriptive, while the non-worseness condition contains
the normative element. The transaction is a Pareto improvement in the sense that each parties subjective
preferences are better satisfied after the transaction.
4Interpreting ♦ as ‘it is permissible that’, C as ‘consent’, and P as ‘pareto’:
1. C
2. P
3. ¬♦Φ
4. (P ∧ C) → ♦Φ
5. ♦Φ (From 1, 2, 4)
6. ♦Φ ∧ ¬♦Φ
7. Contradiction
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Premise 1 is indisputable. There exist Pareto improving and consensual transactions.
Premise 2, as we will see throughout the thesis is less straightforward than it might first
appear. In some problematic transactions that prima facie seem to be impermissible, ex-
plaining just why transacting is impermissible becomes a complicated issue. Nevertheless,
of the three premises, the third is the obvious target for revision. Indeed, the three existing
approaches to exploitation that I outline in the following chapters each provide a different
reason for rejecting premise 3.
1.2 The Sweatshop Case
In order to better understand the tensions in the paradox and the motivations for aban-
doning one of the premises, it is helpful to consider an archetypal case of exploitation: the
sweatshop labour contract. Here, perhaps more than elsewhere, the term exploitation is used
to condemn a practice that many argue is contemptible and morally amiss. Labourers work
long hours for multinational corporations5 at near-subsistence wages in order to produce
goods the workers cannot themselves afford to buy. Robert Ross’s account of conditions at
Chentex, a Nicaraguan garment firm subcontracted by the retail chain stores J. C. Penny,
Kmart, Wal-Mart, and Khol’s is, sadly, typical of this form of labour:
Though the smallest of the four retail chains with major orders at Chentex, Kohl’s
had a 1999 revenue stream of $4.6 billion ($6.1 billion in 2000)—more than double
Nicaragua’s 1999 and 2000 GDP. . .
Chentex workers earn less than 1 percent of the retail price of the jeans they
stitch—between thirty and forty cents an hour. This compares to the 10 percent
typical of the global north and the 5 percent ratio in U.S. sweatshops.
When we visit the workers’ homes we can see the result. . . we meet a woman,
Cristina, who was fired from Chentex, unjustly she thinks, for low production.
Her sister, who lives across town, was fired for being a union member. Christina’s
home is a wooden frame, ten-feet square, hung with plastic sheeting for two of the
walls and with cardboard boxes that once held shirts shipped from the freezone
in Panama for the rest. Her shack has a dirt floor and holds one large bed and
(barely) two chairs for herself, her husband, and their baby. Her toilet is a hole
in the ground. . . Her husband works seven days a week at another of the free zone
plants, but even with his overtime pay they can only afford this bare shelter.6
Christina’s living and working conditions are appalling, her wages (when she was em-
ployed) would not have exceeded $30 per week. Unionisation succeeded for Chentex workers,
but when the union attempted wage negotiations and ordered a one hour work stoppage,
union members were fired and union leaders faced criminal charges.7 Stories like the Chen-
tex case are common, and are familiar, in fact, to many people in developed countries that
purchase the clothes produced in the sweatshops.
Yet, workers in the garment industry, employed (indirectly or directly) by foreign firms,
often receive pay that exceeds wages offered in other industries. Ross notes that per capita
income in Nicaragua “is about $470 annually,” but garment workers can earn nearly twice
5In most cases, companies hire local production companies, which in turn, hire the labourers, thus granting
the contracting companies a degree of plausible deniability about labour conditions and pay.
6Ross (2004, pp.116–18)
7Ross (2004, p.118)
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as much.8 For this reason, “the paychecks of the free trade zone factories, now received
by about thirty-five thousand workers, are highly valued—even when they are earned under
sweatshop conditions.”9 Not only do these workers earn more than their compatriots, they
also freely choose (indeed compete) to work in sweatshop conditions. Further, far from seeing
sweatshops as moral failures, some argue that they are a mechanism for moving people
in developing countries out of poverty by allowing developing economies to exercise their
competitive advantage. Writing in the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof argues that “the
central challenge in the poorest countries is not that sweatshops exploit too many people,
but that they don’t exploit enough.”10
1.2.1 The Ethics of Exploitation
In evaluating the ethics of sweatshops and exploitation, one must be careful to distinguish
between the two closely related issues conflated in the brief discussion above. One concerns
the general role sweatshops play in the structure of global poverty. The second concerns the
morality of the specific transfer of labour for wages. Sweatshops, if they are wrong, may
be so in part because they are exploitative. But this does not mean that the subsequent
evaluation of the exploitative element of sweatshop labour is itself to be evaluated by the
relative merits or demerits of sweatshop labour in particular. The two considerations coincide
only in act utilitarianism, for here the morality of the specific transaction is judged based on
the consequences of that action for overall utility.11 For others, however, there is an important
distinction to be made between what Alan Wertheimer has called the moral weight and moral
force of exploitation.12 Questions about the moral weight of exploitation concern whether
it is wrong, and if wrong, whether it is “seriously wrong.”13 Questions about the moral
force of exploitation, Wertheimer claims, are legislative and concern whether we ought to
prohibit exploitative transactions, enforce exploitative contracts, etc. But questions about
the moral force of exploitation, I suggest, go beyond the important legal concerns Wertheimer
highlights. For if exploitation is wrong, there are further questions about whether it ought
to be morally permissible if it, in fact, mitigates other, greater, forms of injustice. Thus,
applied to the particular case of sweatshop labour, we can see that whether a particular
transaction is exploitative is, in principle, a separate question from whether it ought to be
prohibited from either a moral or legal perspective.
1.2.2 Zwolinski’s Argument
Matt Zwolinski (2007) takes this distinction on board in his evaluation of sweatshop labour,
considering the moral issues internal to the labour transaction separately from the moral
force these conclusions have for the general debate about sweatshops. Since our discussion
concerns the paradox of exploitation, it is Zwolinski’s internal analysis that is of most interest.
Zwolinski notes that the wage agreements in sweatshops are “the product of workers’ consent”
8Ross (2004, p.114)
9Ross (2004, p.114)
10Kristof (2009, p.A35). See also, Maitland (1996)
11That is, if sweatshop wages, although demeaning or unfair for the individual laborer, are the best means
of development for an impoverished population, they cannot be impermissible, and provided it is the case
that exploitation is necessarily impermissible, then provided sweatshop wages lead to the greatest utility,
they cannot be exploitative. Of course, this is not to say that the act utilitarian is powerless to condemn
sweatshop wages. She can quite plausibly claim that, assuming decreasing marginal utility, a distribution
where labourers receive more than sweatshop wages maximises utility.
12Wertheimer (1996, p.278)
13Wertheimer (1996, p.279)
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and further, that sweatshops provide their workers with some benefit.14 Thus, he grants that
the first premise of the paradox is true of sweatshops.
Zwolinski considers and rejects one challenge to the non-worseness condition found in
Ruth Sample’s (2003) analysis of exploitation. For Sample, exploitation “involves interacting
with another being for the sake of advantage in a way that degrades or fails to respect the
inherent value in that being.”15 Thus, Sample advocates adding an additional sub-clause to
the non-worseness condition: it cannot be morally worse to transact than to not transact
provided the transaction is consensual, Pareto-improving, and does not degrade or fail to
respect the persons involved. But, Zwolinski counters, although the employers are “treating
their employees in some respects as means” by benefiting from their labour, he argues that
”such treatment is ubiquitous and generally untroubling.”16 True failures of respect occur
when people are used “without their free consent.”17 He concludes that “further argument
would be required to demonstrate that such agreements are degrading and disrespectful
even in those cases where they are freely consented to.”18 Thus, for Zwolinski, a necessary
condition for disrespect or degradation is a lack of consent.19
Zwolinski grants that certain extreme cases of sweatshop labour, in which actual or threat-
ened violence is present, are cases of exploitation. The difference in such cases, he claims, is
that they involve a violation of rights. Thus, Zwolinski does reject the simplistic formulation
of the non-worseness condition, implicitly arguing that we must add a rights violation condi-
tion. Nevertheless, he rejects the claim that the wage labour contract involved in sweatshops
involves such a rights violation: “Since. . . providing no monetary benefit does not violate
anyone’s rights, and since a contract whereby sweatshops agree to provide some benefit does
not in itself violate anyone’s rights, it follows that such contracts are not exploitative.”20 The
argument is condensed here, but the way in which ‘it follows’ is that since neither consent,
nor Pareto, nor rights are violated, Zwolinski’s modified version of non-worseness is satisfied.
And, since modified non-worseness is satisfied, the transaction cannot be impermissible. But,
since exploitation is impermissible by premise three of the paradox, Zwolinski concludes that
sweatshops (as a particular example of transaction φ) cannot be exploitative.
This conclusion seems odd. Sweatshops are, as I noted at the outset, paradigmatic cases
of exploitation—if anything is exploitative, it seems that sweatshops must be. In his work on
moral paradoxes, Saul Smilansky (2007) identifies a form of paradox he terms an ‘existential
paradox’. He writes,
Some cases of moral paradox disclose. . . that a segment of moral reality. . . is ab-
surd. In this sense the “existential paradox” is constructive: we do not need to
back track desperately and examine how we got to the conclusion, in order to
dispose of it, but on the contrary—the paradoxical result is a revelation of how
things are.21
14Zwolinski (2007, p.710–11)
15Sample (2003, p.57)
16Zwolinski (2007, p.710)
17Zwolinski (2007, p.710)
18Zwolinski (2007, pp.710)
19Shane Sandhoefner asks whether we can really say that a Nicaraguan working in a sweatshop is ‘freely
consenting’ to do so since their economic situation limits their freedom of choice. They consent to the job,
but this seems an empty sort of consent, insufficient to avoid exploitation. In one sense, it seems clear that
US companies are exploiting the fact that economies in certain poor countries are such that they can open
factories which pay workers very little and have sub-standard conditions. Here I can offer only a promissory
note in response: issues of consent and coercion are addressed in 5.3.3, while questions about the motivation
and classification of firms’ behaviour are addressed in section 7.3.1.
20Zwolinski (2007, p.711)
21Smilansky (2007, pp.4–5)
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In the end, it may turn out to be the case that we were mistaken to believe sweatshops,
in particular, were exploitative. This result would, indeed, be odd, for it would show that
we are wrong about one of our primary uses of ‘exploitation’. Yet, even if true, it does not
show that the concept itself is incoherent, for there may be other cases in which it can be
employed. And, of course, we needn’t draw Zwolinski’s conclusion from the paradox. We
might, for example, wish to argue that, despite appearances, sweatshop contracts are not
consensual. Or we may wish to further amend or reject the non-worseness condition. And
finally—although perhaps more revisionary than Zwolinski’s conclusion—we may wish to
reject the idea that exploitation is wrongful or impermissible.
1.3 Chapter 1 Summary and Thesis Outlook
My interest in Zwolinski’s argument lies not in his particular conclusion about sweatshops,
but rather in the way his argument engages with the paradox of exploitation. He rejects
the simple formulation of the non-worseness condition, arguing that exploitation is possible
if there are rights violations. But, he argues, since there are no rights violations in most
cases of sweatshop labour, these cannot be cases of exploitation. As I noted, there are other
ways of dealing with the paradox. Various theories of exploitation, can be grouped—at least
broadly—by the reasons they give for rejecting the third premise of the paradox. In the
first part of the thesis, I present three main approaches to exploitation, framing each as
a particular solution to the paradox. In chapter 2 I present Hillel Steiner’s (1984; 1987;
2010) classical liberal account of exploitation that is centred on the notion of property rights
violations. Chapter 3 features Marxist accounts of exploitation, and in particular, John
Roemer’s (1982a; 1982b; 1986) analytical Marxist theories of exploitation. In chapter 4 I
consider two related approaches to exploitation that share the common theme of being duty-
or respect-based: Ruth Sample’s (2003) theory that grounds exploitation in degradation and
Robert Goodin’s (1987; 1986) vulnerability-based model.
In the second part of the thesis I outline my own account of exploitation, drawing on
the lessons learned from the first four chapters. In chapter 5 I argue that in order to avoid
problems encountered in Sample’s and Goodin’s non-juridical accounts, exploitation must,
as Roemer and Steiner claim, be a form of injustice. Yet Steiner and Roemer’s character-
isation of exploitation as merely a matter of maldistribution is insufficient to distinguish
exploitation from unfair transactions. Thus, I also argue that exploitation must involve an
element of ‘taking advantage’. In chapter 6 refine the account of exploitation developed in
the previous chapter and consider many forms of unjust transaction. There I argue that only
one particular form should be labelled exploitation, and consider the relationships that exist
between exploitation and other forms of unjust transaction.
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Chapter 2
Rights-Based Exploitation
2.1 Chapter 2 Introduction
In a series of articles, Hillel Steiner (1984; 1987; 2010) has presented and defended a lib-
eral theory of exploitation, aiming to explain the “core characteristic of the concept of ex-
ploitation” within “classical liberalism’s psychologically and sociologically ‘thin’ framework
of discourse.”1 He interprets classical liberalism as a morally minimalistic framework with
“one or a very few basic moral principles” that imply a set of rights, “to be construed as
property rights.”2 These rights imply a “ ‘historical entitlement’ conception of just titles.”3
Further, the framework eschews “any conception of objective value or human needs, [is] ag-
nostic as between different tastes and preferences. . . [and] commits itself only to the primacy
of personal rights and liberties and to individual choice.”4 What emerges from these quotes
is an interpretation of classical liberalism that is synonymous with libertarianism, broadly
construed. Of course, both the extension of property rights and principles of appropriation
vary under different forms of libertarianism and, since Steiner’s account of exploitation is
grounded in property right violations, the extension of his theory will depend on the specifi-
cation of the “classical liberal” (hereafter libertarian) framework, in particular, on the scope
of property rights within a given libertarian framework.
Steiner’s stated goal is to make sense of the core characteristic of exploitation, which, he
claims, is a “mutually self-interested, consensual exchange in which what one party trans-
fers is—but need not have been—of greater value than what is received in return.”5 The
account is limited to mutually advantageous consensual cases of exploitation as a matter of
convention. Thus, he assumes the conditions stipulated in the first premise of the paradox
of exploitation obtain. Like Zwolinski, Steiner modifies the non-worseness condition to in-
clude a provision for property rights: a property rights violation is a necessary condition for
Steinerian exploitation.
Thus, both Steiner and Zwolinski resolve the paradox of exploitation with the inclusion
of a third conjunct in the non-worseness condition.6 For both, consensual, Pareto-improving
transactions can be morally worse than a failure to transact when rights violations are
involved. However, unlike Zwolinski, Steiner would defend the claim that—at least in many
1Steiner (1987, p.132)
2Steiner (1987, p.132)
3Steiner (1987, p.133)
4Steiner (1984, p.225)
5Steiner (1987, p.132)
6Note that for the libertarian, rejecting the non-worseness condition with the addition of a rights disjunc-
tion is one of only a few options for resolving the paradox. The libertarian cannot, for example, appeal (as
Ruth Sample and Marx do) to an objective value theory in order to reject non-worseness.
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cases—sweatshop labour is exploitative.
In this chapter I consider Steiner’s solution to the paradox of exploitation. Section 2.2
outlines Steiner’s original account of exploitation and my modified version that addresses a
problem with the counterfactual that underpins his account. Here I also show why Steiner
would disagree with Zwolinski’s conclusion that sweatshops are not exploitative. Sections
2.3 and 2.4 outline two further problems for Steiner’s account. The first addresses a tension
between unintentional exploitation and moral responsibility that arises in Steiner’s framework
and the second highlights two ways in which the scope of Steinerian exploitation is wider
than our ordinary use of the concept.
2.2 Steinerian Exploitation
Steiner’s theory can be stated as set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that char-
acterise it within a libertarian framework where the only moral considerations are a respect
for property rights.7
2.2.1 Steiner’s Conditions
In his (1987) paper, Steiner presents the following case:
C1: Steiner’s case.
Consider an auction. B wishes to sell her right in X, and A and C each wish
to purchase it. C bids but A outbids him and, so, gets X. Two conditions are
required for this transaction to be a stark-budget liberalism exploitation. One
is that C would have outbid A. The other is that the reason why C did not
outbid A is that someone’s rights have been previously violated. And the result
is that B gets less than she would have received for X and is, to that extent,
exploited by A.”8
When this case is combined with Steiner’s claim that the core characteristic of exploitation
is a “mutually self-interested, consensual exchange in which what one party transfers is—but
need not have been—of greater value than what is received in return”, we can isolate the
following conditions for Steinerian exploitation.9 A exploits B in the bilateral and voluntary
transaction10 φ just in case:
(S1) There exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in a history of
exchanges leading to the transaction,
(S2) there is a counterfactual transaction, ψ, between A and B in which the violation is not
present,
(S3) B values ψ over φ,
(S4) A values φ over ψ.
7As we saw, libertarianism admits “one or very few basic principles” based on property rights (Steiner,
1987, p.132, emphasis added). While various nonstandard forms of ‘libertarianism’ might plausibly include
other moral principles, I will limit my analysis to an interpretation of the framework that includes only
property rights for two reasons: first, although Steiner’s “very few” might be taken to imply the existence
of other principles in the framework, his theory relies only on property rights; second, it is interesting to see
the extension of a theory of exploitation based only on property rights.
9Steiner (1987, p.132)
10Explicitly stated here, these domain conditions are assumed throughout the remainder of the thesis,
unless otherwise stated.
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The antecedent property rights violation (S1) means that B receives less (S3) and A more
(S4) than each would have in another transaction ψ that is identical to φ, save for the absence
of the rights violation (S2).
Steiner arrives at this characterisation by considering the properties that distinguish
exploitation from four other forms of transfer: exchange, theft, benefit, and donation. Unlike
unilateral transfers such as theft or donation, exploitation is a bilateral transfer—it involves
goods moving in both directions. And unlike theft, exploitation is a voluntary transfer.11
Thus, exploitations are members of the set of voluntary, bilateral transfers.
It remains to distinguish exploitation from benefit and exchange. Steiner argues that
while exchanges are ‘equal’ transfers, exploitation is a form of unequal transfer. The equali-
sandum here is not immediately clear, which is an obscurity that has created some confusion.
David Miller has argued that if what is equalised is the “standard” or “objective” value of the
items, then Steiner’s theory will be inconsistent with its underlying libertarian framework,
which presupposes a subjective approach to value.12 While Miller’s observation is true, it is
false that the equalisandum for Steiner is some form of objective value. Rather, exploitation
occurs when the subjective values involved in the transfer in the actual world are not equal to
the subjective values attached to a transfer in the possible world where no rights violations
occur. The distinction between exchange and exploitation introduces the core characteristic
of Steiner’s theory: property rights violations. Since property rights form the basis for lib-
ertarianism’s moral principles, it is no great surprise that, on Steiner’s account, exploitative
transfers require property rights violations. After all, an account of exploitation’s wrongness
must follow from the normative considerations of the framework in which it is embedded.
Thus, in addition to the voluntary and bilateral domain conditions, we can add two condi-
tions to distinguish exploitation from exchange: (S1) there is an unrectified property rights
violation in the history of exchanges leading to the transfer that causes one party of the
transfer to receive less than they would have from a transfer where no rights violation occurs
(S2).
Finally, we require a distinction between benefit and exploitation. Steiner argues that
the distinction here lies in a “difference in their counterfactual presuppositions,” claiming
that “a benefit is a bilateral transfer of unequally valued items such that the possessor of
the higher-valued item would not voluntarily make the transfer if the items to be transferred
were of equal [subjective] value. An exploitation. . . is a bilateral transfer of unequally valued
items such that the possessors of both items would voluntarily make the transfer if the items
to be transferred were of equal [subjective] value.”13 Thus, in the case of exploitation, in
the possible world where there is no rights violation, the transfer still lies on the contract
curve, while in the case of benefit, if the beneficiary’s contribution increases to match the
benefactor’s subjective valuation of the token gift, the transfer will not occur. As an example,
consider a benefit dinner where seats can be obtained for $1000. The diners do not (presum-
ably) value the meal at $1000; rather, they place that value on the combination of the value
of the meal plus the donation they make. If the quality of the meal were increased so that
the diners valued the meal alone at $1000, they would not make the transfer, provided their
goal was to enjoy the diner and make a donation.However, this way of distinguishing benefits
from exploitations encounters problems. Some transfers may come about only because of a
past rights violation. Consider the following case.
11At least when we restrict our analysis to mutually advantageous exploitation.
12Miller (1987, p.152)
13Steiner (1984, p.227)
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C2: The trust funder.
B owns an investment that pays her a dividend of $100,000 per annum, an
amount that allows her to realise a fairly comfortable standard of living. B
values her leisure time, but is not opposed to work. Given the dividend, B is
willing to work only if she can secure a salary greater than $40,000. However, no
such jobs are available, so B is unemployed. One day C steals B’s investment,
putting an end to her dividend. Having lost her income, B must now find work.
The only job she can secure is to work for A. Although A usually pays employees
in B’s position $30,000, knowing that B needs a job and that the next best job
B could obtain pays less than $20,000, A pays B only $20,000.
Here is a case where B is worse off, and A better off than either would have been because
of a rights violation. But, importantly, there is no person with whom B could have transacted
in absence of that rights violation that would have paid her more than the $20,000 that she
receives from A. Now, we might want to claim that since no such counterfactual transaction
exists the case cannot be an instance of exploitation. But it seems that the case does
embody the elements of exploitation Steiner’s theory is attempting to capture. We have here
a voluntary, bilateral transaction in which what one party gains from the transaction is less
than they ought to have and what the other party gains is greater because of an antecedent
rights violation.14
If Steiner accepts that ‘the trust funder’ is a case of exploitation that his theory is trying
to capture, then it cannot be the case that the distinction between exploitation and benefit
lies in their counterfactual presuppositions in the way he claims. Stopping to reflect on this
counterfactual failure shows it to be a problem for the distinction Steiner draws between
exchanges and exploitation as well. Here we saw that exploitation can be distinguished
from exchange because in the case of exploitation, a property rights violation leaves someone
accepting a transaction in which they receive less than they would have from a transaction in
absence of the property rights violation. Yet, here again there may be no such transaction;
the rights violation may bring about the need to transact.
The problem arises because benefits are, in fact, complex transfers. Although Steiner
notes that benefits are a “more complex type of transfer,” he, nevertheless, seems to treat
them as a primitive (non-decomposable) form of transfer, stating only that “there is one
clear sense in which the type of transfer involved here is an exchange, and another in which
it is a donation. It is not a typical donation because, so to speak, there are items traveling
in both directions.”15 But benefits are not “in one sense” like exchanges and in another
like donations; they are quite literally complex transfers composed of a donation and an
exchange. Consider again the person who pays $1000 for a plate at a charity dinner. The
transaction can be straightforwardly decomposed into (for example) an exchange of $30 for a
meal and a donation $970 to the charity. That is, it seems clear that when asked how much
he donated, the businessman would consider how much he thought the meal was worth and
report a figure that deducted this amount from the $1000. Taking the claim that benefits are
complex transfers seriously means that we need only distinguish exploitation from donation
14One response to the trust funder case is that the reason it is exploitative is that A could have paid B
more, but altered her price in light of her unjust disadvantage. I address such cases in section 5.2. Although
I do not think A’s change of salary is a necessary condition for exploitaition, if it was a necessary condition
Steiner’s approach would still face a problem, for conditions S1–S4 make no reference to A’s ability to pay
more or his alteration of price upon learning of B’s need. And, more importantly, even if a ‘price changing’
condition were added, the counterfactual would still need to be generalised in order to capture cases where
the transaction between A and B would not have occurred but for a rights violation.
15Steiner (1984, p.226)
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and exchange. If benefits are complex transactions comprising exchanges and donations, then
distinguishing exploitation from both exchanges and donations suffices to distinguish it from
benefits as well. If exploitation is not a member of the set of donation transactions, nor an
element of the set of exchange transactions, then it cannot be in the intersection of these two
sets either. The counterfactual problem concerns the distinction between exploitation and
exchange. It arises in the benefit case only because benefits include an exchange transaction.
So, although this discussion achieves our original goal of distinguishing exploitation from
benefit, it has also caused a bit of backtracking for we must revisit the distinction between
exploitation and exchange.
What we require is a currency for the counterfactual that is not affected by the removal
of the rights violation. We cannot use another transaction as a baseline because, as we saw,
some transactions occur only because of antecedent rights violations. However, we can use
the preferences of the parties involved in the transaction. As Steiner notes, the subjective
conception of value “takes each person’s actual preference ordering as given”. Therefore, a
presupposition of Steiner’s framework is that preferences cannot be counterfactualised.16
2.2.2 Revised Conditions
Prior to the rights violation, B might have had the following preference order among the
following alternatives: 〈 $40,000 and dividend; leisure and dividend; $30,000 and dividend;
$20,000 and dividend; $40,000; $30,000; $20,000; leisure (unemployment) 〉. The rights
violation eliminates those options that include the payment of the dividend, thus it is only
the rights violation that puts B in a position where working for A is preferable to leisure.
After the rights violation, B’s most preferred feasible element is taking the job for $20,000,
but before the violation her most preferred feasible element was ‘leisure and dividend’. In
both cases, the full preference order remains the same, but the rights violation makes some
previously feasible elements unfeasible; it is this sense in which B is ‘worse off’ in the trust
funder case. So, exploitation is an unequal transfer in the following sense: the degree to
which the agents’ preferences are satisfied post-rights violation is not equal to the degree
to which they would have been satisfied had the property rights violation not occurred. In
other words, A exploits B in the bilateral and voluntary transaction φ just in case:
(1) there exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in the history of
exchanges leading to φ that
(2) makes at least one element of B’s original (and finite) feasible set, γB , unfeasible,
leaving her with a new feasible set, δB (where δB ( γB),
(3) B prefers the unfeasible option in γ to her most preferred option in δ,
(4) A’s egoistic preferences:
(a) are better satisfied in φ because γ is restricted to δ,
(b) and if (1)–(3) also hold for A, then the positive change in the degree of satisfaction
of A’s preferences, given (1)–(3) hold for B, is strictly greater than any positive
change in the degree of satisfaction of B’s preferences, given (1)–(3) hold for A.
16Steiner (1987, p.137). The liberal may want to distinguish between an agent’s ‘true’ preferences and her
‘adaptive’ or post-rights violation preferences, by for example taking ‘meta-preferences’—preferences over
preference orderings—as given.
21
Although the nature of the conditions is similar to Steiner’s original conditions—(1) is a
rights violation condition, (2) a counterfactual condition, (3) a loss17 condition and (4) a
gain condition—the revised conditions alter the currency of the counterfactual, making it
‘degree of preference satisfaction’ rather than ‘transaction’.
Condition (1), which remains unchanged, makes exploitation an injustice within a lib-
ertarian framework since it involves the violation of one of the basic moral principles of
the libertarian framework; (2) and (3) serve to distinguish exploitation from exchange and
capture the intuition that exploitation makes people worse off than they might have been.
Condition (4), which captures Steiner’s claim that what B transfers to A is “of greater value
than what is received in return,” requires a little more clarification.18
Condition (4a) requires that A does better—his egoistic preferences better satisfied than
they would have been—because of the rights violation and that this gain occurs ‘in the right
way’. The move to ‘degree of preference satisfaction’ opens the door to gains from rights
violations not typically associated with exploitation.19 For example, when the only benefit
A receives from a past rights violation affecting B is the satisfaction of his preference that
he transact with the victim of a rights violation in such a way that they lose (relative to a
no rights-violation baseline), we would not ordinarily say that when A gains sadistically he
exploits B. There is certainly something odd—perhaps even morally amiss—about his prefer-
ences, but he does not exploit. Condition 4a requires that A gain from the transacdtion and
that his gain excludes all non-self-interested preferences. Condition (4b) rules out those cases
in which both A and B are victims of a rights violation and each are equally disadvantaged
by the violation.
The following example will help to clarify these conditions.20
C3: The car auction.
Suppose B wants to sell her car at an auction that includes, among others,
the potential buyers A and C. B’s (selling) reserve price is $500, A’s (buying)
reserve price is $800, and C’s is $1000. As it happens, A and C have the highest
two reserve prices at the auction. The auction begins, with bids accepted at $10
intervals. When C bids, he discovers his wallet has been stolen. Consequently,
A outbids C and wins the car for $600 (which is at least $10 greater than the
third highest reserve price at the auction). Had C been able to bid, the car
would have sold for at least $810, but the rights violation that left C without a
wallet also meant that B received only $600 for her car.21
In this example, B is exploited by A because of a violation of C’s property rights. This
rights violation satisfies condition (1). Assuming that all participants prefer more money
to less, the fact that the payment B receives from A is less than she would have received
from C, had C not been robbed, satisfies conditions (2) and (3), and the fact that A gets
the car at all (or pays less than he would have had to had he wanted to win the car when C
was present) satisfies (4). Finally, the transfer is bilateral and nothing in the case indicates
that it was anything other than voluntary, so the domain is that of a voluntary and bilateral
transaction.
17Loss relative to a non-exploitative baseline.
18Steiner (1987, p.132). Alan Wertheimer also defends a gain condition, arguing “A does not actually
exploit B unless A gains from the interaction, even if A seeks to gain from the transaction. We can distinguish
between the claim that A exploits B and the claim that A acts exploitatively towards B. (Wertheimer, 1996,
p.209).
19Thanks to Orri Stefa´nsson for pointing this out to me.
20This case is adapted from Steiner (1987).
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2.2.3 Rights and Exploitation
Above I claimed Steiner would disagree with Zwolinski’s conclusion that sweatshops are
not exploitative. According to both, rights violations can generate exploitation. The non-
worseness condition tells us that it cannot be worse to transact than to not transact provided
the transaction is consensual, Pareto-improving and—Zwolinski and Steiner add—the trans-
action does not violate anyone’s rights. So, their disagreement over whether sweatshops are
exploitative must be a disagreement about what constitutes a rights violation. An exami-
nation of this disagreement is instructive, for the scope of Steiner’s theory of exploitation is
dependent on what it is that we take a (property) rights violation to be. Conditions (1)–(3)
provide the core content of the theory, grounding exploitation on a framework of property
rights, specifically those property rights violations that restrict the feasible elements of one
party’s choice set. Thus, the extension of Steinerian exploitation depends on the scope of the
underlying theory of rights. The greater the scope of rights, the greater the scope of rights
violations and, thus, the greater the scope of exploitation.
Zwolinski’s argument that there is no rights violation, and thus no exploitation, in the
particular case of sweatshop labour is the following:
Z1 If providing no benefit to the poor does not violate their rights, then providing some
benefit to the poor does not violate their rights. (Premise)
Z2 Providing no benefit to the poor does not violate their rights. (Premise)
Z3 Contracts for sweatshop work provide some net benefit. (Premise)
Z4 A necessary condition for exploitation is the existence of a rights violation. (Premise)
Z5 Providing some benefit to the poor does not violate their rights (From Z1, Z2)
Z6 Since contracts for sweatshop work provide a benefit, they do not violate workers’
rights. (From Z3, Z5)
C Sweatshop contracts are not exploitative. (From Z4, Z6)
The argument is valid, but I will argue that it is not sound. Some libertarians might
want to challenge the second premise on grounds that (for example) the poverty in devel-
oping countries is a result of the over-appropriation of individuals in wealthier countries;
however, here we can grant Zwolinski this premise, along with premises three and four. The
deeper problem lies with premise one. Steiner’s theory of exploitation can be seen as a re-
sponse to those arguments against libertarian theories of exploitation that depend on premise
one. On a historical entitlement theory of just titles, contracts where sweatshops provide
beneficial wages can be seen as a form of rights violation when they fail to satisfy principles
of rectification of injustice. If a worker is disadvantaged by past property rights violations,
then contracting with workers for wages lower than they would have accepted without these
violations does violate their rights and, therefore, is exploitation. Not only do workers have
a right to the property that was lost in the earlier violation, they also have a right to the
greater advantage this property would have afforded them. The rights-based approach to
exploitation employed by both Steiner and Zwolinski embodies a historical principle of jus-
tice which “creates differential entitlements or differential deserts to things.”22 In the case
22Nozick (1974, p.155)
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of sweatshops, employers are under a correlative obligation to honour the worker’s rights to
more favourable contracts, provided these workers are in a worse position because of previ-
ous rights violations. Transactions that give the worker less than she would have received
had the rights violation(s) not occurred (but more than under the current status quo) are
exploitative. Note that this treatment does not mean that sweatshop contracts are neces-
sarily exploitative. Labelling a sweatshop contract exploitative depends on the existence of
antecedent rights violations. If workers’ weak bargaining positions are not due to past rights
violations, then sweatshop contracts are not exploitative. One may argue that those who
work in sweatshops have not been the victims of past rights violations; in this case, they are
not exploited. However, the reason they are not exploited is not because providing a benefit
cannot represent a rights violation; rather, they are not exploited because the absence of
any past rights violation means they are not entitled to higher wages. Thus, in one sense
Steiner and Zwolinski can agree: Pareto optimal and consensual transactions that still leave
one party impoverished are not necessarily exploitative, but Steiner points out that this is
not because small benefits cannot be rights violations.
Zwolinski’s premise appears appealing only because it failures to compare the transaction
to the appropriate baseline transaction where property rights have not been violated. The
rhetorical thrust of Zwolinski’s arguments for premise one invites us to imagine scenarios like
the following: B’s house has been destroyed by lightning. If it is not wrong for A to ignore
B’s plight, then surely it is not wrong for A to help B. We are much more willing to accept
premise one when framed in this context than we are in the following: B would have only
sold her family heirloom to A for $10,000, but since her home has been destroyed by arson
(a rights violation committed by someone other than A), she is willing (or forced) to sell it
to A for $100. Of course B still receives some benefit when she sells the heirloom to A in the
second case—if it were, all things considered, worse for B to sell the heirloom, then B would
not sell it. The second scenario is a case where A takes advantage of a rights violation to
increase his gains from the transfer. Using the baseline of what B is entitled to, we see that
A’s ‘benefit’ is no benefit at all. Even if B is desperate for the $100, she has a right (but
lacks the power) to claim much more.
So, while Steiner and Zwolinski agree that a necessary condition for exploitation is the
violation of a (property) right, they disagree about when rights violations entitle persons to
a claim on greater benefits in exchange. The above analysis shows that, contra Zwolinski, on
an entitlement theory, persons do have a claim to greater benefits when they are the victims
of rights violations because principles of justice in holdings require past rights violations
to be rectified. However, although this analysis explains why persons can be said to be
exploited when they are the victims of rights violations, it does not explain which actions
can be classified as a property rights violations.
2.2.4 The Scope of Rights
Steiner’s theory is situated as a general libertarian theory. He does not fully specify the
libertarian framework underlying his theory, but offers an analysis of exploitation within the
historical entitlement framework that is amenable to many forms of libertarianism. All forms
of libertarianism include a robust right to self-ownership23 along with some form of ownership
23Most libertarians endorse full rights to self-ownership. However Otsuka’s formulation is a notable ex-
ception since his form of self-ownership includes “robust and stringent rights of control” rather that full
self-ownership (Otsuka, 2003, p.2).
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rights in artefacts and natural resources.24 Additionally, as we’ve seen, libertarian approaches
include principles of just transfer and principles of rectification. Although the forms of these
principles vary, it is the principle of acquisition that serves to most sharply differentiate
the scope of property rights under each framework. Approaches to appropriation can be
distinguished according to whether the appropriation requires consent or can be unilateral,
if unilateral, whether there are limits on appropriation, and if the appropriation is limited,
whether these limits include a tax on the benefits of appropriation.
Perhaps the best-known libertarian framework is Robert Nozick’s (1974) form of right-
libertarianism, but there are a number of left-libertarian frameworks, including both Michael
Otsuka’s (2003) approach and Steiner’s (1994) own account. Each of these three frameworks
employs a different principle of appropriation, resulting in variations in the scope of property
rights and, consequently, variations in the scope of Steinerian exploitation. A consideration of
the differences between Nozick’s right-libertarianism and Steiner’s left-libertarianism shows
how the extension of Steinerian exploitation depends on the principle of appropriation and
scope of property rights employed in the underlying libertarian framework.
Under Nozick’s form of libertarianism, natural resources are assumed unowned and uni-
lateral appropriation is permissible, but limited, with no taxation on the benefits of appro-
priation. Individuals may freely appropriate until the position of those “no longer at liberty
to use the thing is thereby worsened25. . . [but this proviso] does not include the worsening
due to more limited opportunities to appropriate. . . and it does not include how I ‘worsen’
a seller’s position if I appropriate materials to make some of what he is selling and then
enter into competition with him.”26 Additionally, an individual may appropriate beyond the
point where others are worsened, provided “he compensates the others so that their situation
is not thereby worsened.”27 Thus, Nozick’s theory allows for the appropriation of natural
resources, provided others are compensated for any direct negative impact the appropriation
has on their situation, but does not require appropriators to neutralise the benefits they reap
from appropriation.
Steiner’s libertarianism, like Nozick’s, allows for limited unilateral appropriation without
taxation of benefit; however, he places greater limits on appropriation in the following four
ways. First, he argues that appropriators must compensate those who have not appropriated
by paying the value at which the goods would trade in a competitive market rather than an
amount that merely brings others back to their original pre-appropriation state. Second, like
all left-libertarians, Steiner argues that, prior to appropriation, natural resources are owned
by all. Third, once appropriated, these resources remain appropriated only while the agent is
alive, returning to egalitarian ownership upon the agent’s death.28 Finally, Steiner expands
the set of appropriable resources to include ‘germ line genetic material.’ This expansion of the
concept of property, coupled with egalitarian ownership and stronger limits on appropriation,
increases the scope of Steinerian exploitation. A consequence of Steiner’s approach is that
those who inherit “golden genes” must contribute the market value of their talent differential
to a social fund, to be distributed amongst the (relatively) genetically less well-endowed.29
24Following Peter Vallentyne, I take these to be “produced non-agent resources such as buildings” and
“unproduced, non-agent resources such as unproduced land” respectively (Vallentyne and Steiner, 2000, p.5)
25While what is meant by worsened depends on a number of details—the interpretation of the baseline,
the approach to welfare, the scope of welfare, etc., these details need not detain us here.
26Nozick (1974, p.178)
27Nozick (1974, p.178)
28Steiner argues that since the dead have no rights, rights to bequest are not morally valid (but may still
be honored for practical reasons) (Steiner, 1994, ch7, §c).
29Steiner (1999)
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In general, since restrictions on appropriations are more stringent in Steiner’s framework,
the set of actions that can qualify as property rights violations is larger than in Nozick’s
framework. Since property rights violations are a necessary condition for Steinerian ex-
ploitation, the extension of Steinerian exploitation under Steiner’s left-libertarian framework
is greater than the extension of Steinerian exploitation under Nozick’s framework. Not only
can the actions of others make one worse off, but by including germ-line genetic informa-
tion in the set of appropriable goods, Steiner’s framework cordons off a portion of natural
events that can be treated in the same way as the actions of others. Practically speaking,
under Steiner’s framework the extension of Steinerian exploitation is increased to cover cases
involving individuals who are disadvantaged due to disabilities issuing from relatively poor
genetic endowments.30
Finally, note that if the rights underpinning Steiner’s model are not construed as property
rights, but rather rights of a more general form, the account may be extended to a broader
range of theories of justice (e.g. Rawls (1971)). However, it should be noted that Steiner’s
commitment to property rights is based on more than his motivation to show that even classic
liberals must be concerned with exploitation. In Steiner (1977) he shows that “any possible
set of rights contains a set of titles to objects.”31 Sets of non-title-based rights—“action-
based rights”—cannot always be mutually satisfied, they are not “compossible” because
“there is no reason why two persons’ actions, each of which is informed by certain kinds
of permissible purpose, cannot have at least one identical physical component in common.
Thus it is logically possible for one person’s exercise of his rights to interfere with another’s
exercise of his rights within the same such set.”32 However, sets of title-based (property)
rights are always mutually satisfiable. The compossibility of property rights give us a reason
to prefer theories of justice based on property rights rather than action-based rights.
I have characterised Steiner’s original account of exploitation, offered revised conditions
that allow the original account to capture the ‘trust funder’ case, shown how, contra Zwolin-
ski, small benefits may nevertheless be rights violations, and considered variations in the
extension of Steinerian exploitation. I will turn, in the following two sections, to two prob-
lems for Steiner’s account.
2.3 The Problem of Moral Responsibility
According to (my generalised form of) Steiner’s account of exploitation, A exploits B iff: (1)–
(4) are satisfied. And, as we’ve just seen, the scope of this account depends upon the scope
of property rights: when the scope of property rights is wide, many actions will count as a
property rights violation and when the scope of those actions that can generate exploitation—
property rights violations—is wide, the scope of exploitation is wide as well. But note that
Steiner’s account says nothing about the potential exploiter’s epistemic status with respect
to the rights violation; A may not know that B has suffered from a rights violation. The
following section addresses a tension that arises between the claim that exploitation is a
negatively moralised concept and the existence of unintentional exploitation.
30To be disabled in this framework means that the market value of an individual’s skills is below the mean
value for society. Thus, the concept is relative to the value society places on one’s skills. Further, it includes
the total bundle of genetically endowed skills and talents: e.g., blind geniuses may not be disabled in the
present sense if the positive market value of their mental abilities outweighs the negative value of blindness.
31Steiner (1977, p.770)
32Steiner (1977, p.771)
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2.3.1 Unintentional Exploitation
Consider the following variation on the original car auction case:
C4: The revised car auction.
As before, B is selling her car at a large auction and C would have purchased
it for at least $810. And because C’s wallet is stolen, A purchases the car
for $600. Here, however, we can add the following details: C’s wallet is pick-
pocketed by a passer-by, D, while C is on his way into the auction. Further, D
has no knowledge of the auction, or of individuals A and B, and only knows C as
the victim of his pick-pocketing. C does not realise he has been pick-pocketed.
When the auction begins, C and many others bid against A for the car, but while
bidding, C checks his pocket and discovers his wallet is missing. He immediately
leaves to contact the police. Meanwhile, unaware of C’s departure, A continues
bidding and wins the car.
In this revised case, four parties are involved: A, B, C, and D. On Steiner’s theory of
exploitation, the analysis of the case remains the same as in the original car auction case: A
exploits B and C’s rights are violated by D. However, in the revised case, it becomes clear
that A doesn’t need to know that C’s rights were violated by D in order to be considered
an exploiter. In fact, here A is non-culpably ignorant of C’s past rights violation, yet A’s
purchase of the car still satisfies conditions (1)–(4). The possibility of cases of exploitation
involving three or more individuals makes room for situations in which an individual may
be a non-culpably ignorant exploiter, that is, the revised car auction shows that Steinerian
exploitation allows for non-culpably ignorant exploitation.
And if ignorant exploitation is possible, so is unintentional exploitation. In the revised
car auction, A does not know he exploits B. If A does not know he exploits B, then A cannot
intend to exploit B by this transaction. Similarly, while we may assume that D knows that
it is a violation of C’s rights to steal his wallet, D does not know of either the auction or the
existence of individuals A and B. This knowledge is necessary for D to form the belief that
the characterising conditions (1)–(4) obtain. It follows that D cannot know that his theft
of C’s wallet will lead to A’s exploiting B. Lacking this knowledge, D cannot intend that A
exploits B. However, since the characterising conditions remain satisfied, it is still the case
that A exploits B on Steiner’s theory, even if the exploitation is intended by neither A or D.
In short, since on any plausible approach to intentional action, knowledge of the action is
necessary on the part of the agent, and in the revised case both A and D have no knowledge
about the conditions surrounding the transaction, we can conclude that Steiner’s theory also
allows for unintentional exploitation.
2.3.2 The Problem
We might dismiss this feature of the theory as a mere oddity, if not for the fact that Steiner
also purports to give a negativelymoralised account of exploitation. There is an apparent
tension between the existence of unintentional exploitation and the claim that exploitation is
a negatively moralised concept. That unintentional exploitation may occur within Steiner’s
theory is not particularly surprising: the ‘disconnect’ between rights violator and exploiter
ensures that cases (like the revised car auction) where the latter is unaware of a rights
violation are fairly easy to generate. While the intuitive sense that there is a tension between
these two features is fairly strong, the following presentation makes the inconsistency explicit.
P1 Steiner’s theory permits non-culpably (¬Cu) unintentional (¬In) exploitation (Ex).
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P2 On Steiner’s theory, exploitation is a negatively moralised concept, which means if
exploitation occurs, then it is wrong (Wr).
P3 If an action is wrong, then there is at least one person who is morally responsible (Rs)
for the action.
P4 If a person is morally responsible for an action they performed, then they acted either
intentionally or from culpable ignorance.
But since the persons (A and D in the revised case) were non-culpably ignorant of the
fact that exploitation occurred, they could not be described as intentional exploiters. If
they acted neither intentionally nor in culpable ignorance, then they could not have been
morally responsible for the exploitation. But if exploitation is a negatively moralised concept,
someone must have been morally responsible.33
Clearly, these four premises generate a contradiction. If we think that unintentional and
ignorant exploitation seems counterintuitive, then this intuition may arise from the problem
of ascribing moral responsibility presented in the four inconsistent premises. If we accept the
arguments about moral responsibility in premises 2 through 4, then premise 1 must be wrong,
that is, we would be committed to the claim that exploitation cannot be unintentional. Yet,
as we’ve seen, Steiner’s theory of exploitation does admit such cases. Since premise 1 follows
from Steiner’s theory, if we wish to preserve the theory, consistency requires us to alter or
abandon one of the remaining premises 2 through 4. Let’s consider each, beginning with
premise 3.
Premise 3 The third premise states that if an action is wrong, then there is at least one
person who is morally responsible for the action (Wr → Rs); to deny premise 3 is to hold
that there are wrongful actions for which no person is responsible.
Premise 3 can be decomposed into the following three claims:
3a only agents perform actions,
3b only actions34 are wrong,
3c if an action is a member of the set of wrong actions, it is a member of the set of actions
for which an agent can be held morally responsible.
Taken together, 3a and 3b entail that the only source of wrongness is agents.35 In other
33The argument can be represented in premise form (using the parenthetical letters from above) as follows:
1. Ex ∧ (¬Cu ∧ ¬In) (P1)
2. Ex→Wr (P2)
3. Wr → Rs (P3)
4. Rs→ (In ∨ Cu) (P4)
5. Ex→ (In ∨ Cu) (From 2, 3, 4)
6. In ∨ Cu (from 1, 5)
7. In (From 1, 6)
8. In ∧ ¬In
C. ⊥ (From 8)
34Here I mean actions construed broadly and thus will gloss important problems pertaining to omissions
and negative acts.
35That is, where A is an action, I is an agent, P is performs, and W is a wrong, (3a) ∀x[Ax→ ∃y(Iy∧yPx)]
and (3b) ∀x(Wx→ Ax) entail ∀x[Wx→ ∃y(Iy ∧ yPx)]. Support for such claims can be found in Scanlon’s
(1998, p.272) account of moral criticism, which, he claims, “applies only to rational creatures, since only they
are capable of the kind of reflective self-governance in question [in his account].”
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words, a necessary condition for wrongness is the performance of an action by at least one
agent. Thus, the first two claims restrict the domain of premise 3 to the actions of agents,
but they do not supply the core content of premise 3. This is done by 3c, which claims that
wrongness is a subset of responsibility. Together the three claims give us premise 3: since
only agents generate wrongness, and wrongness is a subset of responsibility, then if an action
is wrong, there is at least one agent who is responsible, that is, Wr → Rs.
Are these three claims plausible? The first I take to be definitional, at least for the sake
of this chapter. Actions are a sub-class of events that are performed by agents.36
The second claim, too, is definitional. In order to understand the claim, we must distin-
guish wrongness from badness. Badness is a negative evaluation of a state of affairs brought
about by an event; wrongness, on the other hand, implies that an act violates the standards
of a given ethical theory.37 Wrongness is a property adhering only to acts and, therefore,
requires an agent. Badness does not require an agent, but it may also be applied to events
that can be described as the actions of agents. Thus, while it may be bad that my home is
destroyed by a fire started by lightning, it is not wrong that it is so destroyed. It is, however,
both bad and wrong if it is destroyed through an act of arson. Those who are unhappy with
claim 3b will also (likely) reject my distinction between badness and wrongness. While the
definitions in 3a and 3b are not beyond debate, 3c is a more substantial claim, so it is here
I focus my attention.
Claim 3c argues that wrongness is a subset of responsibility: all wrong actions are actions
for which (accepting the truth of 3a and 3b) agents are responsible. A counterexample to
claim 3c would be an action that is wrong, but for which no agent is responsible. In order
to determine whether such a counterexample exists, we must be clear about what is meant
by responsibility and wrongness. Wrongness is the easier of the two; for my purposes here
we can take the account offered above, where wrong actions are those that, according to a
given moral framework,38 ought not to be performed. Responsibility, on the other hand, can
be understood in a number of ways. One can be causally responsible for an action without
being morally responsible: I knock over a cup while scratching my arm and set off a Rube
Goldberg-like chain of events that brings down the building. While I am causally responsible
for the collapse—since there exists a causal chain connecting the building’s collapse to my
upsetting the mug—I am not morally responsible. Nevertheless, the two concepts are related:
all events for which an agent is morally responsible are also events in which their actions
play some causal role. Moral responsibility, then, is a subset of causal responsibility. So,
which is the form of responsibility employed in claim 3c of premise 3? The answer is that
both forms of responsibility apply to premise 3, but only moral responsibility is non-trivial.
It is straightforwardly true that if an action is a member of the set of wrong actions it is
something for which an agent bears causal responsibility; this is just part of what it means
to be an action. But the substantive claim of 3c is that if an action is wrong, it is a member
of the set of actions for which an agent is morally responsible. Thus, a counterexample to
premise 3 must be a morally wrong action for which an agent (or group of agents) is not
morally responsible.
Yet, as Scanlon (1998) points out, moral responsibility, too, can be understood in two
36Lowe (2010) and Davidson (2001). The exact specification of the identity conditions of actions need not
concern us here, for what follows will be consistent with a wide number of positions regarding the relations
between events and agents.
37Strictly speaking, if we believe there is one true ethical theory, then wrongness implies that an act violates
the standards of the true ethical theory.
38Again, this is wrongness in a framework relative sense (see above footnote).
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ways: either as ‘substantive responsibility’ or ‘responsibility as attributability’. Claims of
substantive responsibility “express substantive claims about what people are required. . . to
do for each other”; an agent is attributively responsible when “for a given action. . . it is
appropriate to take it as a basis of moral appraisal of that person.”39 Such an appraisal is
warranted when an action engages with an agent’s judgment-sensitive attitudes. Note that,
for Scanlon, “having such an attitude involves not only being disposed to judge in certain
ways, but also being disposed to various patterns of unreflective thought”40, so holding some-
one attributively responsible does not require that they have actually rationally reflected on
a particular action, but only that a particular action follows from habits or behaviours that
are themselves the kinds of things for which agents can offer a reason for holding. Thus,
judgment-sensitive attitudes cover more than intentional action, narrowly construed. They
extend to, for example, the foreseeable side-effects of intentional action. Although it is impor-
tant to determine whether an agent is substantively responsible for exploitation, this inquiry
is secondary to the establishment of attributive responsibility.41 The problem of moral re-
sponsibility we are considering is a problem concerning responsibility as attributability. If
exploitation is morally wrong, then there must be someone to whom moral responsibility for
exploitation can be attributed. So, finally, a counterexample to premise 3 is a case in which
an action is morally wrong, but there is no agent (or group of agents) who are attributively
responsible for the action. With these three sub-premises in mind, it does not seem likely that
a counterexample to premise 3 can be produced, but let’s consider two possible contenders.
Suppose John, an epileptic, has a seizure in a shop selling expensive chinaware, which
causes extensive damage to the goods in the shop.42 Suppose we say that John cannot be
attributed responsibility for this action. Of course John may be excused for the seizure itself;
the seizure is an episode that happens to John, not an intentional action. But since judgment
sensitive attitudes can be wider than narrow intentional actions, in order to maintain the
supposition that John is not attributively responsible, it must also be the case that John
had good reason to believe that the seizure would not occur. If John knew he was prone to
destructive seizures, then he ought not to have entered the china shop. In order to excuse
John from attributive responsibility we might suppose John did not know he was an epileptic;
the seizure in the china shop was the first he experienced. In such a case it seems clear that
John cannot be attributed responsibility for the damage done to the merchandise.43 But
once the case is described in a way that exonerates John from attributive responsibility, it
is clear that it cannot be the case that the action is wrong. Under no description of the
event—even widely construed so as to incorporate John’s decision to enter the shop—can
the breaking of the china be described as intentional. Thus, since actions are intentional
under some description, the event cannot be described as an action. But since only actions
(broadly construed) are wrong, the breaking of the china must be described as bad, not
wrong.
The November 17, 2009 issue of the Guardian newspaper reported an unusual murder trial
where the prosecution had asked the jury for a not guilty verdict.44 The defendant, Brian
Thomas, suffered from a chronic sleep disorder which caused his mind to have “no control
39Scanlon (1998, p.249)
40Scanlon (1998, p.21)
41Whether an agent is substantively responsible for exploitation is, I take it, an analogue of Wertheimer’s
concerns about the moral weight of exploitation. See Wertheimer (1996, Ch.9)
42Thanks to Erik Curiel for this example.
43Although, of course, from a legal perspective he may still be liable for the damage.
44Thanks to Zophia Stemplowska for this example.
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over what his body was doing” while he was asleep.45 While dreaming he was attacking an
intruder inside his camper van, Thomas inadvertently strangled his wife. Thomas accepted
that he had caused the death of his wife, but he argued that he had in no way intended
her death. Through a series of tests, sleep disorder specialists confirmed that Thomas’s
behaviour “was consistent with the legal concept of automatism.”46 The Guardian reported
that “the prosecution [did] not seek a verdict of guilty to murder or manslaughter.”47 While
the news report makes clear that Thomas did not intend the death of his wife, one might
argue that if he knew he suffered from such episodes, he ought to have taken care to avoid
such a tragedy. Failure to do so might allow us to attribute responsibility to Thomas;
legally he would, perhaps, face charges of manslaughter. But since we are interested in a
case involving wrongness, but not attributive responsibility, we must suppose that Thomas
had taken care to avoid such a situation. In such a case, the death would not engage with
Thomas’s judgment-sensitive attitudes. But supposing that Thomas had restrained himself,
yet escaped whilst asleep and inadvertently killed his wife it seems—for the same reason
as above—that there is no wrong done. The situation is only a bad state of affairs. The
difficulty of constructing a counterexample to premise 3 seems to shift the burden of proof
to those who would argue that wrongness does not imply attributive responsibility.
Premise 4 Premise 4 claims that persons are attributively responsible when they act either
intentionally, or are culpably ignorant (Rs→ (In∨Cu)). Suppose this premise is false; then
someone may be responsible without acting intentionally or in culpable ignorance. How,
then, might they be attributed responsibility? In order to answer this question, we might
first consider who could be attributed responsibility for exploitation in the revised car auction,
and from there determine why such an ascription might be justified.
If we follow this strategy, there will be five logically possible ascriptions of responsibility
for the exploitation of B in the revised case:
A, the exploiter, is attributively responsible.
B, the exploited, is attributively responsible.
C, the person who’s rights are violated, is attributively responsible.
D, the rights violator, is attributively responsible.
E, some other party, is attributively responsible.
It is implausible to ascribe attributable responsibility in the auction to B or C. Both of
these individuals have been harmed48 in the situation. Clearly, they are innocent victims.
Ascribing responsibility to a party not described in the example (party E) is also implausible.
As the example is described, no other agent’s actions were relevant to the situation. Thus,
if anyone is responsible, then either A or D is attributively responsible.
A cannot be attributively responsible for exploiting B. Consider an analogy to another
form of transfer, theft. For Steiner, property rights violations generate exploitation. Every
theft is a property rights violation as well. If we suppose that classical liberalism admits
only moral principles based on property rights, then the moral wrongness of both theft and
45Morris (2009)
46Morris (2009)
47Morris (2009)
48Harmed at least from a certain perspective.
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exploitation flows from the violation of this same moral principle. With this in mind, consider
a situation where a person is ignorant of a past theft. Suppose they purchase stolen goods, but
are non-culpably ignorant of the fact that they were stolen. Have they done anything wrong
(in the libertarian framework)? Provided they have taken care to ensure the goods were
legitimate, did not engage with disreputable retailers—in short, were non-culpably ignorant
of the purloined nature of the goods—we can say they do not act wrongly in purchasing
the goods, at least as ‘wrongness’ functions in Steiner’s moral framework.49 Were they to
learn that the goods were stolen, their obligations would change. Depending on the details
of the situation, we might require the person to return the goods to the original owner, or
turn them over to authorities. Some form of rectification of injustice in holdings is required,
the details of which depend upon a particular framework’s principle of rectification. Prior to
their learning the goods were stolen, the thief was attributively responsible for the theft and
resultant ownership of the goods; but, when the new owner learns the goods are stolen, they
acquire moral obligations. They become attributively responsible for any failures to respect
principles of rectification—but, importantly, not for the original theft. Likely, such principles
of rectification will imply some form of substantive responsibility for the holder of the goods
as well. Applying this response to exploitation, we can say that just as A does not act
wrongly when he (non-culpably) ignorantly purchases stolen goods, he does not act wrongly
when he exploits B. However, if A learns about past rights violations that made B worse off,
and so comes to learn that he has exploited B, then A inherits rectificatory moral obligations
for which he is attributively and (likely) substantively responsible.50 Thus, although A may
act wrongly if he learns of the exploitation and does not respect the inherited rectificatory
moral obligations, A is not attributively responsible for the exploitation of B in the revised
car auction.
2.3.3 The Negligence Solution
Thus, if anyone is responsible, D must be responsible. How is it that a person can be both
ignorant of the exploitation and not intend it, and yet be attributively responsible? Persons
can be attributively (and substantively) responsible in such cases when they act negligently.
If someone drives a car under the influence of alcohol, they act negligently.51 If in so doing,
they hit a pedestrian, then they have done something wrong for which they can be held
morally responsible. Their negligence makes them attributively responsible even if they did
not know the pedestrian was present and did not intend to hit her. Thus, premise 4 must
be amended to include negligence.52 A person can be attributed responsibility for a wrong
action if the action can be said to be intentional, if the person was culpably ignorant, or
if the person acts negligently. Therefore, D is attributively responsible for A’s exploiting B
because, in stealing C’s wallet, D acts negligently. Thus, premise 4 can be amended to read
49Of course, they also do not act wrongly according to many other moral frameworks.
50We might, for example, say A should compensate B for the difference in their exchange that was brought
about by the rights violation to C.
51Similarly, we might claim that if John, the epileptic, enters a china shop, or Brian, with his sleep disorder,
fails to ensure he is restrained, they act negligently.
52One point of confusion here concerns the relationship between negligence and rights violations. As we have
seen, our minimal libertarian framework admits only property rights violations as the basic moral principle.
Thus, for an act to be morally wrong, it most involve a property rights violation. Yet our (possible) solution
to the problem of moral responsibility is that D is attributively responsible because D is negligent. It may
seem that we are invoking an additional moral principle; however, this is not the case. We must distinguish
between criteria for attributing moral responsibility and the source of moral wrongs. D acts negligently when
he violates C’s rights. The source of the moral wrong is the rights violation, but the negligence of the rights
violation means that consequences of the rights violation—such as A’s exploitation of B—can be attributed
to D.
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Rs→ [In∨ (Cu∨Ng)]. It now appears we have a solution to the problem, for when we run
the argument, we are not forced by the existence of non-culpability in premise 1 to choose
intentionality from the disjunction in premise 4. We may chose negligence, that is, that D
is morally responsible because he acts negligently. The moral responsibility argument no
longer leads to a contradiction. More generally, provided the original rights violator acts in
negligence, in culpable ignorance, or intentionally, they can be attributed responsibility for
ensuing exploitations. In some cases, the exploiter, A, may know of the rights violation or
may consort with the original rights violator to exploit B. In such cases A, too, can be held
(at least) attributively responsible.
However, there is a problem with the negligence solution: just as we can construct cases
of unintentional exploitation in Steiner’s theory, we can also construct cases of non-negligent
exploitation. So, although in some cases responsibility for exploitation can be attributed to
a person because they act negligently—just as in some cases it can be attributed because
they act intentionally or in culpable ignorance—there are cases in which none of the three
conditions for the attribution of responsibility are satisfied. Consider the following example.
C5: Desert island rescue.
Suppose D and C are on a desert island with no other inhabitants. D has
good reason to believe C is dying and that when C dies, C’s possessions will be
bequeathed to him. Nevertheless, while C is on his deathbed, D steals C’s wallet.
Soon after D steals the wallet, the pair are unexpectedly rescued by a passing
ship. C goes on to make a full recovery, and, months after the rescue, attends a
car auction where, sadly, he discovers his wallet has been stolen. Consequently,
he is unable to purchase the car, but would have been the highest bidder, had
his wallet not been stolen.
Here D has good reason to believe the consequences of the rights violation will not go
beyond their island. Given the information he has, it does not seem he acts negligently in
stealing C’s wallet. In such a case, if we accept that D did not act negligently, then there
would be no way to attribute responsibility for the exploitation to him.
Perhaps this particular case is not very plausible; it is certainly far-fetched. But the
general point is that while negligence may solve the problem of moral responsibility in many
practical cases, we should not consider it an acceptable theoretical solution. Negligence seems
to be a ‘broader’ concept than culpable ignorance, but we must be careful not to construe
negligence so broadly that it applies to all cases where negative consequences are possible. If
the concept is satisfied in all cases, it can do no work for us. Thus, in cases such as the desert
island rescue, the negligence solution will not solve the problem of moral responsibility. So,
although in its first form, premise 4 was false, its repair does not offer a theoretical solution
to the problem of moral responsibility. We must now consider the final premise, premise 2.
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2.3.4 The Badness Solution
Premise 2 This premise asserts that exploitation is a negatively moralised concept. Ac-
cording to premise 2, that exploitation is negatively moralised means that to exploit is to do
something wrong (Ex → Ws). Wood notes that “if someone proposed a non-moralised ac-
count of exploitation, that would not necessarily preclude saying that all acts of exploitation,
simply as such, are morally wrong. . . It would merely deny that the moral wrongness was
built into the very meaning of the term ‘exploitation.’ ” Of course, as Wood’s quote implies,
non-moralised accounts of exploitation are possible. In fact, Wood goes on to offer his own
non-moralised account, arguing that “exploitation is not unjust by definition.”53 Thus, for
Wood, although A exploits B, it is nevertheless possible that A does not act wrongly in
doing so. Wood’s approach breaks the chain from exploitation to moral responsibility at the
first step. Yet, although a complete rejection of premise 2 is one solution to the problem,
Wood’s non-moralised account is not very convincing, as we will see in chapter 5. However,
one modification to premise 2 offers a promising alternative that is less drastic.
Wood’s own definition of (negatively) moralised concepts is that they have “wrongfulness
or moral badness” built into their meaning.54 Yet here it is apparent that the form of premise
2 must be altered to include badness (Ex→ (Wr ∨Bd)). As I argued in premise 3, badness
is a negative evaluation of a state of affairs brought about by an event; wrongness, on the
other hand, is a property of acts that implies that an act violates the standards of a given
ethical theory. A state is morally bad—the term Wood employs—when it generates a pro
tanto reason for action.55 More precisely, we may say that a concept is negatively moralised
iff the occurrence of an act or event within the scope of the concept implies wrongdoing or
moral badness.56 The disjunction in the consequent of the modified formulation of premise
2 seems to offer a way out of the paradox, while still allowing us to say that exploitation is
a negatively moralised concept.
Does this move succeed? There are two questions here. The first is whether moral bad-
ness, like wrongness, implies moral (attributive) responsibility. If it does, then the antecedent
of premise 3 would take the form of a disjunction ((Wr ∨Bd)→ Rs) and the inconsistency
would be reinstated, leaving the paradox unresolved. However, if badness does not imply
moral responsibility, there is still a second question, namely, whether exploitation can be de-
scribed as morally bad. For although it may be the case that negatively moralised concepts
in general include those that imply badness or wrongdoing, it does not follow that individual
moral concepts are also both morally bad and morally wrong. It may turn out to be the case
that the badness solution is inappropriate for the concept of exploitation.
In the analysis of premise 3 we saw that, according to Scanlon, attributive responsibility
may be ascribed when an act engages with an agent’s judgment-sensitive attitudes. Badness
is an evaluation of a state of affairs brought about by an event. An event may be called an
action under some descriptions; yet, there are also bad states of affairs brought about by
events that are not actions under any description. Events that bring about morally bad states
of affairs and can be re-described as actions can (often) also be described as wrong.57 Thus,
53Wood (1995, p.2)
54Wood (1995, pp.3–4, emphasis added). Wood’s ‘or’ here should be understood as an ‘inclusive’ or.
55See, for example, Williams (1985, pp.140–41)
56Negatively moralised concepts are special cases of moralised concepts. A concept may be moralised iff
its characterising conditions contain any (positive or negative) evaluative terms.
57Sebastian Ko¨ehler points out to me that this is not always the case. It depends, in part, on whether
the badness is ‘prima facie’ badness or ‘all things considered badness’, and, more importantly, whether we
adopt a consequentialist or non-consequentialist framework. For example, a non-consequentialist can say in
a Kantian vein that telling the Nazis the truth about the Jews hiding in the cellar is not wrong, even though
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these events will still generate a paradoxical result. Yet these are not the events in which we
are interested; we already know from premise 3 that wrongness implies responsibility. We are
interested in whether events that cannot be re-described as actions also imply responsibility.
Clearly, the answer is no, for if an event cannot be re-described as an action it cannot engage
with an agent’s judgment-sensitive attitudes. Thus, provided exploitation can be described
as morally bad, the inclusion of the badness disjunct in the consequent of premise 3 would
resolve the problem of moral responsibility.
This brings us to the second question: is exploitation morally bad, or morally wrong?
My claim that wrongness pertains to actions and moral badness to events (when not re-
describable as wrongness) means the second question can be restated, ‘does the use of the
word exploitation describe an event, or an action?’ There are two separate answers to
this question. The first is in terms of ordinary use, that is, when we ordinarily speak of
exploitation are we speaking of an action or an event. The second concerns Steiner’s account:
is exploitation for Steiner an action or an event? If, on Steiner’s account, exploitation is
an event, then the problem of moral responsibility—a problem of internal consistency—is
resolved.
In his analysis of agency, Davidson writes, “very often a sentence will record an episode
in the life of the agent and leave us in the dark as to whether it was an action. Here are
some examples: he blinked, rolled out of bed, turned on the light, coughed, squinted. . . ”58
Might we add ‘he exploited’ to this list? It seems we can. In the pre-theoretical, everyday
sense, the sentence ‘A exploited B’ is very often taken to impute agency, but not as strongly
as those verbs that, as Davidson describes them, “cannot be anything but intentional”, such
as “taking a square root”.59 For after all, on the classical Marxist account (outlined in the
following chapter) a sentence such as ‘the capitalist exploited the worker’ does not necessarily
imply intention. One may argue that exploitation here is being used in a different sense, but
that is just the point: the verb exploited can be used in both senses, even if it is more natural
to assume it implies agency.
Steiner’s use, too, is ambiguous. In places he writes as if exploitation is an action, claiming
that an individual “exploits”60, is an “exploiter”61, and can be “exploited by”62 another and
claims that there are three principle roles in an exploitation, the “exploited, exploiters, and
sufferers of rights violations.”63 Yet, elsewhere he writes of “the occurrence of exploitative
circumstances”64, viewing exploitation as an unjust event that happens to the exploited.
Although the first set of quotes is perhaps more naturally interpreted as implying intention,
while the second seems to lack it, all of the above quotes allow for either interpretation.
Cases of unintentional (and non-negligent) exploitation are cases where the term ‘ex-
ploitation’ does not imply agency, since there is no true description under which the event
can be said to be intentional. Thus, these cases can only be described as morally bad. As
we saw, moral badness does not imply responsibility. Thus, no one can be held attributively
responsible for the exploitation. Here the ‘exploiter’ is merely an innocent conduit for an
unfortunate outcome. Of course, the moral badness does mean that there is a pro tanto
reason for dealing with—removing, avoiding—the exploitation. Morally bad situations may
it has really bad moral consequences.
58Davidson (2001, p.45)
59Davidson (2001, p.45)
60Steiner (2010)
61Steiner (1984, p.227,232,234)
62Steiner (1984, p.237)
63Steiner (1984, p.235)
64Steiner (1984, p.228)
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generate substantive responsibility; however, although interesting, an answer to the question
of who bears the burden of this form of responsibility will have to wait until the part two.
The ambiguity in Steiner’s use serves him well because it also allows for cases of intentional
exploitation. When A knows about a past rights violation that makes some (more preferred)
elements of B’s choice set unfeasible and A uses this information to take advantage of B, A
intentionally exploits B and, in so doing, acts wrongly. If the rights violator acts negligently,
or violates rights in order to exploit, A and the rights violator share responsibility for the
exploitation. When A is non-culpably ignorant, he may help to bring about a situation that
is morally bad, but he does not act wrongly.
In the assessment of the first question we saw that badness does not imply attributive
responsibility. In the answer to the second we saw that both ordinary use and Steiner’s
account are consistent with interpretations of exploitation as both a bad event and a wrong
action. Thus, it seems the badness solution does offer an acceptable way out of the problem
of moral responsibility.
2.3.5 Wrongfulness and Intentionality
Premise 1 Although the badness solution does offer an acceptable solution to the problem,
there are those that may disagree with this approach, not because the solution itself fails,
but rather because the problem of moral responsibility sets out in the wrong direction even
before premise two. For some, the ‘obvious’ solution to the paradox will be to abandon
the first premise. From this perspective, the unintentional exploitation that Steiner’s theory
allows represents a failure of sufficiency for his theory. The solution, then, is the addition of
some form of intentionality sub-condition to the definition of exploitation in subsection 2.2.2
along the following lines:
(5) A intentionally takes advantage of the disadvantageous effect(s) the rights violation has
on B.
By explicitly ruling out cases of unintentional exploitation, the intentional condition dissolves
the problem by fiat. This solution to the problem of moral responsibility has the added benefit
of solving two other problems of pervasiveness for Steiner’s account, discussed in the following
section. Since the ‘badness’ solution has already dissolved the tension, we may, for the time-
being, take it as a (relatively) unproblematic solution to the problem of moral responsibility,
however various forms of the intentionality solution will reappear in the following section and
chapter 5. As we will see, there may be other reasons to prefer this solution to the badness
solution.
In this section I explored a tension between the existence of unintentional exploitation
in Steiner’s theory of exploitation and the claim that exploitation is a negatively moralised
concept. While the two claims appear to be inconsistent, I argued that following Wood’s claim
that a negatively moralised concept “already has wrongfulness or moral badness built into its
very meaning” dissolves the apparent tension.65 Although wrongfulness requires a person to
whom moral responsibility can be attributed, badness carries no such requirement. Along the
way I outlined two additional solutions: the intentional condition solution and the negligence
solution. Although the negligence solution allowed for the attribution of responsibility in
some cases, the paradox could be reinstated for cases of non-negligent exploitation. The
intentional condition solution offers a solution not only to the problem of moral responsibility,
65Wood (1995, p.3, emphasis added)
36
but also (as we will see in the following section) to problems of pervasiveness for Steiner’s
account. The advantages and disadvantages of this approach will be discussed in the following
section.
Although Steiner’s theory of exploitation emerges relatively unscathed in my analysis,
the discussion does have wider consequences for theories of exploitation in general. The
ambiguity between exploitation as an action and exploitation as an event in Steiner’s theory
allows his approach to capture the ambiguity of the concept in ordinary use; however, eliding
the difference comes at a cost. Having identified a case of exploitation, we are unsure of
whether the exploiter acts wrongly: person A is an exploiter regardless of his intention. The
ambiguity is unproblematic in the case of B, the exploited, since regardless of whether A’s
action was intentional, B is the victim of an injustice. But from the perspective of substantive
responsibility it seems to matter a great deal whether A intentionally exploited B. A theory
of exploitation that tells us someone has been exploited, but not whether this exploitation is
the result of a wrongful action seems incomplete.
The general lesson of the analysis is that accounts of exploitation that allow for uninten-
tional exploitation and narrowly and negatively moralised accounts that take exploitation
to be necessarily wrong (and not simply morally bad) are incompatible. Of course, this is
relatively unsurprising and follows from my claim that wrongness is a property of actions and
not events that cannot be described as actions. Yet both a narrowly negatively moralised
account and a systemic account are desirable. Narrowly negatively moralised accounts allow
us to easily assign both attributive and substantive responsibility to the exploiter. Accounts
allowing unintentional exploitation offer an explanation of what is morally amiss (morally
wrong or morally bad) with certain transactions even when there is no person to whom moral
responsibility can be attributed. While Steiner’s account offers a marriage of both accounts,
there may be reason to think that our ordinary concept of exploitation encompasses (at
least) two concepts, one captured by narrowly negatively moralised accounts and the other
captured by systemic accounts. An examination of this idea appears in chapter 6.
2.4 Pervasiveness
The first two sections explored how exploitation can arise from unrectified past rights vi-
olations and failures to respect limits on appropriation. In the discussion of Zwolinski’s
argument we saw that even when a transfer is beneficial and consensual, there are cases
where the benefiter may violate rights by not benefiting enough even when not transacting
at all is not a rights violation. The third section addressed a tension that arises from the
existence of unintentional exploitation in Steiner’s account. In this fourth and final section
on Steiner’s theory I address two problems of pervasiveness the account faces.
2.4.1 Diachronic Pervasiveness
Steven Walt (1984) points out that it is possible for many transactions to be ‘infected’ by
exploitation from a single rights violation. Since Steiner’s theory is built on a historical
entitlement conception of just titles, the theft of C’s wallet in the car auction examples can
lead to more than just B’s exploitation. Commenting on Steiner’s (1984) paper, Walt writes:
[M]ost if not all titles have a far from “clean” causal ancestry. . . hence if a title
to objects resulting from a rights violation is invalid and exploitation involves a
rights violation, then it follows that most if not all unequal bilateral exchanges
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are cases of exploitation. But this is implausible. The presence of exploitation is
unquestionable. Its omnipresence is questionable.66
Walt identifies a problem of overextension for Steiner’s theory that stems from the histor-
ical entitlement theory of rights. Since this pervasiveness occurs over a series of transactions,
we can call it ‘diachronic pervasiveness’. Diachronically pervasive exploitation is certainly a
problem if one is looking for a theory of exploitation that closely approximates the extension
of ordinary use; it seems that, given the number of known past property rights violations,
Steinerian exploitation is omnipresent. But while overlap with ordinary use is a reasonable
desideratum for a theory of exploitation, it is not the only desiderata. One may, for example,
wish to capture certain normative characteristics, even when this involves a departure from
ordinary use.
Additionally, note that Walt’s criticism of overextension is a problem not only for Steiner’s
theory of exploitation, but for historical entitlement accounts of justice in general. If just
holdings of property depend upon persons being entitled to those holdings “by the principles
of justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principles of rectification of injustice” as
Nozick claims, then it is likely that most, if not all, holdings are also unjust.67 Yet, both the
proponent of a libertarian theory of just distribution and a proponent of a libertarian theory
of exploitation may respond that yes, exploitation (or injustice) is more widespread than
ordinary language would indicate, but there is nothing in ordinary language that dictates
our normative use of the concepts. If we accept the normative force of the principles of an
entitlement theory, then despite what ordinary language might suggest, we do have a reason
to think that exploitation is pervasive and that this pervasiveness is morally problematic.
Of course, I do not wish to offer a full defence along these lines here, but only to suggest
how such an argument might begin. Thus, there are two main responses one can give to the
critique of diachronic pervasiveness: first, that it does not seem to be especially problematic
for exploitation, but rather a general problem with the historical entitlement approach and
second, without further argument there does not seem to be a reason that we should, upon
previously accepting the normative force of the historical entitlement approach, abandon it
because it does not conform to ordinary use. This is not to say that the diachronic critique
cannot be further developed; however, there is another problem of pervasiveness which, in
combination with the diachronic form, dissolves any practical difference between exploitations
and ordinary transactions.
2.4.2 Synchronic Pervasiveness
In section 2.2.3 I claimed that conditions (2)–(4) capture the intuition that exploitation in-
volves a case where one person gains at the expense of another, and also serve to distinguish
exploitation from exchange. The problem of diachronic pervasiveness is that, given enough
time, nearly all transactions will be ‘downstream’ from some property rights violation. The
problem of synchronic pervasiveness is that the outcome of nearly all property rights vio-
lations satisfies (2)–(4). If C steals B’s x, then the next time B engages in an ‘x-related
transaction’ she is likely to be disadvantaged vis-a`-vis A’s position. B’s loss of her x will
always place her at a disadvantage. . . except when it does not. Her loss of x will not place her
at a disadvantage only when not having x is, for some reason, advantageous in a transaction.
But in this case, A, not B, will be at a disadvantage and his disadvantage will have been
66Walt (1984, p.242, emphasis added)
67Nozick (1974, p.153)
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brought about by a past property rights violation as well. There are only two cases in which a
rights violation will not lead to an exploitation: either when B never engages in an x-related
transaction, or when a past property rights violation leaves neither B nor A with a rela-
tive advantage over the other (that is, when (4b) is not satisfied). Synchronic pervasiveness
makes exploitation (nearly) as widespread as rights violations; the only remaining difference
between the two (ignoring the above two rare cases) is that exploitation is the consequence
of a rights violation. Its cause is the generalisation of the currency of the counterfactual from
transactions to the degree of preference satisfaction.
There are a number of responses Steiner might give to this form of pervasiveness. He
may attempt to refine (2)–(4) in order to make the conditions more restrictive. However,
it does not seem that this approach is likely to be successful since the generalisation to the
domain of preferences is required to capture the trust funder case. Steiner may of course deny
that the trust funder case is a case his theory should capture, but this too seems unlikely
since the case is one in which one party is made worse off by a rights violation in a way
that is very similar to ‘ordinary’ cases of Steinerian exploitation where there is, in fact, a
transaction in the absence of the rights violation. Finally, Steiner may adopt a line of defence
similar to the approach outlined in the discussion of diachronic pervasiveness, arguing that
as it happens, the concept of exploitation in ordinary language is too restrictive to capture
those cases that we have reason to care about. However, the combination of both forms of
pervasiveness makes this response less promising. For if almost every transaction includes
an unrectified rights violation in its history and almost every rights violation makes someone
worse off in the sense of (2)–(4), then it will be nearly impossible not to be an exploiter or
an exploitee in any given transaction. But surely we want a theory of exploitation that tells
us something important about our paradigmatic cases of exploitation. There seems to be a
strong difference between every-day transactions (dog sitting for my neighbour in exchange
for a bottle of wine) and paradigmatic cases of exploitation (sweatshop labour), but if both
are cases of exploitation on Steiner’s theory then, in lieu of addressing the pervasiveness of his
account, he owes us an account of the difference in these kinds of transactions. Ordinarily—
and as Steiner himself attempts to show—we take exploitations to be a particular kind of
wrongful (or bad) transaction that is distinct from ordinary exchanges, thefts, donations, and
benefits. But if the above two pervasiveness objections are correct, then most transactions
are not, in fact, exchanges of these varieties. Most exchanges, according to Steiner’s account,
are exploitations.
2.4.3 The Intentional Condition
A solution to both synchronic and diachronic pervasiveness can be found in the intentional
condition (5) outlined in section 2.3.5. As we’ve seen, in addition to the constraints of the
domain (bilateral voluntary transactions) (1)–(4), limit the scope of exploitation to trans-
actions in which a rights violation (1) limits asymmetrically (4b) and negatively (3) affects
the degree to which one transactor’s preferences are satisfied (2) and this transactor’s loss is
the other’s gain (4a). But the point of the synchronic pervasiveness critique is that almost
every property rights violation alters the feasibility of elements of someone’s choice set. And
the point of the diachronic pervasiveness critique is that these rights violations can infect
otherwise innocent streams of transaction. These facts make the scope of exploitation too
wide.
Above I argued that we may have reason to diverge from ordinary use when we wish
39
to capture certain normative characteristics of a concept. Normatively speaking, the same
elements that make sweatshop labour exploitative may be present in a seemingly innocent
every-day transaction, the difference being one of degree rather than kind. However, even if
the normative point is granted, the descriptive difference remains unexplained: what is the
difference between my dog sitting and Chentex’s garment production that leads us to call
the latter exploitation when the former is not? If the only difference is one of degree, why
do we not have a greater number of vague cases of exploitation? And what is the unit of
measurement of these degrees? And finally, what licences the use of the ‘exploitation’ label
in these cases? Can’t the normative status of the transaction be preserved without calling
the transaction an exploitation? These questions are not meant as an argument against the
claim that the difference in our ascription of exploitation is not one of degree. Rather, the
point is that claiming that it is one of degree is not the end the matter; important questions
remain.
One important distinction between certain transactions is, of course, the intention of
the would-be exploiter. Even if the criteria for Steinerian exploitation are satisfied by both
my dog sitting and Chentex’s garment production, it seems that, unlike in my every-day
transaction, Chentex intends to make use of the labourer’s unjustly weakened bargaining
power. That market rate for Nicaraguan labour is less than American labour is why Chentex
is based in Nicaragua. The addition of the intentionality condition (5) to Steiner’s list of
conditions would allow his theory to capture this difference and thus limit its scope. Condition
(5) provides a response to both forms of pervasiveness. It limits diachronic pervasiveness
because one must intend to take advantage of historical rights violations in order to exploit,
and it limits synchronic pervasiveness because although any rights violation that excludes
more preferred elements of an individual’s choice set may generate exploitation, fewer of
these exploitation-generating violations will be converted into exploitations. Rather than
placing a limit on the ‘candidate’ causes of exploitation, (5) places a restriction on how these
causes may be converted into an exploitation. The previous set of conditions (1)–(4) can be
seen as containing two main requirements, that there be a past rights violation and a future
transaction, and two sub-requirements: that the past rights violation resulted in a restriction
of some more preferred element of an individual’s choice set, and that the other individual
gained from this restriction. (5) adds a sub-requirement not to the past rights violation side
of the main requirements, but rather to the transaction side: the future transaction must
be one in which the party whose advantage is increased by the past rights violation (the
exploiter) intends to make use of this strategic advantage for gain. Of course, in addition to
solving the two pervasiveness issues for Steiner’s account, the intentional condition solution
(in subsection 2.3.5) also dissolves the problem of moral responsibility by explicitly ruling out
the problematic cases of unintentional exploitation. So, the intentional condition solution
offers three benefits. Unfortunately, there is also a disadvantage of adopting the condition.
Cases of exploitation seem to derive their wrongness from the fact that agents intended to
exploit. If this is the case, (5) must be read normatively. But if the intentional condition is a
normative condition, further work must be done to establish its relationship with the property
rights principle of Steiner’s libertarian framework. At best, the intentional condition might
be derivable from the property rights principle, although here I am sceptical. It seems likely
that if the intentional condition is to be adopted as a normative principle it will not only
require a revision to Steiner’s theory of exploitation, but also a revision to his underlying
ethical framework. Thus, even though the intentional condition offers a solution to both
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the pervasiveness issues and the problem of moral responsibility, it seems that its success is
purchased at a strongly revisionary price. Although (5) warrants more discussion, further
analysis must be saved for the second half of this thesis, where these issues will be revisited.
2.5 Chapter 2 Summary
In this chapter I have presented Steiner’s solution to the paradox of exploitation, which
involves a modification to the ‘non-worseness’ condition. Transactions can be impermissible,
Steiner argues, if they violate the rights of one of the transacting parties. However, premise
one of my reconstruction of Zwolinski’s argument claims that if not transacting is not a
violation of rights, then a beneficial transaction is not a violation of rights, a premise that
frustrates attempts to label sweatshop labour a case of exploitation. Yet, an analysis of
the entitlement theory of property rights that grounds the Steinerian approach shows that
premise one is false. If one of the transacting parties is made worse off by a rights violation,
then a transaction that offers her less benefit than she would have received in the non-rights
violating case does violate her rights. Thus, Steiner’s theory does capture paradigmatic cases
of exploitation, such as sweatshop labour. We saw that the extension of Steiner’s theory
depends on the scope of property rights in the underlying libertarian framework. Right-
libertarian accounts like Nozick’s contain limits on appropriation that are weaker than left-
libertarian accounts such as Steiner’s. Thus, the set of violations of limits on appropriation
will be smaller for right-libertarians and, consequently, the scope of Steinerian exploitation
on such accounts is more limited than it is for left-libertarians.
The third section outlined a problem for Steiner created by the existence of unintentional
exploitation within his theory. The claim that exploitation is a negatively moralised concept
seems at odds with the existence of unintentional exploitation: if one cannot be responsible
for exploiting without knowing one is exploiting, and wrongness requires responsibility, then
how can unintentional exploitation be wrong? The solution I explored in this section involves
the response that in cases of unintentional exploitation there is no wrongdoing; rather, the
exploitation is morally bad. Negatively moralised accounts are not limited to the claim that
the concept in question is wrong; rather, as Wood points out, they are those that have
“wrongfulness or moral badness” built into their meaning.68
Finally, in the fourth section, I argued that there are two problems of pervasive exploita-
tion for Steiner’s theory that generate a gap between the extension of the concept in ordinary
use and the extension of Steinerian exploitation. While there are some responses that might
be offered to the problem of diachronic pervasiveness, synchronic pervasiveness erodes the
distinctive nature of Steinerian exploitation, leaving it—in most cases—a mere downstream
consequence of rights violation. In my discussion of diachronic pervasiveness (and again in
the discussion of the synchronic form) I briefly noted that we may want a theory of ex-
ploitation to capture certain normative characteristics of exploitation, even at the expense of
coextension with ordinary use. Of course, these two desiderata must be balanced against one
another—we don’t want a theory of exploitation that picks out clearly unrelated actions. And
the combination of synchronic and diachronic pervasiveness seems to do just this for Steiner’s
theory, undermining the relevance of the account. But we need not respond by retreating to
a theory that seeks to maximise the fit with ordinary use. Other approaches may be more
successful at capturing certain normative characteristics without overextending the theory.
68Wood (1995, pp.3–4, emphasis added)
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One response to the pervasiveness issue—and to the problem of moral responsibility—is the
inclusion of condition (5) in Steiner’s characterising conditions. While this condition solves
three problems for Steiner, it also restricts the scope of exploitation and it is not clear that
it coheres with Steiner’s normative framework.
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Chapter 3
Marxist Exploitation
3.1 Chapter 3 Introduction
Steiner and Zwolinski agree that the non-worseness condition, absent any mention of rights,
is false. What these two disagree about is whether there are, in fact, rights violations in-
volved in sweatshop labour. There are, however, other ways in which the non-worseness
condition might be false. Historically, the most prevalent reason for rejecting the basic form
of the non-worseness condition is that—to put it simply—transactions may be impermissible
if something is sold for more than it is worth. For the classical liberal who accepts a subjec-
tive theory of value, such a condition is nonsensical; provided the transactors consensually
transact, things are simply worth what people will pay for them. However, although the
subjective approach to value is dominant in economics and prevalent in moral and political
philosophy, alternative ‘objective’, or ‘just price’, theories of value are by no means scarce.
Aquinas’ just price, Marx’s labour theory of value, and even recent approaches that base
a fair price on the cost of production1 all draw, at least in part, on an objective approach
to value. Objective value theories have also been used to mount a different critique on the
non-worseness condition that should not be confused with Marx’s labour theory of value.
Ruth Sample argues that exploitation may be brought about, in part, by “commodifying,
or treating as a fungible object of market exchange, an aspect of that person’s being that
ought not be commodified.”2 Sample’s claims is based on the argument, defended recently
by Michael Sandel, that the “extension of markets and of market-oriented thinking to spheres
of life once thought to lie beyond their reach . . . is by and large a bad thing, a development
that should be resisted.”3
Although the classical Marxist account of exploitation relies on the labour theory of
value, which is an objective theory, the ‘analytical Marxists’ such as Cohen (1979) and
Roemer (1982a,b) have shown that many of the concerns central to the classical account
can be captured by accounts of exploitation that do not depend upon the labour theory
of value. Roemer’s property relations model of exploitation attempts to incorporate the
normative elements of the classical Marxist approach while abandoning any notion of an
objective approach to value. Much of the present chapter focuses on Roemer’s property
relations account of exploitation. Before examining Roemer’s account, however, it is helpful
to consider the classical account, not only because it is this account that informs Roemer’s
approach, but also because some of the failures of the labour theory of value that underpins
1Reiff (2013)
2Sample (2003, p.57)
3Sandel (1998, pp.93–94)
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the classical account will be relevant to the plausibility of other objective value-based accounts
of exploitation. An analysis of Sample’s objective value theory will have to wait until chapter
4, where I discuss duty-based accounts of exploitation.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2 I present the clas-
sical Marxist account of exploitation and argue that the failure of Marx’s labour theory of
value means we should reject the classical account. Section 3.3 presents Roemer’s unequal
exchange and property relations accounts of exploitation. In the first part of the section
I sketch the unequal exchange account and show why certain problems of ‘over-constraint’
motivate a move to his more general property relations account. The second part considers
the property relations account and the relationship between this model of exploitation and
Steiner’s account. In section 3.4 I show that without a properly specified dominance condi-
tion, Roemer’s account, like Steiner’s, faces an over-extension problem. Finally, section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Classical Marxist Exploitation
The classical Marxist approach to exploitation differs significantly from modern liberal theo-
ries both extensionally and normatively. Extensionally, Marx was concerned with a narrower
set of interactions—namely, the economic relationship between the capitalist and proletariat
classes.4 Marxist exploitation is limited to interactions similar to those in the sweatshop
case. It does not provide a general account of exploitation. The normative difference be-
tween the classical Marxist account and modern liberal accounts is not one of kind, but of
degree. While many modern writers offer accounts not only of what exploitation is, but also
why it is wrong,5 Marx seems to have conceived of exploitation as wrong,6 but his primary
concern was to offer an explanation of the cause of exploitation.7
However, both lines of inquiry share a common motivation: the paradox of exploitation.
While the source of expropriation in Feudalism was clear—the serf was coerced into providing
corve´e and demesne labour—explaining how non-coerced labourers would submit to expro-
priation was less so. As Roemer notes, “The riddle for Marx was: How can one explain the
systematic expropriation of the surplus product. . . when the institution for labor exchange
is not coercive?”8 Thus, while modern liberals are concerned with the normative question
of how a Pareto-improving consensual exchange can be impermissible, Marx was concerned
with why workers would consent to some transactions in the first place.
Marx offers his own outline of the paradox of exploitation in Capital, Volume I. He notes
that, prima facie, it appears the conditions of Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham
4As Elster writes, “it is a special case of a more general notion of exploitation that also encompasses
non-Marxist varieties.”(Elster, 1986, p.27)
5See, for example, Ruth Sample’s (2003) book, Exploitation: What It Is and Why It’s Wrong.
6This claim is controversial, many Marxists deny that the Marxist account of exploitation is moralised,
arguing that the account is purely descriptive. See, for example, Wood (1981). As G.A. Cohen notes, these
interpreters reject the claim that “One reason for overthrowing capitalism is that it is a regime of exploitation
(and exploitation is unjust),” either because there is no reason to overthrow capitalism, or because injustice
is not the reason to overthrow capitalism (Cohen, 1979, p.342). However, like Cohen, Wolff, (1999) and
others, I believe Marx’s conception is moralised. See Geras (1985) for an overview of the debate.
7Both Elster and Cohen make note of these two dimensions of exploitation, with Elster writing that the
underlying the concept of exploitation is the idea that “to exploit someone means to take unfair advantage
of him, a notion that embodies a causal and a normative aspect” (Elster, 1982, p.364). Max Steuer has
pressed me on my claim that Steiner, Sample, and even myself ofer a theory of exploitation. Theories of
exploitation, Steuer argues, should provide an account not only of what exploiation is, and why (if at all) it
is impermissible, but also an explanation of its causes and persistence. Characterisations of exploitation we
might simply call ‘accounts’. In Steuer’s sense, Marx, more than any other thinker considered in the thesis,
offers a theory of exploitaition.
8Roemer (1982a, p.6)
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are satisfied in the labour market.
Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity. . . contract as free agents,
and the agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expres-
sion to their common will. Equality, because each enters into relation with the
other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent
for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And
Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings them
together and puts them in relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain
and the private interests of each.9
He acknowledges that in exchanges between the labourer and capitalist the conditions of con-
sent (freedom and equality) and Pareto improvement (Bentham) are satisfied. And yet, Marx
claims, while these conditions are ‘satisfied’ in one sense, a closer look at the mechanisms at
work will disclose something altogether different—the exchange is not, in one sense, equal.
Elster writes, “The meaning of [Marxist] exploitation can be stated, somewhat simplified,
as follows: workers are exploited if they work longer hours than the number of labour hours
embodied in the goods they consume.”10 In order to understand this definition we must first
understand Marx’s notions of surplus labour, and the labour theory of value.
3.2.1 Surplus Labour and the Labour Theory of Value
Since Marx employs a labour theory of value, the currency of exploitation is embodied labour
hours. The labour theory of value states that the value of all commodities is determined by
the amount of labour-time necessary for a commodity’s production and reproduction.11 So,
for the commodity of workers’ labour-power, value is determined by the amount of time
needed for the labourer herself to be produced and reproduced, that is, to eat, find shelter,
acquire skills, and procreate.12 When capitalists employ their capital to produce a product,
they must purchase raw materials and machinery, as well as labour, to form the materials
into a marketable product; the price they pay for these commodities is also given in terms
of the amount of labour time necessary to reproduce the commodity.
So, Marx tells us, suppose a capitalist who wants to make a profit producing yarn pur-
chases 10 pounds of cotton for $10 and machinery for $2. If the amount of labour necessary
to reproduce (i.e., sustain) labourers is 12 a day’s labour, that is, $3, then, the value of labour
for a whole day is $6. Thus, the $12 spent on materials represents 2 days embodied labour.
And finally, if spinning 123 lbs. of cotton into the same of yarn takes 1 hour, then “the [10
pounds of] cotton absorbs six hours’ labour” when it is transformed into yarn.13 At the end
of the process we have 2 days labour from the raw materials and machinery and 12 a day
of labour from the labour. Since the value of labour-power is $6 per day and 2 12 days are
embodied in the yarn, then “the value of the product [$15] is exactly equal to the value of
the capital advanced” and no profit has been made for the capitalist.14 The capitalist can
only make a profit by working one of his inputs harder. But, Marx claims, buying more raw
cotton will simply result in more produced yarn, but no profit. The machinery too cannot
provide him with profit. Working the machinery harder causes it to wear out faster, leaving
9Marx (1887, p.121)
10Elster (1986, p.121)
11Marx (1887, p.118)
12Marx (1887, pp.118–20)
13Marx (1887, p.131)
14Marx (1887, p.131)
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him in the same position as the yarn. And, while he may buy machinery that is techno-
logically superior to the present machines, the development of the technology represents an
increase in embodied labour and thus price, according to Marx’s theory of value, once again
thwarting profit. The remaining possible source of profit is labour.
In the example, although labour is paid $3, which is enough to subsist for 24 hours (and
reproduce), they work only for 6 hours. They could however, work 12 hours for $3, converting
$20 worth of cotton and $4 of machine use into $30 of yarn15 since the $3 is sufficient to
sustain and reproduce the worker for the next day. Here the capitalist realises a profit of $3.
This profit Marx calls ‘surplus value’ and the “degree of exploitation (D) of labour-power by
capital” is given by this value divided by the time required to produce the worker (socially
necessary labour time), i.e., in the present example:16
D =
3
3
= 1 (3.1)
Thus, to reiterate Elster’s claim, for Marx exploitation occurs when workers work longer
hours than the hours embodied in the goods they consume.
It is easy to see why, with this characterisation of exploitation, Marx was concerned with
the cause of exploitation. Why would the worker consent to working a 12 hour day for the
same price as a 6 hour day; why would he continue to work once he earned enough to sustain
himself? The answer, Marx claims, lies in the private ownership of the means of production.
The worker is characterised as a worker because he lacks capital: “In order that a man may
be able to sell commodities other than labour-power, he must of course have the means of
production, as raw material, implements, &c [sic].”17 Yet, in order to survive, the worker
must eat; he “requires also the means of subsistence.”18 And in order to eat, he is forced to
sell his labour to the capitalist. Thus, it is the inequality in the ownership of capital—the
means of production—that forces the worker to sell his labour, and it is the acuteness of his
poverty that forces him to sell it cheaply. Here the parallels with the sweatshop case are
striking. The worker is made better off by working for the capitalist since by so doing he will
not starve,19 and he freely chooses this alternative. Thus, here again, we see that the Pareto
and consent conditions of premise one obtain.
Although Marx confronts a version of the paradox of exploitation, as I stated above, he
is less concerned with the normative premise. Rather, the paradox for Marx, is as follows.
The Paradox of Capitalist Exploitation
C1 Transaction P is a Pareto improvement over the status quo (Q).
C2 However there is another transaction that is a greater improvement than transaction
P. Call this transaction G.
C3 Workers make choices that maximise their income.
C4 Workers consensually chose transaction P over G or Q.
Premises one and two show that the preference order for a worker is 〈G,P,Q〉. Premise
three says that workers chose that option from their choice set (G) that maximises their
income, but this contradicts premise four, which claims workers consensually chose P.
15Since the yarn contains 20 cotton +4 machinery +6 labour, its value is $30.
16Marx (1887, p.150)
17Marx (1887, p.117)
18Marx (1887, p.117)
19Indeed, the careful capitalist will ensure the worker is paid well enough to work effectively and to
reproduce himself, just as he would care for his machinery, since a failure to do so may lead to the erosion of
his capital stock.
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Roemer writes, “Marx’s effort was to resolve this paradox by providing a theory of value
which claimed that despite the non-coerciveness of the institution of labour exchange, that
exchange was exploitative.”20 In particular, an appeal to Marx’s labour theory of value
shows that there is a possible distribution in which the worker works only long enough to
reproduce himself, the minimal limit on the length of the working day.21 There is also a
maximal limit to the working day, which depends both on the “physical bounds of labour-
power” and on what Marx calls ‘moral’ (but what we might call ‘social’) limits, since “the
labourer needs time for satisfying his intellectual and social wants”.22 It is this range then
over which the worker and capitalist bargain. The measure of exploitation is the difference
between the work hours (actually) set in transaction P, and the minimal possible hours,
represented by the greater Pareto improvement afforded by (from the worker’s point of view)
transaction G. If (by C3) workers make preference maximising choices, why don’t they choose
the transaction G solution to the bargaining problem?
The answer, quite obvious by now, is that they lack the power to do so. The distribution
represented by transaction G is not feasible (for the worker acting alone). It is this infeasi-
bility that leads to exploitation. And, Marx claims, this infeasibility is caused by inequalities
in the means of production.23 Thus, Marx uses the labour theory of value to identify a
particular baseline—transaction G—against which exploitation can be measured. He then
shows that it is the inequality of ownership in the means of production that causes a shift
from transaction G to P, since workers’ weak bargaining power makes G unfeasible. In terms
of the paradox of capitalist exploitation, C4 is false. The worker does not choose P over
options G or Q; G is not feasible. Rather the worker chooses P over Q.
We can see how Marx solves his own puzzle about exploitation, but how does his approach
solve the paradox of exploitation outlined in chapter 1? Marx accepts the claims that the
transaction is consensual and Pareto-improving. Although debatable, he may also be seen
as accepting the claim that exploitative transactions are impermissible—at least insofar as
exploitation provides us with a reason for condemning capitalism. In this case, the labour
theory of value is read not only as a theory of exchange or economic value, but as a more
general—and prescriptive—theory of value. On such a reading, Marx, like Steiner, can be
seen to be rejecting the non-worseness condition. For Marx, the cause of exploitation is
unequal ownership of the means of production. If workers had such ownership, they would
not be exploited. Insofar as Marx can be read as claiming that exploitation is impermissible,
it must so because this inequality is impermissible. The labour theory of value provides us
with a non-exploitative baseline G. Transactions would be non-exploitative if they occurred at
G and they would occur at G if there was equal ownership of the means of production. Thus,
Marx can be read as tacitly rejecting the non-worseness claim of the paradox of exploitation
and replacing it with G.24
20Roemer (1994, p.16)
21Marx argues that the working day tends towards this limit, but, given “the basis of capitalist produc-
tion. . . the working day itself can never be reduced to this minimum.” (Marx, 1887, p.159)
22Marx (1887, p.159)
23Marx is not as concerned to explain the exact cause of this inequality, noting that “one thing, however,
is clear—Nature does not produce on the one side owners of money or commodities, and on the other men
possessing nothing but their own labour-power. This relation has no natural basis. . . [but] is clearly the result
of a past historical development, the product of many economic revolutions.” (Marx, 1887, p.118)
24Roberto Veneziani reminds me, however, that Marx is not primarily concerned with individual actions
or transactions, but about the fundamental structure of society. It is possible to read Marx as claiming that
individuals are not obliged to refrain from exploitative relations even if it would be better for everyone and
morally appropriate to replace capitalism with a society in which workers can choose transaction G. Such
obligations are not logically contradictory, Veneziani claims. I am not convinced of Veneziani’s claim that
such obligations are logically consistent. But his general assertion—that applying Marx’s comments to the
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3.2.2 Critiquing the Classical Account
There are two main types of critique that the classical Marxist account faces. The first and
most common concerns the well-motivated claims that the labour theory of value is false.
As Nozick writes, “with the crumbling of the labor theory of value, the underpinning of [the
Marxist] theory of exploitation dissolves.”25 The second form of critique, presented most
succinctly by G.A. Cohen, is that “the relationship between the labor theory of value and
the concept of exploitation is one of mutual irrelevance.”26 This second critique is, of course,
logically prior to the first. We can first ask whether Marx’s account of exploitation depends
upon the truth of the labour theory of value, and if the answer to this question is ‘yes’, then
we can ask whether the labour theory of value succeeds (or, more accurately, if and why
it fails). While I agree with Cohen’s claim that the spirit of the Marxist account does not
depend essentially on the labour theory of value, it is worth noting the reasons for rejecting
the theory.
In his dismissal of the labour theory of value, Nozick provides us with a laundry list of
problems and counterexamples: “found natural objects (valued above the labor necessary
to get them); rare goods. . . that cannot be reproduced in unlimited quantities; differences in
value between identical objects at different places; differences skilled labor makes; changes
caused by fluctuation in supply and demand; aged objects whose producing requires much
time to pass (old wines), and so on.”27 While Nozick’s disdain for the theory may not be
misplaced, some of his critiques are, uncharitably, levelled at what Cohen calls the “popular
surrogate” of Marx’s account: the claim that “labour creates value.”28 According to Marx,
however, socially necessary labour time creates value.29 Nevertheless, the lack of a convincing
(non-circular) definition of socially necessary labour time, the theory’s inability to reliably
explain the relationship between value and prices (known as the ‘transformation problem’),
and the arbitrariness of labour as the value nume´rarie mean that the labour theory of value’s
problems are not only numerous, but deep as well.30
Like Nozick, Cohen argues that the labour theory of value does indeed fail to deliver.
But, he claims, “what really animates Marxists, whatever they may claim. . . is not that the
capitalist gets some of the value the worker produces [as the labour-theory implies], but that
he gets some of the value of what the worker produces.”31 Workers, Cohen argues, “do not
create value, but they create what has value.”32 While Nozick is correct to claim that the
particular form of exploitation found in the classical account is formulated in terms of the
labour theory of value, and that this theory of value is false, it is not the case that amended
versions of the account must also fail. In terms of the paradox of exploitation, we may say
that, since Marx’s formulation of the baseline G depended on an unacceptable approach to
value, we must reject G. However, this does not mean that we must accept the non-worseness
premise. We may identify a new baseline in the Marxist spirit. We may still ask how it is
that capitalists get some of what the workers produce if it is indeed true that workers are the
paradox of exploitation represents an extension of Marx’s systemic focus—is certainly correct.
25Nozick (1974, p.253)
26Even though, Cohen hastens to add, Marx’s theory of value was false. (Cohen, 1979, p.338)
27(Nozick, 1974, p.258)
28Cohen (1979, pp.357–58)
29Marx (1887) See Elster (1986) for a discussion.
30For a discussion of the arbitrariness of labour as the value nume´rarie see Roemer (1982a). The trans-
formation problem is discussed in Samuelson (1971) and an overview of the debate between Samuelson and
Marxist economists is provided in Bronfenbrenner (1973).
31Cohen (1979, p.354, emphasis original)
32Cohen (1979, p.354, emphasis original)
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only ones who create what has value. Although the alternatives in the bargaining problem
outlined for classical Marxist exploitation do depend on Marx’s formulation of the labour
theory of value, new (and similar) alternatives may be formulated that do not. We may
also ask normative questions about whether such distributions are impermissible and what
our response to them ought to be. And finally, we may also wish to confront cases that
seem, in an ordinary sense, to be exploitative, but that are not covered by Marx’s theory.
The rehabilitation, normative justification, and expansion of Marx’s approach are the tasks
Roemer sets himself in his analysis of exploitation.
3.3 Roemerian Exploitation
Roemer offers two accounts of exploitation: the unequal exchange model and the property
relations model. The former explores the relationship between labour and exploitation. Here
Roemer abandons Marx’s labour theory of value and shows that what is really necessary for
exploitation is asset inequality. Unfortunately, Roemer’s unequal exchange models are un-
realistically over-constrained. Once generalised to dynamic environments with heterogenous
labour, the strength of these results becomes compromised. The complications brought by
weakening some of the initial assumptions motivates a move to the second account of ex-
ploitation called the property relations model. Here Roemer abandons the labour theory of
value altogether, focusing primarily on the normative properties of exploitation and offering
a general theory of exploitation that covers a wider domain than either the unequal exchange
model or the classical Marxist account.
3.3.1 Unequal Exchange
The first puzzle about the unequal exchange model is why we should consider it at all. If it
is indeed true that the property relations model offers a more general account of exploitation
that also does not suffer from the over-constraints of the unequal exchange account, why not
simply focus on the property relations model? There are two reasons. First, the orthodox
Marxist may be concerned that the rejection of the classical Marxist account of exploitation is
the rejection of a straw man. Marx’s original account, based on his labour theory of value, is
not the most plausible unequal exchange version of exploitation. Roemer’s account improves
significantly on the classical Marxist account and represents a more plausible version of an
approach to exploitation that is, nevertheless, similar to Marx’s own account. Second, even
if Roemer’s unequal exchange account fails it is altogether clear—at least to Elster—that the
different approach he takes in the property relations model is a step in the right direction.
Elster argues, “[Roemer’s] theory of exploitation as unequal exchange is strikingly original
and illuminating, whereas the game theory account of exploitation in terms of hypothetical
alternatives is seriously misleading.”33 Even if the unequal exchange model Roemer presents
ultimately fails, other approaches along the same lines might prove more successful than the
property relations model.
Roemer notes that Marx was concerned with explaining how one class could expropriate
surplus value from another “when the institution for labor exchange is not coercive”; Marx’s
answer, as we saw, was that private ownership of the means of production caused this ex-
ploitation.34 However, Roemer notes, in some societies that have transitioned to socialism
33Elster (1982, p.363)
34Roemer (1982b, p.254)
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“we observe certain systematic types of inequality and certain political behaviour that. . . we
might wish to think of. . . as an indication of exploitation.”35 This presents a problem sim-
ilar to the one faced by Marx—“He required a theory of exploitation that was robust even
without a coercive institution of labor exchange; we require a theory of exploitation that is
robust even without private ownership of the means of production.”36
Roemer begins his analysis by asking what is minimally necessary “for one producer to
appropriate the labo[u]r of another” and, perhaps surprisingly, he finds that labour markets
are not necessary.37 He sets up a model of an economy with N producers who have varied
endowments of produced goods and their own labour (which is homogeneous), which they
use to produce goods to exchange in the market for goods that they can use to meet their
subsistence needs. Each producer faces the same technology, which is assumed to be a
Leontief input-output matrix, each has the same subsistence needs, and producers live for
just one period (thus precluding the ability to save). Roemer shows that when the producers
seek to minimise labour time—subject to the constraints that they meet their subsistence
needs (which are homogeneous) and replace their endowments of produced goods38—two
solutions emerge: either the amount of time that each producer works is equal, or some
producers work less and others more.
The inegalitarian solution occurs only when the initial endowments of produced goods
are unequal. This is, in a sense, unsurprising: the only variation in the initial conditions is
in the endowments of produced goods and those who are endowment-rich will have greater
access to production than the endowment-poor; consequently, the endowment-poor will need
to work longer than the endowment-rich in order to meet the same subsistence requirements.
However, the importance of the simple model is its demonstration that expropriation of
labour can occur “even in the absence of an institution for labo[u]r exchange.”39 This is
true in the following sense: suppose in a two person economy consisting of persons i and j,
i worked more than the average labour time and j less. Then, “suppose j killed i and took
i’s endowment and then tried to reproduce herself in the economy where only she existed;
she would have to work [the average labour time] to reproduce herself.”40 Since j would
have to work more without i being present, j is “somehow expropriating labour from i”.41
And this form of expropriation—where one person was made to work more than the socially
necessary labour time and one less (or not at all)—is central to the classical Marxist approach
to exploitation. Roemer’s achievement is to show that this core component is possible in the
absence of a labour market.
Roemer then shows that when labour markets are introduced, an interesting equilibrium
emerges. In a second model economy that now includes labour markets, producers face three
options for meeting their subsistence needs: they can produce their own goods, buy labour,
sell labour, or optimise by combining one of the three pure options. Roemer proves that,
at an equilibrium, the population can be partitioned into five groups, depending on how
producers optimise: those who only buy labour, those who optimise through a combination
of self-employment and buying labour, those who are strictly self-employed, those who are
both self-employed and sell their labour, and finally those who only sell their labour. The
35Roemer (1982b, p.254)
36Roemer (1982b, p.254)
37Roemer (1982b, p.256)
38Along with the formal constraint that they work less than or equal to one period.
39Roemer (1982b, p.259)
40Roemer (1982b, p.259)
41Roemer (1982b, p.259, emphasis added)
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initial endowments of each producer determine their optimal behaviour since, again, all
other variables are fixed. Those with the greatest endowments optimise by only employing
other labourers; those who have no endowments optimise by selling labour. These five
partitions correspond to five classes: the pure capitalist, small capitalist, petit bourgeois,
mixed proletarian, and proletarian. From these results Roemer derives the following theorem:
[The Class Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP)] states that every
agent who is in a labor-hiring class. . . is an exploiter, and every agent who is
in a labor-selling class. . . is exploited. The exploitation status of members of the
petit bourgeoisie is ambiguous.42
Roemer shows not only that the core of classical Marxist exploitation can exist without
labour markets, but also that when such markets are introduced, both exploitation and the
Marxist class structure can be derived (not merely postulated) from the models without ref-
erence to surplus production. Roemer continues to expand his models, showing that similar
results can be obtained from the introduction of credit, rather than labour markets. Thus,
Roemer demonstrates that “the entire constellation of Marxian ‘welfare’ concepts can be
generated with no institution for the exchange of labor.”43 In his final model Roemer con-
siders the case of exploitation in an accumulation economy in which, rather than minimising
their labour after reaching a subsistence level, producers seek to maximise their revenues. In
this model, an agent is exploited if the revenues they receive from profits and wages are not
sufficient to purchase any bundle of goods for which the embodied labour time is greater than
the amount of time the agent works. Conversely, the agent is an exploiter “if the minimum
of these embodied labo[u]r times is greater than the amount of time he worked.”44 These
models present a view of Marxist exploitation that is revisionary, yet (arguably) true to the
spirit of the Marxist project and show that labour is not necessary for Marxist exploitation.
What is necessary is asset inequality.
3.3.2 Problems of Over-constraint
Roemer’s results are obtained in idealised analogue economies that are simple representations
of reality, an approach that worries some philosophers such as Nancy Cartwright (2009).
Cartwright argues that—in many cases—the results of models such as Roemer’s “are over-
constrained. They include all the constraints necessary to isolate the cause properly so that
it is the only cause at work. But there are a good many more constraints involved beyond
that.”45 Cartwright’s concerns are about the general use of models in economics, about when
we are justified in making an inductive inference from a model to the real world. However, we
needn’t accept her claim that idealised analogue economies as a type are problematic in order
to apply Cartwright’s concerns to Roemer’s particular models. Of course, economists, too,
are aware of the fragility of their models—hence the plethora of statistical robustness tests.
Roemer’s progression from a simple economy lacking labour markets to an accumulation
economy is a progression towards more realistic model economies. Nevertheless, his models
still employ simplifying assumptions: production technologies are limited to Leontief input-
output matrices, labour is assumed to be homogeneous, producers live for one period, etc.
As we will see, relaxing some of these assumptions alters the results obtained in Roemer’s
42Roemer (1982b, p.262, emphasis original)
43Roemer (1982b, p.266)
44Roemer (1982b, p.269)
45Cartwright (2009, p.49)
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models. Roemer is not unaware of the fragility of his models and, in fact, he identifies two
concerns of over-constraint himself—the restriction of production sets to Leontief matrices
and the assumption of homogenous labour.
Leontief Production Sets. First, Roemer notes (echoing Cartwright), “the Leontief tech-
nology is terribly special, and a theory that is only true for that technology is a fragile
theory.”46 The generalisation of the CECP to a model employing standard neo-classical pro-
duction functions with constant returns to scale “verifies that the correspondence is robust,
and not an artefact of the special Leontief assumptions.”47 However, in order to maintain
the CECP in a generalised environment, we must assume embodied labour time is defined
as the “minimum amount of direct labour used in producing [a bundle] c, minimised over
the set of maximally profitable processes.”48 While the technical details of how this defini-
tion maintains the CECP are unimportant here, what is significant is that this definition of
labour value makes labour value dependent on price.49 Had the CECP held only for Leontief
production technologies, we would have had reason to suspect the result was ‘assumption
generated’; that the results hold only when labour values are made dependent on prices is
a concession (from the orthodox Marxist perspective), but not one we need find worrying.
Given the rejection of the traditional labour theory of value in section 3.2.2, this concession
is desirable. Thus generalising the production technology to models that assume constant re-
turns to scale results in the ‘rehabilitation’ (from the neo-classical perspective) of the Marxist
theory of exploitation, achieving one of the three tasks stated above. The first ‘problem’ of
over-constraint turns out to be a problem for the orthodox Marxist only.
Homogenous Labour. The second problem occurs with the relaxation of the homoge-
neous labour assumption, allowing for producers with varying amounts of labour. In this
case, although the CECP remains true, the appealing (from a Marxist perspective) correla-
tion between wealth and exploitation no longer holds. As Roemer explains, “There may be
very wealthy and skilled producers who sell labo[u]r power and are exploited, and there may
be poor, unskilled producers who hire labo[u]r and are exploiters.”50 Though Roemer offers
a brief defence of the strict version of the homogeneous labour assumption where labour
delivery is uniformly distributed, it is unconvincing. In the models comprising the unequal
exchange account, a uniformly distributed commodity is required to produce a theory of
exploitation that maintains the desired correlation between poverty and exploitation, and
“according to the Marxian theory of capitalism, there is just one such commodity, and that
is labour power.”51 The assumption that labour is so distributed is, Roemer assures us,
appropriate “for the study of capitalism at one level of abstraction.”52 While an approach to
exploitation that vindicates the Marxist interpretation of history as a clash between workers
and capitalists is desirable for those already committed to Marxism, the response that Marx-
ist theory assumes homogeneous labour is not appropriate from an external perspective. An
appreciation of these concerns motivates Roemer’s move to the property relations model of
46Roemer (1982b, p.271)
47Roemer (1982a, p.147)
48Roemer (1982b, p.272)
49Labour value is defined with reference to those processes that are maximally profitable; determining
maximal profit requires knowledge of equilibrium prices. Therefore labour value is dependent on equilibrium
prices.
50Roemer (1982b, p.274)
51Roemer (1982b, p.274)
52Roemer (1982b, p.274)
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exploitation. Although the results obtained in the unequal exchange models are not robust
to the relaxation of these two assumptions, the takeaway lesson of the unequal exchange
approach is not found in the way the approach fares in realistic models. Rather, the most
important results are obtained in the sparsest of Roemer’s models, for here he shows—contra
the classical theory—that “differential distribution of property and competitive markets are
sufficient institutions to generate an exploitation phenomenon, under the simplest possible
assumptions.”53 The models’ simplicity allows them to act as “Galilean experiments” that
“[isolate] the cause under study so that it operates ‘without impediment.’ ”54
Static Models. However, as Roberto Veneziani (2007; 2013) shows, even the results from
the simplest of Roemer’s models depend upon over-constraint. Roemer’s results are driven
by the static nature of his models; when the models are extended to dynamic subsistence
economies, exploitation as unequal exchange no longer persists (though both asset inequali-
ties and classes do).55 The inter-temporal nature of Veneziani’s models allows for two inter-
pretations of exploitation: producers may be exploited—that is, work longer than socially
necessary labour time—within a period (WPt exploited), or over the course of their whole
lives (WL exploited). Although Veneziani argues (correctly) that the former concept is of
greater normative import, the choice of exploitation concepts can make a difference in deter-
mining, for example, class membership, since over the course of their lives individuals may
belong to many classes. Veneziani’s introduction of dynamic models allows for the possibility
of savings.
If agents save, then a “change in WP status does not necessarily reflect genuine inter-class
mobility and may simply be the product of inter-temporal trade-offs with little normative
content.”56 Further, these shifts between classes complicate the interpretation of the CECP:
“potentially large portions of society” can be classified as members of a class that has no
clear Marxian interpretation and, as in Roemer’s relaxation of the homogeneous labour
assumption, the correlation between wealth and exploitation breaks down.57 On the other
hand, if agents do not save, then the dynamic model can be seen as a generalisation of
Roemer’s original theory; however, in such cases, in the long run
profits and WP 58 exploitation decrease over time and disappear in the limit. The
WP class structure tends to become, loosely speaking, more just, due to the ten-
dential decrease in the dispersion of WP classes around the petty bourgeois. . . and
to the absence of big capitalists.59
Additionally, the CECP fails in those cases where agents do not save between periods. Roe-
mer’s claim that the jointly sufficient institutions for the persistence of exploitation are
differential distribution of property and competitive markets is shown to be false in a dy-
namic setting. Veneziani concludes that “asset inequalities are proved to be normatively
secondary, though causally primary in explaining exploitation and the normative relevance
of asset inequalities per se is put into question”, along with Roemer’s account of class.60
53Roemer (1982a, p.42, emphasis added)
54Cartwright (2009, p.47)
55Roemer’s theory can be seen as a special case of Veneziani’s dynamic model “under the assumption that
stv = 0, all v [that is, there are no net savings for any agent at period t].” (Veneziani, 2007, p.197)
56Veneziani (2007, p.199)
57Veneziani (2007, p.199)
58Veneziani notes that WL exploitation does not disappear in these models.
59Veneziani (2007, p.202)
60Veneziani (2007, p.204)
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Although Veneziani’s results are the most damaging for Roemer’s unequal exchange ap-
proach, the relaxation of the homogeneous labour assumption is a significant problem on its
own. (The remaining issue—the dependence of labour value on price—is, as we saw, problem-
atic only for orthodox Marxists.) Roemer’s own response to tensions in the unequal exchange
approach led him to embed it within a more general account of exploitation, which he called
the ‘property relations’ account. Although he took the unequal exchange account to be a
specific case of capitalist exploitation within the scope of the general account, Veneziani’s re-
sults raise questions about the relationship between the two unequal exchange and property
relations approaches, since unequal ownership is taken to be the basic moral concern of the
property relations account as well. Despite these concerns, Roemer’s general theory is worth
considering. Although the insufficiency of asset inequality may make the link between the
two accounts less clear, both may also be seen as stipulative (conventionalist) accounts of
exploitation. There are two responses we may take to Veneziani’s results. We may conclude,
as Veneziani does, that the necessary and sufficient conditions for exploitation as unequal
exchange are not as they seemed to be in Roemer’s models. Or, we may alter our definition of
exploitation just enough to avoid the problems Veneziani identifies. For example, Veneziani
and Yoshihara (2011) show that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the persistence
of exploitation are asset inequalities, competitive markets, and that agents have a time pref-
erence factor that is less than 1, that is, that agents are not indifferent between receiving
income in the present period and later periods. The unequal exchange approach can provide
a ‘correct’ account of exploitation if the time preference condition is incorporated in the
definition of exploitation. Yet this move lacks theoretical justification. The required notion
of time preference—pure time preference—is not normatively significant.61 Thus, although
a conventionalist definition may be altered to account for problematic results, we desire nor-
matively justifiable alterations. Taking the latter approach is ad hoc and lacks theoretical
justification. However, in the same vein as the latter approach, we may also produce a new
theoretical account of exploitation that departs from the unequal exchange of labour values,
but places an emphasis on asset inequality. Such is the position of the property relations
account, which Roemer claims “makes clear what the ethical imperative of the [Marxian]
theory is.”62
3.3.3 Property Relations
Roemer’s property relations account begins with the proposal that “a group be conceived of
as exploited if it has some conditionally feasible alternative under which its members would
be better off.”63 This proposal can be captured in the following two conditions. A coalition
S in a larger society N is exploited if and only if:
(PR1) There is an alternative, which we may conceive of as hypothetically feasible, in which
S would be better off than in its present situation.
(PR2) Under this alternative, the complement to S, the coalition N −S = S′, would be worse
off than at present.64
61Veneziani and Yoshihara write,“the moral relevance of time preference is disputable even in non-Marxian
approaches, and a theory of persistent inequalities that crucially depends on time preference seems objec-
tionable” (2011, p.21). See also Rawls (1971) and Ramsey (1928).
62Roemer (1982b, p.275)
63Roemer (1982b, p.276, emphasis original)
64Roemer (1982a, p.195)
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Roemer notes that certain “bizarre” counterexamples may be produced in the absence of
a third ‘dominance’ condition (but his formal analysis makes use of only (PR1) and (PR2)),
namely,
(PR3) S′ is in a relationship of dominance to S.65
However, in the present section I will follow Roemer, focusing primarily on (PR1) and (PR2).
Various concepts of exploitation can be specified in the property relations model by altering
the withdrawal conditions that specify the hypothetical situations. Roemer focuses on three
specifications that characterise feudal, capitalist, and socialist exploitation. The conditions
are formally modelled as a cooperative game played by the agents in N , which is defined by
what “any coalition can achieve on its own, if it ‘withdraws’ from the economy.”66 Under
specific withdrawal conditions there is a “utility frontier available to any coalition” and
coalitions are exploited if there are frontiers, achievable by withdrawing, that dominate the
frontier available to the coalition when it remains in the economy (PR1) and the coalition’s
complement fares worse if the coalition withdraws (PR2).67 Roemer defines the following
three withdrawal conditions:
Feudal exploitation The coalition can take with it its own endowments.
Capitalist exploitation The coalition can take with it its per capita share of society’s
alienable, or transferable, nonhuman property.
Socialist exploitation The coalition can take with it its per capita share of all endowments,
alienable and inalienable (i.e., skills and talents).68
A coalition is, for example, capitalistically exploited when it would do better and its
complement worse if it withdrew with its per capita share of (alienable) assets. The property
relations approach clarifies the ethical imperative(s) behind exploitation claims. One may
agree with the general structure Roemer defines in the property relations approach while
disagreeing that the content—i.e. a particular withdrawal condition—is normatively accept-
able. The paradox of exploitation can thus be seen as a disagreement about the ethical
content of the property relations approach.
The neo-classical economist (canonically) accepts the claim that property rights must be
respected. For her, the withdrawal conditions for capitalist (and socialist) exploitation are
not acceptable. If a coalition’s condition was such that the feudal withdrawal conditions
were satisfied, then she could endorse the claim that the coalition was exploited. Shaping
the problem in this way, Roemer claims, explains why many liberals accept the claim that
there is no exploitation in a private ownership market economy. They are correct to claim
that there is no feudal exploitation under capitalism (at a competitive equilibrium). But,
65One critique of Roemer, as we will see below, is that the number and oddity of the counterexamples that
arise without a dominance condition are greater than Roemer admits. This issue is discussed at length in
Veneziani (2013). Julius Sensat (1984) offers the following example. Consider a two person society comprising
Able and Unable (who cannot work). If Able works 1 day to turn 1 unit of seed corn into another unit of seed
plus 2 units of daily subsistence for himself and Unable, then we can say that Unable is exploiting Able since
if Unable withdrew with his per capita share he would be worse off and Able better off. Thus, by (PR1) and
(PR2) he would be an exploiter. But this fails to distinguish between relevant differences in social power.
Unable is an exploiter regardless of whether Able is his slave, Able is his employee, or Able and Unable are
friends and Able acts out of concern for Unable. The difference in these cases, the argument goes, can be
captured by the dominance condition.
66Roemer (1982a, p.195)
67Roemer (1982a, p.196)
68Roemer (1982a, chapter 7)
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the Marxist claims there is capitalist exploitation under capitalism, because she accepts the
capitalist withdrawal conditions.69
The dependence of a particular form of the property relations approach on a theory
of justice can be further emphasised by noting that, in addition to the three withdrawal
conditions Roemer identifies, many others may be produced. Proponents of the libertarian
approach outlined in the previous sections would accept withdrawal conditions that allowed
agents to take their just holdings. Libertarian withdrawal conditions occupy a space between
the feudal and capitalist conditions and would form part of a theory of just rectification.
For radical right-libertarians who place no limits on appropriation, just distributions are
determined only by principles of justice in transfer. The withdrawal conditions of feudal
exploitation that demand current endowments be respected correspond to the withdrawal
conditions of radical right-libertarianism (assuming that current endowments were justly
acquired). Libertarians who do place a limit on appropriation would specify withdrawal
conditions that allow the worse-off coalition S to withdraw with its current endowments,
plus its share of those endowments that the complement, S′, had gained through over-
appropriation. A brief consideration of the various libertarian accounts of justice shows that
there are many withdrawal conditions possible between the feudal and capitalist conditions
Roemer specifies. A similar consideration of various Marxist approaches would reveal other
conditions lying between the capitalist and socialist conditions.
The solution that Roemer’s property relations account offers for the paradox of exploita-
tion depends on the specified withdrawal conditions. Under Feudalism, it is false that the
transactions occurring between lord and serf were consensual for the serf; thus, the consent
premise (and likely the Pareto premise) are false. Here there is no confusion about why the
serfs fare poorly in the transaction; the only puzzle is why we might want to call such cases
exploitation rather than outright theft. As we saw, if one accepts the feudal withdrawal con-
ditions, but not the capitalist withdrawal conditions, then it is clear that there is no feudal
exploitation under capitalism. From the capitalist perspective the paradox is dissolved: the
mistake is in thinking that it is impermissible to engage in Pareto optimal and consensual
exchanges at a competitive equilibrium. Thus, here the second premise is dropped. From the
Socialist and Marxist perspectives, morally superior alternatives can be identified, namely,
the equality of alienable assets or alienable assets, skills, and talents. Thus, under both of
these perspectives, the third premise, non-worseness, is abandoned.
Roemer’s property relations approach can be seen as a general framework for thinking
about exploitation that separates the structure of an exploitative transaction from the ethical
content that allows us to condemn the transaction. The normative conditions of exploita-
tion are specified by approaches to distributive justice. Because of this separation, debate
about the normative acceptability of the withdrawal conditions requires debate about issues
that reach beyond considerations of exploitation (and the scope of this chapter). However,
we may still examine the acceptability of the structural conditions Roemer provides. In
section 3.4 I examine the claim that, as in Steiner’s account, the formal conditions of Roe-
mer’s property relations approach are insufficient to capture our ordinary understanding of
exploitation. However, before moving to this critique, I will first consider the relationship
between Steinerian and Roemerian exploitation.
69Roemer (1982a, pp.206–07)
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3.3.4 Contributions, Rights, and Transactions
Above I noted that libertarian withdrawal conditions may be specified for Roemer’s account.
In such cases it is tempting to conclude that Roemerian and Steinerian accounts coincide,
but, as I will show in this section, the principle of fair transaction underpinning Roemer’s
account—contribution—differs from that which underpins Steiner’s—rights. However,
the most plausible versions of each principle coincide. Still, even when both accounts’ prin-
ciples of fair transaction coincide, the two are not fully coextensive since the domain of
Roemer’s account is not limited to bilateral transactions.
In his discussion of ‘fair transactions’ Alan Wertheimer notes that the strongly intuitive
idea that the distribution of the gains from a mutually beneficial endeavour should be pro-
portional to each individual’s contribution to the endeavour is “at the heart of the Marxian
theory of exploitation.”70 This principle is not only central to the Marxian theory, but also to
Pigou’s (1920) and Robinson’s (1933) neo-classical accounts, whereby the exploited are those
who receive less than their marginal contribution to production. That the principle—which
we may call contribution—can unite such disparate approaches should make us suspicious
that it bears some similarity to the normative elements of Roemer’s account, and indeed it
seems that this is the ethical imperative that underpins Roemer’s account.
When left unqualified, the basic form of contribution is implausible; plausible versions
“[do] not solely refer to what a factor of production contributes to the end product, but to its
moral claim to be rewarded in accordance with that contribution.”71 For example, we may
argue that individuals should not be rewarded for contribution that is due to undeserved or
morally arbitrary talents and skills. In this case, those who make larger contributions that
are the result of above average skills and talents do not have greater moral claims to reward.
Thus, contribution claims that a transaction is fair iff the following condition is satisfied:
CONTRIBUTION: the distribution of gains from transacting is proportional to the morally
relevant contribution of each individual to these gains.
Roemer’s three withdrawal conditions provide differing accounts of which factors should be
counted in determining claims to reward. Of course, on Roemer’s account the failure of a
fully specified contribution principle is not sufficient for exploitation. Exploitation, for
Roemer, requires not only that B receives less than her proportional (per capita) share, but
also that A receives more.72
The principle of fair transaction underpinning Steiner’s account is rights. In general,
it claims a transaction is unfair when what B receives is less than what she has a right to
receive. As is the case with the former principle, rights may take many forms, depending
upon the conception of rights that is employed. For example, as we will see in chapter 4
Ruth Sample claims that those whose basic needs are unmet have a right that these needs
are met. However, as with contribution, plausible versions of rights must be restricted
to certain forms of rights. As we saw in chapter 2, Steiner (1977) has shown that in order for
a set of rights to be compossible, and so to avoid problems of self-frustration, the set must
consist only of property rights. With this restriction in place, we may say that a transaction
is fair iff the following condition is satisfied:
70Wertheimer (1996, p.227)
71Wertheimer (1996, p.228, emphasis added)
72It is possible for B to receive less than her per capita share without A gaining if, for example, a portion
of B’s share is simply destroyed. Thus, we require also that A receives more.
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RIGHTS: there does not exist an unrectified property rights violation in the history of
exchanges leading to a transfer φ that makes one party worse off than they would be.
According to my revised version of Steiner’s account, a party is ‘worse off than they would
be’ because of a property rights violation when the violation means that φ satisfies their
preferences to a lesser degree than they would have been satisfied absent the rights violation.
We have then four principles of fair transaction, two of which are the general rights- and
contribution-based accounts, and two of which are the more specific rights and contribu-
tion principles. The most general of the four is the general rights principle which claims a
transaction is unfair when individuals receive less than that to which they have a right. The
general contribution principle is a subset of this principle, claiming that what individuals
have a right to is their proportional contribution to the transaction. While it seems clear
that the specific principles will be subsets of the general contribution principle, the rela-
tionship between the two individual principles themselves is less straightforward. And this
is because each of the more specific principles may be further specified, depending on the
scope of property rights and what is taken to be a ‘morally relevant’ contribution. As we saw
above, these do coincide in cases where the withdrawal principle is specified by a libertarian
principle. Thus, the most plausible and fully specified versions of rights and contribution
can coincide in certain cases. Any apparent discrepancies between the principles that arise
do so because of differences in the accounts of ‘morally significant’ or ‘property rights’ and
not because of differences in the structure of the principles of fair transaction themselves.
However, agreement between Steiner and Roemer in what counts as a fair transaction
does not entail that their accounts of exploitation are coextensive. The difference in the scope
of the accounts arises because of a difference in the domains for the characterising condi-
tions of each account. For Steiner, exploitation is one kind of bilateral, voluntary exchange.
Because it is a form of exchange, exploitation is a relational concept. When Steinerian ex-
ploitation occurs, the participants A and B are in an asymmetric relation: A exploits B.
Yet, as Elster points out, Roemer’s account “does not enable us to define the relation of
exploitation, only the predicates ‘is exploited’ and ‘is an exploiter.’ ”73 Being exploited, for
Roemer, is a condition of certain members of a society and it is not necessarily a kind of
bilateral voluntary exchange. Since Roemer does not place the same domain restrictions on
exploitation as Steiner does, the extension of the two accounts does not coincide even in
cases where both accounts use the same notion of fair transaction. Roemer’s omission of
these domain conditions causes some notable problems for his account; in particular, like
Steiner, his conception of exploitation outstrips ordinary use.
3.4 Overextension
Many disagreements about the adequacy of a theory of exploitation are normative in na-
ture. Roemer’s property relations approach avoids these debates, situating the normative
issue within theories of distributive justice. Nevertheless, complications for Roemer arise at
the structural level. In this section I will focus on Jon Elster’s (1982) and Julius Sensat’s
challenges to Roemer’s property relations account. In 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 I identify and evaluate
three features of cases that might allow us to claim Roemer’s account is insufficient to cap-
ture exploitation. I argue that although Roemer can meet two of these challenges, without
an operationalisation of the dominance condition, his account is overextended.
73Elster (1982, p.363) Jonathan Wolff also notes that, for Roemer, exploitation “is not a relation between
individuals” (Wolff, 1999, p.199).
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3.4.1 Dominance
Exploitation in the property relations approach is specified by a “doubly hypothetical” sit-
uation in which we assume both that a group withdraws from society and that it suffers no
incentive problems.74 This approach, Elster claims, “fails to capture the idea that exploita-
tion occurs because of interaction between the exploiters and the exploited”, that is, the idea
that the exploiters cause the exploitation of the exploited.
Elster begins his critique by presenting his own working definition of exploitation, where
exploitation is a theoretical concept that (as in Roemer’s account) obtains much of its norma-
tive content from a broader theory of distributive justice. To exploit someone, Elster claims,
means “to take unfair advantage75 of him, a notion that embodies a causal and a normative
aspect.”76 The normative content—the unfairness—is derived from a theory of distributive
justice. This supplies the normative content of (PR1) and (PR2). The causal element—the
taking of advantage of—is provided in Roemer’s theory by the structure of conditions (PR1)
and (PR2).
The problem with Roemer’s account, Elster claims, is that “causality essentially cannot
be captured by counterfactual statements [since]. . . the truth of ‘if [e1] had not been present,
[e2] would not have been present’ is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of ‘[e1]
caused [e2].’ ”
77 The non-necessity of the counterfactual claim can be shown by the existence
of pre-emptive causation, the non-sufficiency by what Elster calls cases of “epiphenomena”,
that is, cases where e1 and e2 are both caused by a common cause, ec. Elster then uses
these general problems for counterfactual accounts of causation to produce counterexamples
to Roemer’s theory where, although S and S′ satisfy (PR1) and (PR2), it is nevertheless
clear that S′ does not cause the ‘exploitation’ of S. Since, according to Elster, an account
of exploitation must include both the normative and causal components, in failing to deliver
on the second, Roemer’s account fails.78
To illustrate this, Elster presents what we might call the ‘non-dominance problem’. He
asks us to consider two groups that have ideological interactions, but no economic interaction.
One group, S, has (religious) beliefs about the other’s work habits that negatively influence
its own productivity; the other, S′, has beliefs that positively affect its productivity. If S′
did not exist, then S would be better off. If S did not exist, then S′ would be worse off.
Conditions (PR1) and (PR2) are satisfied. But it seems absurd to claim that S′ exploits S
precisely because S′ does not appropriately cause S to be worse off.79 By identifying the
general causal problem that leads to cases like the above, Elster provides a recipe for creating
any number of counterexamples to Roemer’s property relations account.80 Elster notes that,
74Elster (1982, pp.365–66)
75Found in Wertheimer (1996), Sample (2003), Goodin (1987), and elsewhere, the phrase “take unfair
advantage” has become the de facto ordinary language definition of exploitation.
76Elster (1982, p.364, emphasis original)
77Elster (1982, pp.366–67)
78Elster’s claims about counterfactuals imply that he favours what Ned Hall calls the productive concept
of causation, which we evoke “when we say of an event c that it helps to generate or bring about or produce
another event e” (Hall, 2004, p.225). Hall distinguishes this concept of causation from what he calls the
notion of causation as “dependence”. Although not necessary for causation as production, the counterfac-
tual ‘c causes e just in case, had c not occurred, e would not have occurred’ is necessary for causation as
dependence. The additional conditions for Roemer’s account that Elster’s critique prompts can be seen as
conditions that attempt to capture (at least a portion of) a productive causal relationship between exploiter
and exploitee. However, some of the concerns Elster seems to want to capture by appealing to a productive
concept of exploitation can be, arguably, better captured by including conditions like my (A5) (see chapter 5)
which explicitly outline the productive role of exploiter. With the addition of (A5), the (relatively simpler)
dependence concept of causation can be employed.
79Elster (1982, p.368)
80For example, in addition to the example provided above, one might imagine a dual desert island case,
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although restricting the scope of Roemer’s theory to ‘situations of arm’s-length economic
transactions’, along with the inclusion of (PR3), may handle epiphenomena, both “appear
ad hoc and are, in any case, much less precise than the other criteria.”81 He continues with
the (unargued) claim that “any attempt to make them precise would come up against new
counterexamples that formally satisfy them and yet would not count as exploitation.”82
This last quote from Elster is somewhat puzzling, if his concern about Roemer’s theory
is that it cannot assure the right kind of interaction between S and S′. For if Roemer’s
conditions are restricted to arm’s-length economic transactions and (PR3) is true of the
transaction between S′ and S, then it seems possible to say that one group exploits the
other. Of course, these modifications may still be ad hoc since, as Kymlicka notes, “they are
disconnected from the ‘ethical imperative’ he identifies as the basis of exploitation theory.”83
But while an ad hoc solution might be unacceptable, it is not necessarily inadequate. There
are two other reasons that Elster may think that Roemer’s theory cannot succeed.
3.4.2 Dependence and Interaction
Putting aside the general weaknesses of an ad hoc solution, one reason for thinking that
precisifying (PR3) cannot adequately handle Elster’s case is that it involves more than a
mere failure of dominance. Roemer’s (PR1) and (PR2) conditions fail to restrict exploitation
to cases where the following occur:
Individual Interaction: Particular members of S′ and S ‘interact directly’.
Dependence: S′ ‘depend on’ S for their advantage.
The clauses in quotes—‘interact directly’ and ‘depend on’,—are underspecified, but I take
it that, as they stand, these descriptions of cases are intuitively clear. In Elster’s coun-
terexample, none of these conditions seem to be satisfied (depending on how we understand
‘depend on’). The counterexamples produced when these three conditions are not met are
similar to those that would be produced if Steiner’s theory did not contain condition (4).84
What we want from (4) and from a properly specified (PR3), arm’s-length condition, etc.,
is a restriction of exploitation to cases where not only does A gain from the transaction,
nor merely does A gain from B in the transaction, but A gains from B in the right way.
In order to emphasise what is intuitively missing from Roemer’s account, consider another
counterexample presented by Julius Sensat (1984), which highlights a case where the lack of
dependence features prominently.85
Our intuition that this result is wrong is driven by the fact that the wealthy islanders
do not depend on the poor island for their wealth in any way. There may be something
unjust about the distributions from an egalitarian perspective, but it is surely not the case
where S inhabits one island and S′ another. A story can then be told about how the mere presence of one
group positively or negatively affects the other.
81Elster (1982, pp.368–69)
82Elster (1982, pp.368–69)
83Kymlicka (1990, p.204, fn.13). Even Roemer himself notes that, since his goal was to produce a purely
distributive notion of exploitation, the inclusion of an undefined notion of dominance is ad hoc (Roemer,
1982b, p.277, fn. 15). Thanks to Roberto Veneziani for bringing this point to my attention.
84Recall that condition (4) states: ‘A’s egoistic preferences are better satisfied in φ because γ is restricted
to δ, and if (1)–(3) also hold for A, then the positive change in the degree of satisfaction of A’s preferences,
given (1)–(3) hold for B, is strictly greater than any positive change in the degree of satisfaction of B’s
preferences, given (1)–(3) hold for A.’
85The case also features a lack of dominance because non-dominance can be seen as a subset of non-
dependence. If A and B do not interact with each other at all (non-dependence), then their interaction
cannot be of the wrong kind for exploitation (non-dominance).
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C6: Desert island dependence.
Suppose there are two fully independent, equally populous desert islands, one
wealthy and one poor. The existence of each island is unknown to the other.
We may assume resources are equally distributed within each island. If the
total wealth of those on the rich island is $15 million, and the wealth of those
on the poor island is $5 million, then the rich exploit the poor by (PR1) and
(PR2). Taken together as N , the total wealth is $20 million; each island could
withdraw with $10 million, which makes the rich island worse off and the poor
island better off than before.
that the wealthy exploit the poor in the example. Exploitation, at least in ordinary use, is
not merely an unjust distribution or an unfair transaction. It is a particular kind of unfair
transaction. However, Roemer’s (PR1) and (PR2) do not allow us to draw any distinction
between exploitation and maldistribution.
Roemer offers the following condition to deal with a lack of dependence: “capitalist
exploitation can be said to exist only if one coalition is gaining at the expense of another”86,
that is, “if the would-be exploited withdrew with their own endowments, the complementary
coalition would be worse off.”87
Sensat argues that the dependence condition is problematic. Although required to assure
the sufficiency of Roemer’s account, the dependence condition is not necessary for exploita-
tion. In order to motivate this claim he presents the following case.88
C7: Billions of burgers.
Suppose I force you to prepare hamburgers for me every day without providing
you with anything in return. If this is exploitation, then clearly it is exploitation
even if I own a freezer filled with a lifetime supply of prepared hamburgers that
I need only pop into my microwave oven to bring them up to the condition of
your prepared ones (suppose this takes no more time, energy or trouble than
forcing you to work for me does). I am not dependent on you in the sense of
the requirement, and yet I am exploiting you. . . mere expansion of the resource
base cannot turn an exploitative state into a non-exploitative one.
Sensat draws a distinction between what he calls ‘Framework I’ theories of exploitation,
in which exploitation is seen as a property of a state of affairs arising from a maldistribution
of resources and ‘Framework II’ theories, in which exploitation can be a property of a social
system and can include social features such as power and dominance. He concludes that all
‘Framework II’ theories violate the condition that “the mere expansion of the resource base
cannot turn an exploitative state into a non-exploitative one.”89 While I am sympathetic
to his concern that the focus Roemer’s and similar theories place on what Sensat calls the
“material conditions” of exploitation fail to capture important social factors that also play a
role in our willingness to label cases exploitative, his charge that the dependence condition
generates a failure of necessity is mistaken.
We may grant Sensat the claim that forced hamburger preparation is exploitation90, but
his claim that “I am not dependent on you in the sense of the [dependence] requirement”
86Roemer (1982c, p.300, emphasis added)
87Sensat (1984, p.28, emphasis original)
88I quote Sensat directly here from (Sensat, 1984, p.29), but have titled the example myself.
89Sensat (1984, p.29)
90Although, this is at odds with the paradox of exploitation in which exploitation is a consensual Pareto
improvement that, nonetheless, is unjust. Sensat’s example might be amended to allow for a very small
payment to the hamburger flipper.
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is false.91 If the hamburger flipper is providing some burgers to the exploiter, then the
exploiter would be worse off without these burgers. Sensat’s charge of non-necessity hinges
on an equivocation in what is meant by ‘worse off’. One may be worse off in a strict sense
or in a practical sense. Strictly speaking, if the exploiter, A, has billions of burgers in the
freezer and receives five burgers from the would-be exploited, B, then if B withdraws and
A no longer receives burgers, we can call A worse off. His burger endowment decreased
from billions plus five to mere billions. Of course, in a practical sense, this will make little
difference to A. But clearly this is not the sense in which Roemer intends the condition.
Sensat makes another attempt to explain the non-necessity of the condition:
Consider a state x in which according to the theory some individual is exploiting
the rest of society, i.e., he would be worse off and his complement better off under
coalition withdrawal with per capita shares of means of production. We may also
suppose that the individual dominates his complement and that he satisfies the
dependency condition. Now expand the resource base by providing him with
skills which would enable him to maintain under the withdrawal circumstances
the benefit level he enjoys in x. Relative to the expansion, he is no longer an
exploiter in x, according to the theory.”92
It is unclear what this example is supposed to show. Suppose that the baseline case is one in
which A’s holdings are $15 and B’s are $5. If each withdraws with their per capita holdings
and dominance and dependence are satisfied, then A exploits B. Now, Sensat asks us to imag-
ine a case where A’s skills are such that he can maintain the same level of benefits he enjoyed
pre-withdrawal, i.e., he can produce for himself $15 worth of endowments. It is unclear why
we are allowing skills to vary over the counterfactual situation. Surely A exploits B when A
depends on B for his unjust holdings, and the situation is not rendered non-exploitative if A
has the means for producing more resources to replace those he loses from B’s withdrawal.
Additionally, even if Sensat’s counterfactual can be shown to be well-motivated, the move
from endowments to skills confuses capitalist exploitation with socialist exploitation. Sup-
pose we grant that Sensat’s modification of A’s skill set makes sense. Although it may be the
case that A does not capitalistically exploit B, A can still be said to exploit B when socialist
withdrawal conditions—which allow for the equalisation of skills and talents—are employed.
Thus, even granting the odd counterfactualisation of skills, Sensat’s example seems to rest
on a slide between capitalist and socialist exploitation.
Although the desert island dependence case shows the need for a dependence condi-
tion, the billions of burgers example does not establish a failure of necessity for Roemer’s
model when the condition is added. The dependence condition successfully excludes non-
dependence cases. When combined with the arm’s-length economic transaction restriction,
it seems that these restrictions can also rule out non-interaction cases. ‘Being exploiters’
on Roemer’s account is a property of a coalition, not necessarily an individual. Coalitions
may contain only one individual, but they may also contain many members. Thus, that the
exploitation relation holds between the two coalitions S and S′ does not assure us that it
holds between particular individuals in each coalition.
This problem might be solved by simply restricting the language of (PR1) and (PR2)
to individuals rather than groups so that, for example, A exploits B iff (in an arm’s-length
economic transaction) A would be better off (PR1) in the transaction and B worse off (PR2)
91Sensat (1984, p.29)
92Sensat (1984, p.30)
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if B had X and A’s doing better depends on B not having X. But by broadening his scope to
coalitions, Roemer is able to capture cases where both individuals and groups are worse off
not because of the actions of any particular individual, but rather because of many actions of a
group. Of course, since each member of the exploiting group may be unaware of the aggregate
effect of the multiple actions on the exploited party, they will be unintentional exploiters.
Thus the systemic scope of Roemer’s theory is related to its inclusion of non-intentional cases.
This feature bears a striking resemblance to the tension between unintentional exploitation
and moral responsibility encountered in the previous chapter.
Despite Sensat’s concerns, Roemer’s dependence condition and restriction to arm’s-length
economic transactions seems to ensure that—if we restrict our attention now to individuals—
not only does A gain, he gains from B, when he exploits. This leaves us with the original
problem of a lack of dominance. We must ensure that A gains from B in the right way.
Consider the impact of the restrictions we have considered on a series of versions of the
desert island dependence case. Recall that in the original case a wealthy and poor island
are completely independent from each other, one is rich; the other poor. If we take the
total population of both islands as society N , we can identify the poor island as exploited,
according to Roemer’s (PR1) and (PR2), but this is clearly incorrect. Roemer responds
that exploitation exists only if coalition A’s gain comes ‘at the expense of’ coalition B. This
solves the problem with the first version of the case. Restricting the scope of the theory
to arm’s-length economic transactions and restricting the scope to individuals rather than
coalitions avoids problems stemming from a lack of interaction between A and B. However,
we may still encounter a problem like the case Elster outlines, in which, although A’s gain
comes at the expense of B, A does not extract his gain ‘in the right way’. A’s gain is merely
the effect of his odd psychological beliefs about B. The answer to this problem is the addition
of a dominance condition. We require that, in order for A to exploit B, he dominates her.
Above I mentioned Kymlicka’s claim that this approach is ad hoc for Roemer, given
his stated goal of providing a purely distributive account of exploitation. While it may
be ad hoc for Roemer, the failure of purely distributive conditions to provide an adequate
account of exploitation does not lie with the conditions, but the goal. Exploitation does not
merely involve an unfair transaction, it involves an unfair transaction that comes about in a
particular way. Roemer may have failed to meet his own goals, but the cases in which his
account fails show that something more is required. Unfortunately, as stated, (PR3) does
not provide an adequate solution to Roemer’s problem, since it is a trivial solution. In order
to offer a full account of exploitation, Roemer must offer an account of dominance. Only
with such an account in hand can we determine, for example, whether cases of unintentional
exploitation are possible on Roemer’s account.
While Roemer uses the term ‘dominance’, what problematic cases like Elster’s really
seem to indicate is that Roemer’s account only captures the unfairness of exploitation, not
the ‘advantage taking’. In chapter 5 I outline an account of ‘advantage taking’ that may also
serve as an operationalisation of the dominance condition (PR3).
3.4.3 The Process of Exploitation
Both Steiner and Roemer offer systemic accounts of exploitation, that is, accounts that
allow for cases of exploitation that arise in economic and social systems. The benefit of
such accounts is that they allow us to say that, for example, the labourer is exploited not
necessarily by the capitalist, but by the system of capitalism. This seems correct because in
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many cases it is not clear that there is one person or one group who is directly responsible
for exploitation. Rather it seems to be brought about by a series of morally bad events and
morally wrong actions.
Unfortunately the breadth of scope allowed by systemic accounts encounters two prob-
lems. First, although it allows us to capture what we ordinarily call exploitation in some
cases, the more permissive conditions that are required to capture these cases also seem to let
in cases that we would not call exploitation, for example, diachronic and synchronic perva-
siveness, desert island cases, etc. Nevertheless, that a particular account renders exploitation
more pervasive than we thought is not in itself a damning charge against that account. If
the theory identifies a phenomenon that, on reflection, we find normatively undesirable and
it provides a causal account that allows us to identify what brings the phenomenon about
and what would lead to its cessation, then that theory provides pro tanto reasons for ac-
tion. It may turn out that there is more exploitation in the world than we once thought.
However, as I noted in the discussion of pervasiveness in Steiner’s account, the desideratum
of co-extension with ordinary use must be balanced with the ability of a theory to capture
important normative and causal characteristics of exploitation. The extension of a viciously
pervasive theory may fully separate from our ordinary use of the term, or it may not act
as a guide to action. And in both Steinerian and Roemerian exploitation, providing condi-
tions that capture only those systemic cases we would ordinarily call exploitation without
overextending the concept seems unlikely. At the very least, it seems that purely distributive
conditions will not be adequate. An account of exploitation that does not include (much)
more than what we ordinarily think of as exploitation must involve conditions that go beyond
specifying when the outcome of a transaction is a maldistribution.
Roemerian exploitation, when morally amiss, is so because of unjust inequalities. Steine-
rian exploitation, when morally amiss, is so because of previous rights violations. These
two normative cases amount to the same thing in certain situations. For both accounts,
the conditions that lead to exploitation’s impermissibility are prior to the systematic or in-
stitutional elements that bring it about. The ‘normative aspect’ of exploitation—a rights
violation or inequality—occurs first. The ‘causal aspect’ of exploitation occurs when A’s use
(intentional or otherwise) of the vulnerabilities created by the rights violation or inequality
allow A to extract some gain from B. The problems of overextension for Roemer and Steiner
concern when it is appropriate to say that this second, causal aspect is satisfied. As I noted
above, the accounts are trying to pin down when or how ‘A gains from B in the right way’
for exploitation to occur. The tension between systemic and more personalised accounts of
exploitation concerns two different criteria for what it means for A to gain ‘in the right way’.
Rather than ‘taking on’ concerns about the process by which exploitation occurs or an
account of when a transaction is unfair (maldistributive), some accounts of exploitation
abandon the approach taken by Roemer and Steiner altogether. Instead they place the
process of exploitation in the forefront. According to these approaches, the attitudes of
A towards B—the way the two interact—are more important than the individuals’ pre-
transaction states. In these accounts, the priority of causal and normative aspects is inverted.
The systematic or institutional elements that allow for exploitation occur first; what makes
a particular act exploitative is the individual’s use of the vulnerabilities created by these
elements to take advantage of another. Although the background conditions leading to a
case of exploitation may involve injustice or wrongdoing, they are not necessarily themselves
morally tainted. Here, the causal comes before the normative aspect of exploitation.
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3.5 Chapter 3 Summary
Marxist exploitation is a broad church, comprising not only the classical Marxist account
based on Marx’s labour theory of value, but also Roemer’s unequal exchange and property
relations models of exploitation. In 3.2 I outlined the classical Marxist account and explained
why problems with Marx’s labour theory of value undermine its success. Section 3.3.3 pre-
sented two alternative accounts developed by Roemer: the unequal exchange and property
relations account. Here we saw that all that is really necessary for the core components of
Marxist exploitation is asset inequality. While important, Roemer’s results from the unequal
exchange models are limited, applying only to static models with homogenous labour. His
property relations model offers a more general account of exploitation that is based on the
contribution principle of fair transaction, which coincides with Steiner’s rights principle,
at least in special cases. In section 3.4 we saw that the basic version of property relations,
characterised by (PR1) and (PR2), allows for exploitation in cases where A does not gain,
does not gain from B, and does not gain from B in the right way. We saw that a dependence
condition and a restriction of his account to arm’s-length economic transactions solve two of
these problems, ensuring that A exploits B only when he gains unfairly from her. While the
addition of a fully specified (PR3) could, in principle, ensure that A exploits B only when he
gains from her in the right way, Roemer’s version of (PR3) is ad hoc and, more importantly,
does not define dominance. Both Steiner and Roemer provide accounts that do not restrict
exploitation to a particular kind of interaction between A and B, thus allowing for systemic
exploitation. Thus, both permit cases of ‘exploitation’ where individuals are unaware they
exploit (and are unaware they are exploited). Although stretching their conceptions to cover
such cases allows Steiner and Roemer to identify as exploitation cases that other theories
cannot, this wider scope also brings counterintuitive results. In my discussion of these cases
in both the present and previous chapter I have remained agnostic about whether accounts
should try to capture systemic exploitation or whether a narrower scope is more appropriate.
The following chapter addresses a family of accounts that places a stronger emphasis on the
attitudes involved in exploitation and the processes that bring it about. After exploring these
theories we will be in a better position to adjudicate the trade-offs between individualised
and systemic accounts of exploitation.
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Chapter 4
Duty-Based Exploitation
4.1 Chapter 4 Introduction
In many cases it seems natural to say that A’s exploiting B requires that he directly cause a
maldistribution. Roemer’s and Steiner’s accounts, as we have seen, do not always assure us
that A’s actions are connected to the maldistribution in such a way that we can naturally call
the case an exploitation. Sections 3.4 and 2.4 in the two previous chapters have addressed
various ways in which the scope of these two accounts might be limited to cases in which A’s
actions and the maldistribution are appropriately connected.
But many accounts of exploitation find the distributive approaches of Steiner and Roe-
mer misguided. According to accounts of exploitation offered by Ruth Sample and Robert
Goodin, exploitation does not necessarily involve maldistribution—at least not in the same
way as it does for Steiner and Roemer. Rather, according to their accounts it is possible (but
not always necessary) to characterise exploitation by referring to the attitudes and/or duties
involved in A’s interaction with B. Goodin claims that exploitation involves A’s failure to
protect the vulnerable1; for Sample, A exploits B by “interacting with [her] for the sake of
advantage in a way that degrades or fails to respect [her] inherent value.”2
In the sections that follow, I outline both Goodin’s and Sample’s accounts. I argue that
although they are correct to claim that A’s attitudes are in some way connected to—or
necessary for—his exploitation of B, their rejection of Steiner and Roemer-style maldistri-
bution as a necessary component of exploitation creates insurmountable difficulties for their
approaches. Section 4.2 considers Goodin’s vulnerability-based account and his distinction
between general exploitation and the exploitation of a person. In 4.3 I outline and endorse
Sample’s critique of Goodin’s account and consider her own degradation-based approach.
Section 4.4 presents a problem for both accounts. Here I show that both Sample and Godin
produce accounts that imply the existence of non-juridical exploitation; yet, purportedly
non-juridical exploitation creates a dilemma for the accounts: either they are incomplete
or self-frustrating. In order to expunge non-juridical exploitation from the scope of their
theories, Sample and Goodin must prohibit prudential risks, but since such a prohibition is
implausible, I argue we must instead abandon the ‘come-what-may duties’ on which their
accounts are based. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes both the chapter and the first part of the
thesis.
1Goodin (1987)
2Sample (2003, p.57). A similar position is advanced by Allen Wood (1995, p.15), who claims that
exploitation is the violation of “proper respect for others [by treating] their vulnerabilities as opportunities
to advance our own interests.”
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4.2 Goodin’s Vulnerability-Based Theory
Goodin (1987) develops a theory of exploitation grounded in the duty to respect the vulnera-
ble.3 The analysis of exploitation, Goodin argues, is “parasitic upon an analysis of [the] duty
to protect the vulnerable.”4 Goodin begins by distinguishing what he calls “advantage1” and
“advantage2”, which correspond to bargaining power and the benefits received from a coop-
erative venture respectively. He notes that exploitation does not merely involve strategically
positioning oneself to maximise bargaining power, but only occurs when superior bargain-
ing power is actually exercised to extract benefits. Nor, he argues, is every benefit gained
through the use of superior bargaining power the result of exploitation; rather, he suggests
that “exploitation refers to the taking advantage of an unusual situation”, either when the
situation itself is non-standard, or when we make non-standard or non-paradigmatic use of
ordinary situations.5 Finally, he notes that only agents can exploit. Thus, generally speak-
ing, agents exploit when they use superior bargaining power to secure benefits in ways or
situations that are non-paradigmatic. So, as an example, we exploit a concert when we use
it to distribute advertising fliers at the gate. Concert goers attend to listen to music, not to
collect fliers; thus our distribution of fliers is ‘non-standard’. However, Goodin claims that
unlike the exploitation of persons, this form of exploitation is not always wrong.6
4.2.1 Exploiting Persons
Although exploiting a person is always, pro tanto, wrong7, Goodin argues that we must also
distinguish between whole-person exploitation and exploiting a person’s attributes: “We
might exploit their strong backs or weak minds. . . their fears, ignorance, superstitions. . . love
or trust. . . [but] we infer whole-person exploitation from the fact that certain of the person’s
attributes are being used if they are being used unfairly.”8 But, this notion of unfairness
must be explicated. We need an account of what it means to use a person unfairly. Goodin
considers four possible interpretations of the unfair use of persons: coercion, non-reciprocity,
manipulation, and (mere) use, but ultimately rejects each.
The unfairness in exploitation is not to be understood as coercion, since as Steiner also
mentions, this would make exploitation indistinguishable from theft.9 Nor is it to be under-
stood as a lack of reciprocity, since although some cases where reciprocity is lacking may be
exploitative, not all cases are (for example, gift-giving). Therefore, non-reciprocity is not a
sufficient condition for exploitation. Nor, Goodin argues, is it a necessary condition, since
“we can have such a thing as ‘reciprocal exploitation’.”10 According to Goodin, the third
option, manipulation, has “three salient features”: it is active, i.e., intentional, it is deceptive
or hidden, and it is “contrary to the putative will of the persons being manipulated.”11 But
although exploitation may satisfy the third feature, Goodin claims that there exist cases of
exploitation that are unintentional and “out in the open”, and that exploitation cannot be
3Goodin establishes the foundational argument for this duty in his book Protecting the Vulnerable (1987).
4Goodin (1987, p.167)
5Goodin (1987, pp.169–70) Goodin emphasises that his use of ‘usual’ does not connote ‘frequent’ but
rather refers to the socially accepted intended use of things and situations.
6Though it may sometimes be wrong. Goodin develops an account of the wrongness of exploiting mere
things at the end of his analysis.
7Goodin (1987, p.173)
8Goodin (1987, p.171)
9Steiner (1984, p.227), Goodin (1987, pp.174–75)
10Goodin (1987, p.176). It should be noted that the existence of reciprocal exploitation—especially in
Goodin’s consequentialist framework—is dubious.
11Goodin (1987, pp.177–78)
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unfair because it is manipulative.12 The remaining possibility is that exploitation is unfair
because it involves the use of others to attain our own ends.
Now, we use people far more often than we exploit them, so the notion of ‘use’ that
underpins the unfairness of exploitation must itself be restricted. Goodin considers three
restrictions: mere instrumental use, non-consensual use, and harmful use. There exist cases
of the first, such as a butcher and baker’s mutual (mere instrumental) use of each other, that
are not cases of exploitation; mere instrumental use is thus not sufficient for exploitation.
Nor does non-consensual use imply a case of exploitation: we do not, Goodin argues, exploit
a larger spectator at an outdoor event when using their body’s shadow to shield our eyes
from the sun. Although we are non-consensually using an attribute of the spectator, we
are not engaging in whole-person exploitation.13 So, non-consensual use is not sufficient
for exploitation. Nor is non-consensual use necessary, for we may exploit someone, claims
Goodin, by renting their womb, even when they consent.14 Finally, we cannot explicate the
notion of unfair use through an appeal to harmful use because some of the most troubling
cases of exploitation are just those where the exploited do in fact benefit, at least when
compared to a no-transaction baseline.
Goodin concludes that in the forms considered, neither the three elaborations on unfair-
ness (coercion, non-reciprocity, and manipulation) nor the three senses of use (mere instru-
mental, non-consensual, and harmful) succeed as an account of the wrongness of whole-person
exploitation. However, he remarks that use simpliciter is a necessary condition: “what more
is required in order to make it sufficient is. . . some specification of the ways in which people
are being used.”15
4.2.2 Using the Vulnerable
Here Goodin abandons the language of ‘use’, opting instead for the term ‘play for advantage’.
He argues that the unfairness associated with exploitation lies “in playing for advantage in
situations where it is inappropriate to do so” and “exploitation thus consists in playing games
of strategy in circumstances which render them somehow inappropriate.”16 Goodin identifies
four kinds of situation where playing for advantage is inappropriate: when playing against
those who have “renounced playing for advantage themselves”17, “who are no match for you
in games of advantage”, “who are unfit or otherwise unable to play in games of advantage at
all”, and “when your relative advantage derives from others’ grave misfortunes.”18 But each
of these situations are “manifestations of one particular kind of wrong,” namely, a failure to
honour the moral norm of “protecting the vulnerable. . . regardless of the particular source of
their vulnerability.”19
We can fail to protect the vulnerable in one sense by failing to aid them, but we can
also fail them in a more grievous sense by using their vulnerabilities for our own personal
12Goodin (1987, pp.177–78)
13Goodin (1987, p.179)
14Goodin (1987, p.179). It should be noted that although Goodin makes this claim he does not show it can
be incorporated by his theory of exploitation. Thus, despite this quote, it seems that the extension of Goodin’s
account does not include those transactions that might fall under the remit of an anti-commodification
argument. For further discussion see §4.3.2.
15Goodin (1987, p.180)
16Goodin (1987, p.184, emphasis original)
17Michael Otsuka has pointed out to me that it is not clear that playing for advantage in this situation
is inappropriate. Is it inappropriate to compete with the wealthy robber-baron who has now renounced his
cut-throat tactics (but nevertheless keeps his wealth)? This particular concern is related to the problems I
will outline in section 4.4.
18Goodin (1987, pp.184–87)
19Goodin (1987, p.187, emphasis added)
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gain. It is this flagrant violation of the norm20 that Goodin claims “wholly accounts for the
wrongness of interpersonal exploitation.”21 Goodin concludes his analysis of exploitation by
arguing that the duty to protect the vulnerable implies not only a negative duty to refrain
from exploiting them, but also a positive duty to “do whatever we can to prevent anyone
(ourselves or others) from taking unfair advantage of people’s vulnerabilities.”22
In short, Goodin argues that ‘exploitation in general’ involves taking advantage of an
unusual situation. But the negatively moralised form of exploitation that we are concerned
with involves the exploitation of a person. The wrongful use of others’ attributes is exploita-
tion when we use their vulnerabilities, no matter the source, to secure for ourselves some
form of benefit in games of strategy. We have a duty, Goodin claims, not only to refrain from
exploiting people in this way, but also to do whatever we can to ensure that these vulnerable
are not exploited by others.
4.2.3 Goodin’s Normative Foundation
The normative foundation for Goodin’s account depends on the duty to protect the vulner-
able.23. In his (1986) paper Goodin presents what he calls the ‘first principle of individual
responsibility’ as follows:
If A’s interests are vulnerable to B’s actions and choices, B has a special responsi-
bility to protect A’s interests; the strength of this responsibility depends strictly
upon the degree to which B can affect A’s interests.24
Goodin argues that responsibility for protecting the vulnerable means a responsibility to
protect others from harm, regardless of whether the source of the harm is in human action
or natural events. Further, Goodin argues that this responsibility falls upon “whoever has
the ‘last clear chance’ to prevent harm. . . regardless of the causal history up to that point.”25
For Goodin there is no important moral difference between acts and omissions.26 Further,
we should not conceive of the harm that might befall persons as merely material harm;
rather, a person is harmed when their general welfare is compromised. Yet, Goodin also
notes that material interests should not be altogether excluded: “there are certain sorts
of things that the principle would require us to do for others no matter what particular
standard of interests we adopt. Specifically we would be required to protect people’s ‘needs’
or ‘vital interests’: these are ‘primary goods’.”27 This focus on the outcomes or consequences
of vulnerability makes his account “fundamentally consequentalistic in form”28 since “it is
always responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions and choices that is at issue.”29
Goodin equates vulnerability with harm and harm with a loss of welfare. Thus, the duty to
protect the vulnerable can be expressed as a duty to minimise welfare loss, or conversely, to
maximise welfare.
20Goodin claims that exploitation is a “flagrant violation of a duty” (p.167) and that our obligations
originate in a “norm” (pp.188–89). At the end of his paper he returns to the use of ‘duty’ (p.189). These
shifts give us some insight into the sense in which Goodin is using ‘duty’: for Goodin the duty to protect the
vulnerable depends on the existence of a commonly agreed upon norm.
21Goodin (1987, p.188)
22Goodin (1987, p.189)
23Goodin (1986)
24Goodin (1986, p.118). Goodin also develops a “Principle of Group Responsibility” and a “Second Prin-
ciple of Individual Responsibility”, both of which deal with special cases of distributed responsibility.
25Goodin (1986, p.129)
26Goodin (1986, p.110)
27Goodin (1986, p.111)
28Goodin (1986, p.116)
29Goodin (1986, p.113)
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4.3 Sample’s Degradation-Based Account
Ruth Sample argues that Goodin’s consequentialist normative foundation creates three prob-
lems for his account of exploitation. First, at least prima facie, there seems to be a tension
in the idea that we have special obligations to intimates and the underlying consequentialism
Goodin espouses; second, it is unclear how Goodin’s account can solve the paradox of ex-
ploitation since (strictly) Pareto-improving transactions will entail welfare improvements. Fi-
nally, the account seems subject to the traditional demandingness objections levelled against
consequentialist accounts.30
Nevertheless, Sample acknowledges the importance of vulnerability, but seeks to limit
the scope of our obligations to the vulnerable. Thus, in this sense, her account can be
seen as a refinement of Goodin’s. The normative foundations of Sample’s account are non-
consequentialist. She argues that exploitation involves interacting with another being for the
sake of advantage in a way that degrades or fails to respect the inherent value in that being.
4.3.1 Critique of Goodin
Sample sees Goodin’s consequentialist foundation as fundamentally mistaken, arguing that
it “has all of the traditional drawbacks and counterintuitive results of consequentialism”
and is ultimately unable to account for our intuition that we owe more to intimates than
strangers.31 Although Sample critiques the tension between Goodin’s consequentialism and
his desire to incorporate special obligations into a vulnerability-based moral principle, she
does not argue that the tension cannot be resolved, but only states that “it is unclear that
the notion of obligation is consistent with Goodin’s framework.”32 While the existence of
such a tension is clear, Goodin is not unaware of this tension; indeed, he spends a great
deal of time in his book Protecting the Vulnerable (1986) addressing it. Nevertheless, an
evaluation of Goodin’s arguments here would take us far afield. Since Sample claims that
Goodin’s account suffers from two remaining problems. In the interest of space, I will turn
to these concerns.
Sample worries that Goodin’s consequentialism leaves him unable to provide a solution to
the paradox of exploitation. Both Sample and Goodin agree that there are some consensual,
Pareto-improving transactions that are, nevertheless, impermissible. They must, therefore,
both abandon the non-worseness premise. Yet as Sample states, “if consequences are ulti-
mately what matter, Goodin needs an argument to show that exploitation in general fails to
bring about good consequences. . . [but] it is hard to see how mutually beneficial exploitation
is a case of failing to bring about good consequences.”33 In short, Goodin’s consequentialism
seems to commit him to the acceptance of the non-worseness condition.
Sample notes that Goodin can claim we are not merely obliged to bring about good
consequences to the vulnerable, but we ought to “optimally enhance” their welfare.34 But in
this case, she argues, Goodin’s account is too morally demanding. Surely exploitation does
not involve the failure to optimally enhance the welfare of those with whom we transact. But,
Sample claims, without a successful argument against the non-worseness premise, Goodin is
30Sample (2003, p.27)
31Sample (2003, p.47)
32Sample (2003, p.46)
33Sample (2003, p.51) Sample’s argument here is weak. Sebastian Ko¨ehler reminds me that a consequen-
tialist can be a value pluralist. For example, Goodin can attach value to welfare and also to how that welfare
is created (e.g. whether it is created by harming the vulnerable). This might give a high amount of welfare
a lower moral value than a lesser amount of welfare if there former was created by harming the vulnerable.
34Sample (2003, p.53)
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unable to provide a solution to the paradox of exploitation. Goodin seeks to limit the scope
of our obligations by claiming that “on balance, persons relatively near to us in space and in
time probably will be rather more vulnerable to us. . . . This fact saves my argument from
the traditional reductio of requiring that we give everything we have to starving Asians. . . ”35
Sample disagrees:
The reductio works. . . global communication has made it possible to collect, store,
and transfer data about others quickly and accurately. Not only can we discern
who is suffering from starvation, dehydration, and disease. . . but it is also pos-
sible to match organ donors to recipients with just the same technology. The
vulnerability model implies enormous moral debt to countless unknown others.36
My own view is that Sample and Goodin’s debate about whether the scope of Goodin’s
theory extends to ‘unknown others’ is tangential to a much deeper problem. I believe that the
primary demandingness objection that Goodin’s account faces is not that it might oblige us
to persons half a world away, but that it might too easily oblige us to persons wherever they
live. Goodin’s insistence that we have not only a negative duty to refrain from exploitation
but a positive duty to do “whatever we can to prevent anyone” from taking advantage of
vulnerabilities regardless of the source is extremely morally demanding and leaves scant room
for personal responsibility, an issue I address in section 4.4.37 For now though, it is clear
that Goodin must provide additional argument, both in order to account for both forms of
demandingness and to show how his account of exploitation can condemn Pareto-improving
consensual transactions. It seems that an account of exploitation that incorporates Goodin’s
concerns about the misuse of vulnerable others in a non-consequentialist framework could
allow us to characterise the concept by considering the attitudes and duties involve in A’s
interaction with B without the problems of consequentialism. Sample’s goal is to provide
such an account.
4.3.2 Exploitation as Degradation
Sample recognises the need for a theory that sits “between the extreme level of obligation
entailed by the views of Peter Singer and Robert Goodin, on the one hand, and the ex-
tremely deflationary account of obligation delivered by voluntarism. . . and the other views
that emphasise negative rights, on the other.”38 For Sample, it is neither the case that
we are responsible only to those whose vulnerability is the result of our voluntary actions,
nor is it the case that we are committed to doing whatever we can to prevent anyone from
being exploited. While Goodin’s focus on vulnerability is well-motivated, Sample argues
this vulnerability is not itself the source of our obligation to others. Rather, people may be
vulnerable because their basic needs are not met, or because they are the victims of past
injustice, but in either case, taking advantage of such vulnerability means we degrade or
fail to appropriately respect the person. Vulnerability, Sample argues, “is thus dependent
upon an account of what humans require for a good life.”39 And exploitation stems from our
failure to respect others by ensuring that their needs are met when we do choose to interact
with them. According to Sample’s account, exploitation involves
35Goodin (1986, p.121, emphasis original)
36Sample (2003, p.48)
37Goodin (1987, p.187, emphasis added)
38Sample (2003, p.75)
39Sample (2003, p.74)
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. . . interacting with another being for the sake of advantage in a way that degrades
or fails to respect the inherent value in that being. It is this lack of respect that
explains the badness of exploitation. . . This accommodates the fact that moral
agents can fail to demonstrate respect for persons not simply in the course of
harming them, but also when improving their situation.40
These failures of respect fall into three general domains. We can fail to show proper respect
for, or degrade the value of other persons by:
(D1) Taking advantage of an injustice done to him.
(D2) Neglecting what is necessary for that person’s well-being or flourishing.
(D3) Treating as a fungible object of market exchange, an aspect of that person’s being that
ought not to be commodified.41
The first form of disrespect echoes the domain of exploitation found in Steiner’s and Roemer’s
theories and, as we might expect, Sample’s elaboration of (D1) bears a strong resemblance
to Steiner’s account. She claims, “If a person is in a weaker bargaining position because of a
past injustice, we stand to gain disproportionately in virtue of that injustice.”42 But Sample
extends the domain of exploitation to cases covered by (D2) and (D3).
Sample argues that when we interact with others in a way that benefits them “but
nonetheless would ignore [their] basic needs, then [we] must ask whether the maxim of [our]
action would pass the test of the categorical imperative. If my action cannot pass this test,
then it is prohibited.”43 When we transact with others whose basic needs are not met we
fail to respect their value as persons and, thereby, exploit them.44 Sample notes that there
are many accounts of those goods that constitute basic needs or human flourishing, but she
argues that the concept is best elaborated by Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach,45 and in
particular, Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of basic capabilities.46 Thus, Sample argues
that we should interpret basic needs as capabilities and exploitative interactions as “those in
which the capabilities of our interactors are ignored47 in the pursuit of our own advantage.”48
Finally, we may also fail to respect others by commodifying an aspect of their person
that ought not to be commodified. There are some transactions in which the “nature of
the transaction itself” is degrading.49 When we engage in such transactions for the sake of
advantage we engage in exploitation. Sample notes that “just what sorts of things ought
40Sample (2003, p.57, emphasis added)
41Sample (2003, p.57)
42Sample (2003, p.82). One significant difference between Sample’s account and Steiner’s is that Sample
argues that if a person’s bargaining power is not “seriously compromised” (Sample, 2003, p.83) by an injustice,
then they are not exploited; for Steiner, all unjust disadvantages can lead to exploitaition.
43Sample (2003, p.71)
44It should be noted that this test of the categorical imperative, in its rudimentary form, is problematic.
Also problematic is Sample’s application of the test to exploitation. It doesn’t seem that all actions falling
within Sample’s example fail such a test: when I buy a handmade wallet from a man at a craft fair but give
no regard for whether his basic needs are met do I really fail to respect his value as a person? It does not
seem that Sample means that exploitation is caused by mere neglect of what is necessary for well-being, since
one might neglect the well-being of the well-off. Rather, more charitably she seems to mean something like
the following: exploitation can be caused by the failure to constrain one’s transaction with persons who are
blatantly impoverished.
45Sen (1999)
46Nussbaum (2003)
47Note that Sample does not mean ‘ignored’ in the literal sense, but rather something like ‘not given proper
weight’ or ‘not considered from a moral point of view’. In many cases, in order to exploit others we must in
fact pay attention to their capabilities, if only to use them for our own gain.
48Sample (2003, p.81)
49Sample (2003, p.81)
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not to be subject to market exchange is of course a controversy. Hence the exploitation
claims made by appealing to such an anticommodification argument are also controversial.”50
Sample refrains from endorsing a particular account of those transactions that fall within the
domain of (D3), but, in places, she suggests that the sale of sex is a characteristic example.51
For Sample, most cases of exploitation involve a failure to meet the basic needs of the
vulnerable party; many others occur when we take advantage of past injustice. She implies
that relatively few cases will involve the anticommodification domain (D3). We can imagine
her account as a nested account: all transactions52 in which the benefits of the transaction
fall below a certain basic needs level for one person are exploitative. Some transactions
above this level are also exploitative, namely, those involving historical injustice. Finally,
some transactions that are neither below a basic needs level nor affected by past injustice
are also exploitative because they are inherently degrading.
Note that, like Steiner, Sample considers the general domain of exploitation to be that of
bilateral and voluntary transactions. Her account is clearly an individualised account that
does not allow for systemic exploitation. Interestingly she also argues that unintentional
exploitation is possible when exploiters “believe that their interactors are not deserving of
respect. . . [when they are] mistaken in their accounts of what respect requires. . . , [and when
they are] mistaken in their judgement of what it takes to fulfil the requirement of respect.”53
Sample also claims that exploitation is a negatively moralised concept, but that it may at
times be morally bad (as opposed to morally wrong). Although she does not explicitly address
the tension between unintentional exploitation and the claim that it is a negatively moralised
concept, Sample’s remarks about the moral badness of exploitation indicate that she would
prefer this solution to the problem.
Sample’s move to a nonconsequentalist framework allows her to avoid the problem plagu-
ing Goodin’s theory: nothing in her ethical framework prevents her from claiming that
Pareto-improving consensual transactions are impermissible when they degrade one of the
parties. Thus, she offers a consistent solution to the paradox of exploitation. An appeal to
disrespect (degradation) allows her to reject the non-worseness premise. Further, her shift
from Goodin’s claim that we are obliged to the vulnerable regardless of the source of their
vulnerability to the claim that we are obliged to those who are vulnerable in (D1) and (D2)
limits the demandingness of her theory. Whether Sample’s inclusion of the anticommodifi-
cation domain (D3) is an improvement upon Goodin’s theory or a weakness is debatable.54
Sample offers little in the way of a normative defence of (D3) and does not endorse “any
particular conception of which features of persons are beyond exchange.”55 Noting that it
is “the most controversial” of the domains, she offers what seems to be a defence of (D3)
on descriptive grounds: “whether one finds these anticommodification claims plausible, it
seems clear that they constitute an important class of putative judgments of exploitation
claims.”56 We can accept the claim that people do speak about exploitation in this way,
without agreeing these claims have normative force.
50Sample (2003, p.83)
51Sample (2003, p.95)
52Sample does offer a caveat here: if the only possible mutually beneficial transaction is one in which the
basic needs of one person cannot be met then the transaction is not exploitative (Sample, 2003, p.75). The
concerns that motivate this caveat will reemerge in chapter 6.
53Sample (2003, pp.58–59)
54Although Goodin agrees with Sample that “there are some uses to which people should not be put” and
that it would be “exploitative to use a person in these ways”, it is not clear (nor does Goodin tell us) how
such uses can be wrong based only on an appeal to vulnerability (Goodin, 1987, p.181).
55Sample (2003, p.75)
56Sample (2003, p.58)
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4.3.3 Objective Value and Non-commodification
It is time to make good on chapter 3’s promise to discuss objective value-based approaches
to exploitation in more detail. In that chapter I noted that objective value theories may
be used to support accounts of exploitation in two ways, either by identifying a moralised
baseline that grounds the claim that a particular transaction does not give ‘enough’ to B,
as Marx’s labour theory of value does, or by claiming that a particular kind of transaction,
such as the commodification of sex, is impermissible.
In chapter 3 I also provided a number of reasons for rejecting Marx’s particular objective
theory of value. While many other labour-based and cost-of-production-based objective
value theories exist, there are a number of reasons to curtail discussion of this approach to
exploitation. The first and most practical is that space and time do not permit an excursion
into territory tangential to the current project. The second reason is that at least some of the
problems that Marx’s theory faces are not limited to his account, but rather are problems
that exist for a whole family of objective value theories. These common problems give
us some reason to see whether subjective value theories can deliver an adequate account of
exploitation. The third and final reason is that, problems related to establishing anything like
wide consensus about the plausibility of a particular objective value theory aside, objective
approaches make the solution of the paradox of exploitation quite straightforward. Pareto-
improving, consensual transactions are impermissible when the goods exchanged do not
trade at their fair price. There is simply nothing morally perplexing about exploitation for
the objective value theorist (once they develop their value theory). The ‘hard’ problem of
exploitation arises only for the subjective value theorist. If goods are simply worth what
people will pay for them, then it cannot be the case that a particular transaction is an
exploitation because the goods don’t exchange for what they are worth. This feature of
subjective value theories has led many to claim that “liberalism is conceptually incapable of
construing any consensual exchange as exploitative”57 and thus to simply reject the concept
of exploitation out of hand.58 Thus, one reason for focusing on subjective theories of value
is to see whether such dismissals of exploitation are justified.
However, these three reasons are not (at least directly) reasons for abandoning Sam-
ple’s claim that certain transactions are exploitative because they involve non-commodifiable
goods. One may claim, as Sample appears to, that most of the goods that we exchange are
‘normal’ goods that are not subject to the anticommodification argument. The value of these
‘normal’ goods is determined simply by individuals’ subjective preferences. Those ‘special’
goods that form the basis of the anticommodification argument, on the other hand, have a
value that is not determined by subjective preferences, and it is this special objective value
that prohibits exchanges of these goods. This kind of pluralism does not escape the ‘hard’
problem of exploitation, for even if some exploitations involve trade in non-commodifiable
goods, Sample must still explain—without appealing to objective values—what is wrong with
those cases that involve Pareto-improving consensual transactions of ‘normal’ goods. From
the pluralist perspective then, anticommodification exploitation is an extension of ordinary
exploitation.
Sample’s comments in the quotes from above indicate that she is aware that lists of non-
commodifiable goods are “controversial” and indeed the difficulty of defending such a list
57Steiner (1987, p.132)
58See, for example, Nozick’s claim that “Marxian exploitation is the exploitation of people’s lack of under-
standing of economics.”(1974, p.264)
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seems to be behind her reluctance to endorse “any particular conception of which features
of persons are beyond exchange.”59 However, it is possible to make the weaker claim that
certain aspects of life ought not to be commodified without also holding the view that there
is anything intrinsically wrong with doing so. Rather, our worry about the commodification
of, for example, child labour could be that it exists only because of past injustices and
inequalities. “The problem with child labor, on this view,” writes Debra Satz, “is the whip
of poverty and hunger that compels parents to put their children to work, not the market in
child labor itself.”60
This approach seems preferable for Sample since it would allow her to claim that (for
example) nearly all exchanges of sex for money are exploitative without the need to defend
the claim that such exchanges are intrinsically morally amiss. Such transactions would be
exploitative when they violate either of the two remaining domains: past injustice and basic
needs. Further, if nearly all of a particular kind of transaction involve violations of these two
domains, we have good practical reasons to enact legal prohibitions or restrictions on these
transactions.
Thus, while there are two ways in which we might base an account of exploitation on
an appeal to objective values, neither seems well-motivated. First, subjective theories of
economic value, such as Marx’s labour theory of value, face many challenges and explaining
why even those who endorse a subjective value must worry about exploitation is a valuable
project. Second, claims that some forms of exploitation involve trade in goods that we ought
not commodify may be made without the need to appeal to the claim that these forms
of transaction are intrinsically morally amiss. This approach reduces Sample’s domains of
exploitation from three to two. In the following section I present a dilemma for both Sample’s
and Goodin’s accounts that reduces Sample’s account of exploitation to the first domain of
exploitation, leaving her with an approach equivalent to Steiner’s.
4.4 A Dilemma for Duty-Based Accounts
It has been commonly acknowledged that exploitation is—or involves—taking unfair advan-
tage.61 Of course, as Richard Arneson points out, useful definitions must go further. If
exploitation is simply taking unfair advantage, then there will “be as many competing con-
ceptions of exploitation as theories of what persons owe to each other by way of fair treat-
ment.”62 Steiner and Roemer go further by arguing that exploitation falls within the domain
of injustice. Sample and Goodin argue that although exploitation can often be brought about
by injustice, it may also involve a failure to be constrained by others’ disadvantage.
In particular, according to Sample’s and Goodin’s approaches, exploitation may be caused
by taking advantage of mere poverty, vulnerability, or disability, that is by taking advantage
of mere disadvantage. Goodin claims disadvantage can generate exploitation “regardless
of the particular source”63 of the disadvantage, and Sample claims that exploitation may
occur when we neglect “what is necessary for [a] person’s well-being or flourishing.”64 In
59Sample (2003, p.75, 53)
60Satz (2010, p.5) Satz herself disagrees, arguing that “we have reasons to block certain markets, to limit
the domain of things that money can buy, even when such limits cannot be justified by considerations of
economic desperation or by a prior unjust distribution of income and wealth.” (Satz, 2010, p.5)
61See, for example, Goodin (1987); Sample (2003); Steiner (1984, 1987); Tormey (1976); Wertheimer (1996);
Wolff (1999); Wood (1995). Wood is an exception: on his account although taking unfair advantage is
sufficient for exploitation, it is not necessary.
62Arneson (1992, p.350)
63Goodin (1987, p.187)
64Sample (2003, p.57)
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contrast, while the disadvantaged—when unjustly disadvantaged—may be called exploited
under theories such as Steiner’s, which admit only injustice as a cause of exploitation, those
who are not unjustly disadvantaged cannot be exploited.65 In other words, for the present
debate we may suppose the sources of exploitation fall within two domains: the domain
of injustice (D1) and the domain of disadvantage (D2). Sample and Goodin claim that
exploitation may be brought about by causes from either domain, while Steiner and Roemer
deny that the subset of (D2) that does not intersect with (D1) can be a source of exploitation.
The latter admit only that subset of (D2) that intersects with (D1). Although I will not
consider his account in this section, Allen Wood summarises the juridical versus non-juridical
debate nicely when he writes,
It is often thought that exploitation is bad because the exploiter takes unfair
advantage of the exploitee. But [for Sample and Goodin] we have reason to
consider exploitation bad even when it involves no unfairness or injustice. For
if the badness of exploitation lies in the fact that it is base and dishonourable
of the exploiter, and insulting and degrading to the exploited, for the former to
make use of the latter’s vulnerability, then this badness seems to be present even
where the exploitation involves no unfairness, injustice, or violation of rights.66
Thus, while both accounts acknowledge that injustice can generate exploitation, they also
argue—implicitly or explicitly—that various forms of disadvantage (poverty, vulnerability)
may be independent sources of exploitation.
4.4.1 Sample’s Dilemma
Although the existence of non-juridical exploitation brought about by mere disadvantage
seems plausible, Sample and Goodin face a common dilemma: all cases of mere disadvantage-
generated non-juridical exploitation are either self-frustrating or incomplete. Since the ac-
counts differ slightly, I present a case that highlights the dilemma for Sample’s account first
before considering a case that presents a problem for Goodin’s account.
Consider the following sequential game, given in both strategic and narrative form. In
the strategic form tree, ‘A’ and ‘B’ denote the players, ‘0’ a chance node, and ‘C’, ‘W’, and
‘E’ represent the options ‘cooperate with’, ‘work for’, and ‘employ’, respectively.
65That is, they cannot be exploited in virtue of this particular disadvantage. They may at some time, past
or future, be victims of injustice and thus face the possibility of exploitation.
66Wood (1995, p.17)
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C8: The lotteries (sequential).
Stage 1: Consider the following two lotteries, L1 and L2. Individual A may choose
either, but B is (for whatever reason) committed to L2.
L1 (p =
1
2 , $100; 1− p, $0)
L2 (p = 1, $50)
Stage 2: A and B now face each other in the labour market. The wealthier of the two
is the employer and pays wages out of the revenue he earns to the less wealthy, who
is the employee. If they are equally wealthy they may work cooperatively, paying no
wages and splitting revenue equally. Suppose the values for revenue, wages, and profit
are as follow: R = $11, ω = $5, pi = 6. The revenue from a cooperative venture is
thus $5.50. Finally, suppose the following constraint, embodying Sample’s particular
approach to (D2), holds:
BN If a player chooses to transact with another, then all players’ outcomes must be
≥ $10.
L2B
L2
L1
A
1
2Loss
1
2Win
0
¬E
$100, $50
E
A
¬W $100, $50
W $106, $55
B
¬W
$0, $50
W
A
¬E $0, $50
E $10, $51
B
¬C
C
B
¬C $50, $50
C $55
1
2 , $55
1
2
A
¬C $50, $50
C $50, $50
A
Figure 1: Γ1 (BN Holds)
C8 in strategic form.
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When B is committed to L2, which lottery
67 should A (rationally) choose, assuming
players have full knowledge of the game structure? We can answer this question using
backward induction. Let us first consider the bottom branch, supposing A chooses L2. In
this case, the players will be equally wealthy, each holding $50. They may choose to form a
cooperative venture or to not cooperate, but clearly it is in the interest of each to cooperate,
so the outcome of A choosing L2 is ($55.50, $55.50).
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Suppose A chooses L1. Then, there are two equiprobable possibilities: either A will win
the lottery, or A will lose the lottery. Suppose A loses, then after the lottery A will be the
poorest. He can choose to work for B or to remain unemployed, and B can choose whether
to employ A, but both will choose employment. Since post-lottery A has $0, BN holds. B
must pay A $10 in wages, but she keeps $1 for herself. The outcome of a lottery loss is thus
($10, $51). What if A wins the lottery? Then A will be the wealthiest player. And again,
it is rational for both players to choose employment. This time A is the employer and, since
both players’ holdings are greater than $10, BN doesn’t apply. A will pay B $5, keeping
$6 for himself in profits. Thus, the outcome of a lottery win is ($106, $55). Now, a lottery
win and a lottery loss are both equally likely, so the expected value of choosing L1 is
1
2 the
outcome of a win and 12 the outcome of a loss, or ($58, $53). Since the expected value of L1
is greater for A than the expected value of L2, A will rationally choose L1.
In order to determine the effect of (D2) on the outcome of the case69 we must consider
two variants of the case70: one with, and one without the (D2) constraints (BN) in place.
When we consider the variant where BN does not hold, it is clear that a difference in the
outcomes of A’s choice is generated by BN. If BN does not hold, the outcome of A choosing
L1, losing the lottery, choosing work, and B choosing employ (i.e., the fourth terminal node
from the top) changes to ($5, $56), making the expected value of L1 ($55.50, $55.50). Thus,
if BN doesn’t hold, the expected value of A’s choice is equivalent for both players and for
both lotteries. Table 4.1 lists the expected value of each lottery for A and B, with, and
without BN.
A
B
L2
L1 $58.00, $53.00
L2 $55.50, $55.50
A
B
L2
L1 $55.50, $55.50
L2 $55.50, $55.50
Table 4.1: Expected values with (left) and without (right) BN.
When BN is in place, if A chooses L1, A does better and B worse. Since this difference
is brought about by A’s actions, A gains $2.50 of (expected) value at B’s expense. With BN
in place, players have an incentive to choose L1 and to avoid L2. In other words, if given a
meta-choice between being in the position of A or B, players would choose to be A because
A’s choice of L1 affects the expected value of L2 for B.
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Intuitively, and from an ordinary language point of view, when BN holds and A chooses
67We may consider these lotteries as something like choices between alternative social positions.
68I follow the convention of representing outcomes as: (A, B) and strategy profiles as 〈A,B〉.
69Since the goal is to determine the effect of being bound by BN on the outcomes, we must consider
variations in the presence of BN since “event ‘e’ depends causally on [possible cause] ‘c’ if and only if, if c
had not been, e had never existed” (Lewis, 1973, p.563).
70Strictly speaking, these are two different games, but here I refer to them as variations of one case.
71The inability of B to choose her own lottery is a topic I will return to below.
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L1, A takes unfair advantage of—exploits—B. The presence of BN means that B subsidises
the loss A experiences. If A loses, B must ensure that if she transacts with A, A’s basic needs
are met. Yet, A pays nothing for the chance of subsidy: if A wins the lottery, he does not
share the gains with B. Since BN requires part of A’s costs to be covered by B, but does not
require that A share his gains with B, BN increases the expected value of choosing L1 for A.
Clearly, A takes advantage of B’s being bound by BN.
Is A’s advantage unfair? It seems it is. A’s use of BN to secure greater expected value
for himself is at odds with the spirit, if not the letter, of BN. Presumably the principle is
meant to help those who are truly in need of aid—the real poor—and not those who, like A,
began in a situation that is better than the situation of B and end up worse off through their
own choice. Before A’s choice, B could expect72 at least $50, and A’s choice set contained
all options in B’s choice set (L2, plus L1). Thus, pre-choice, A is doing at least as well as
B. Since A could have chosen L2, it is unfair for him to use BN to subsidise his losses if he
chooses L1 and loses. Thus, A not only takes advantage of B, but his doing so is unfair. If
exploitation involves taking unfair advantage, then since A takes unfair advantage of B in
the lotteries case, A exploits B in this situation.
Sample may respond that this means the choice of L1 is impermissible. Since choosing L1
leads to A’s exploiting B, A may not choose the risky option. If this choice is impermissible,
then in a deontically perfect version of the lotteries case, A cannot become disadvantaged and
therefore, cannot be in a position to receive the BN subsidy. Therefore, he cannot exploit
B. However, if A is not in a position to receive the subsidy, B is not obliged to abide by
BN and there is no possibility of disadvantage-based non-juridical exploitation. This form
of exploitation can only occur when B disrespects A by neglecting what is necessary for A’s
well-being or flourishing, but if A cannot lose the lottery, his basic needs will not go unmet.
Thus, while we encounter no problems when prohibiting A’s choice of L1, there is also no
non-juridical exploitation in this case—at least when A abides by the obligation to refrain
from choosing L1.
But what if either A does not abide by his obligation to refrain from exploiting by choosing
L1, or there is no such obligation? In these cases, if A chooses L1 and wins, it does not make
sense to claim that he has exploited B because no exchange has occurred between A and
B (and again here there will be no non-juridical exploitation). But if A chooses L1 and
loses, then when A receives BN from B, A exploits B because, as I argued above, in so doing
A takes unfair advantage of B. Since exploitation is impermissible, A is obliged to refrain
from taking the BN subsidy. But Sample’s remarks about (D2)—cases involving a failure to
meet basic needs—indicate that if B fails to meet A’s basic needs, by failing to give him the
subsidy when she employs him B exploits A. If A exploits B when he receives the subsidy
and B exploits A when she fails to give it, we face a problem.
In order for each to avoid exploiting the other, they must allow themselves to be exploited.
And conversely, in order to avoid exploitation, they each must allow the other to exploit.
In a discussion of a related case, Hillel Steiner writes, “they are each obligated to employ
all available measures necessary to remove the obstacle constituted by the other person’s
[not exploiting]. And this obligation persists until the point where either (i) one of them
has actually prevailed. . . and the other is incapable of further ‘attempting’, or (ii) both are
[so] incapable. . . ”73 Sample’s account provides no way of determining who should concede.
Short of an appeal to justice that would undermine the non-juridical nature of the case,
72$50 from L2 plus whatever she gained from the second round.
73Steiner (1994, pp.197–98)
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there is no way to adjudicate between A’s and B’s attempts to not exploit. Sample’s account
of exploitation implies a self-frustrating moral code, “the rules of which at once make [non-
exploitative] performances obligatory and, at the same time, are such as to require (in certain
circumstances) the deliberate frustration of any [non-exploitative] performance for the sake
of no other principle or value.”74
Sample might claim that A’s actions cannot be described as exploitation according to
her theory because these actions do not satisfy (D1), (D2), or (D3). If A’s actions are
not exploitation, then the theory is not self-frustrating. Rather, it gives a unified guide to
action. B is obliged to provide A with the BN subsidy. While this approach would avoid the
self-frustrating objection, it leaves Sample’s theory unable to capture a paradigmatic case
of exploitation. A and B are in nearly identical situations—they are only nearly identical
because A’s ability to choose between the two lotteries means his opportunities are better
than those of B. Yet through his own choice, A takes a risky option that may result in his
becoming impoverished. Not only does A free ride, A free rides on B’s willingness to abide
by a moral principle. Surely we desire an account that is capable of identifying cases of free
riding on moral principles as cases of exploitation.
The problem can be presented as a dilemma. When disadvantage-based non-juridical
exploitation occurs, either:
Horn 1: The account is incomplete, or
Horn 2: The account is self-frustrating.75
In order to avoid the horns, Sample must abandon the implicit claim in (D2) that “neglecting
what is necessary for that person’s well-being or flourishing” may serve as a separate source of
exploitation above and beyond the source of injustice.76 When combined with my argument
against (D3) in 4.3.3, we see that Sample’s account is reduced to (D1).
4.4.2 Goodin’s Dilemma
A similar problem exists for Goodin’s account of exploitation. Recall that Goodin argues
exploitation is unfair because it involves the use of others to attain our own ends. In partic-
ular, exploitation is the objectionable use of others who are vulnerable: a failure to respect
the duty to protect the vulnerable “regardless of the particular source of their vulnerabil-
ity.”77 We exploit others when we use their vulnerabilities to secure for ourselves some form
of benefit in a game of strategy. With this in mind, consider the following case:
C9: Rural roads.
Suppose A is returning home during a rainstorm. He faces a choice between
two routes: rural route, and urban route. The first is much quicker, but there
is a 0.50 probability he will become stranded (vulnerable) in the rugged and
muddy terrain. The second route is longer, but certain to be passable with his
car. However, A knows B’s farm lies along the rural route and, since Goodin’s
vulnerability principle holds, he knows B is required to help him if he is stranded.
Which road should A take?
74Steiner (1994, p.199, emphasis original). Note that the self-frustrating objection does not depend on the
denial of mutual exploitation, that is, it cannot be avoided by claiming A and B exploit each other. A’s
exploiting B and B’s exploiting A in the lottery case are mutually exclusive actions. The performance of one
action precludes the other.
75Thanks to Christian List for pointing out this structure of the problem.
76Sample (2003, p.57)
77Goodin (1987, p.187)
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Although less formal, the general structure of this case is similar to the lotteries case:
A is faced with a choice between a risky and a certain option. Like Sample’s claim that
we should ensure basic needs are met, Goodin’s duty to protect the vulnerable requires B
to subsidise A when A loses a freely chosen gamble. However, unlike the previous example,
here A is obliged to aid B when B is vulnerable to A.78 Nevertheless as with Sample, Goodin
faces a dilemma.
“The vulnerable”, Goodin tells us, are “those whose interests are strongly affected by
our actions and choices.”79 It is a “relational notion: a full specification will tell us who
is vulnerable to whom with respect to what. Saying that A is particularly vulnerable to B
with respect to X clearly fingers B as the agent who should be particularly responsible for
seeing to it that A’s interests in X are protected.”80 Since B is the only person able to help
A in the rural roads case, A’s interests are strongly affected by B’s actions and choices. A
is vulnerable to B with respect to being rescued because he is stranded close to B’s home.
Therefore, should B choose to aid A, B must not take advantage of A’s vulnerability by
charging him for rescue.81 However, by the same criteria, B is also vulnerable to A. B is
vulnerable to A with respect to Goodin’s duty to protect the vulnerable. In the rural roads
case, if A chooses the risky option and becomes stranded, B must rescue A without profit,
just as B must subsidise A in the lotteries case. When A takes the rural road and forces B to
subsidise him B is vulnerable to A. If A is stranded and B profits from A’s rescue, B exploits
A, but if B doesn’t profit, then A unfairly uses Goodin’s duty to protect the vulnerable to
extract a benefit at B’s expense, namely, cheap rescue. If both A and B fail to protect the
vulnerable, either A must allow B to profit for rescue, thereby making B an exploiter, or B
must rescue without profit, thereby making A an exploiter. Goodin, too, faces a problem of
self-frustration.
But perhaps, how the vulnerabilities have arisen is relevant. Perhaps A is not really
vulnerable since A freely chose to take the rural route knowing B would be obliged to help
him. Goodin disagrees: “how the vulnerabilities have arisen is not relevant: all vulnerabilities
give rise to the same sorts of responsibilities.”82 Thus, on Goodin’s account of vulnerability
we must conclude that A is indeed vulnerable to B when his car becomes stuck. Perhaps we
must conclude then that B is not really vulnerable to A because vulnerability is such that
only one of the two may be ‘all-things-considered’ vulnerable to the other. While this claim
about vulnerability seems reasonable, it runs contrary to Goodin’s arguments.
Goodin may, of course, alter his account of vulnerability so that we cannot claim B is
vulnerable to A, but as with Sample’s theory, this move only damages the ability of Goodin’s
theory to incorporate a paradigmatic case of exploitation. Surely when A takes advantage
of B’s vulnerability to Goodin’s moral principle, A exploits B. Thus, the incompleteness
objection that confronts Samples theory arises again for Goodin. Any theory that cannot
capture this case of exploitation is incomplete. Goodin faces the same dilemma as Sample:
when disadvantage-based non-juridical exploitation occurs, either the account is incomplete,
or the account is self-frustrating.
78Note that what is important here is that A is obliged to transact with B according to Goodin’s accout of
obligations. Whether there is such a general obligation in these non-life-threatening cases is open to debate.
79Goodin (1987, p.191)
80Goodin (1987, p.118)
81Perhaps B is entitled to receive the cost of rescue from A, but he is presumably not entitled to profit
from A’s vulnerability. Unlike in the lotteries case, the rural roads case does not operationalise Goodin’s
vulnerability obligation in a constraint like BN.
82Goodin (1986, p.142)
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4.4.3 Diagnosis
In both theories we find the claim that mere disadvantage may generate wrongful non-
juridical exploitation. It seems true that those who engage in (D1) exploitation, that is,
those who take advantage of unjust disadvantage, are guilty of degrading behaviour. But
who are those who would fall only in (D2)? They are those who are disadvantaged, but not
unjustly disadvantaged.83 It is possible to construct cases that generate a dilemma for both
theories. Specifically, when individuals know that potential losses from risky options must be
subsidised by others, they have an incentive to engage in behaviour that lowers the expected
outcome of those who do not take risks. On Sample’s account the independence of the duty
to ensure basic needs are met from the cause of the poverty generates the dilemma; for Wood
and Goodin the source of the problem is the duty to protect the vulnerable “regardless of
the particular source”84 or “even where the exploitation involves no unfairness, injustice, or
violation of rights.”85
The common cause of the dilemma is an insensitivity to personal responsibility. Consider
the original lotteries case. Note that the dilemma here would not exist if A’s choice of L1
were not exploitative. I argued above that it is indeed exploitative, but what is it that leads
to this conclusion? It is the intuition that in choosing L1 and accepting the subsidy, A
takes unfair advantage. Mere advantage taking is permissible, so it must be the unfairness
of A’s choice that creates the problem. And, as I argued above, A’s actions seem unfair
because A and B were in analogous situations,86 but A, through his own choice, took the
risky option. Requiring B to subsidise A in such cases is unfair for two reasons. First, there
is a failure of reciprocity: B shares in A’s losses, but not his gains. Second, it violates B’s
autonomy, making B subject to the bad consequences of A’s freely chosen actions. Note
that this same unfairness, generated by the insensitivity to personal responsibility, occurs
regardless of whether the requirement to aid A is based on an appeal to basic needs or
vulnerability. Although the scope and normative foundation of exploitation differs slightly
under each theory, the form of the problem remains the same. The unfairness is caused by the
presence of what we might call a ‘come-what-may’ duty that makes the theory of exploitation
insensitive to actions for which agents should be held responsible. This insensitivity, in turn,
generates a dilemma for any theory of exploitation that is based on come-what-may duties.
4.4.4 Extension
As I noted in the discussion of the lotteries case, if Sample is forced to abandon the claim
that exploitation can occur in (D2) only, and we abandon the claim that exploitation can
occur in (D3), then she is left with an account that is quite similar to Steiner’s: exploita-
tion is generated by taking advantage of past injustice. Thus, it is clear why the existence
of non-juridical exploitation is important for the uniqueness of Sample’s account. Because
non-juridical exploitation is important for Sample, avoiding the dilemma by prohibiting A
from choosing the risky lottery does not seem an attractive option for her, for this pre-
cludes the possibility of non-juridical exploitation. However, it is not clear that non-juridical
exploitation is important for Goodin’s account. Goodin might claim that the existence of
non-juridical exploitation implied by his account is simply a loophole, and one that should
83Note that these arguments are compatible with any responsibility-sensitive account of justice. Which
actions qualify as not unjust depends upon the account of justice employed.
84Goodin (1987, p.187)
85Wood (1995, p.17)
86Indeed, since A has a choice of lotteries where B does not, A is arguably better off.
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be closed. Thus, Goodin might quite happily concede that A should be prohibited from
choosing the risky option.
Unfortunately, it does not matter much whether Sample and Goodin find prohibiting
A’s risk taking an attractive solution because it is an unacceptable solution. Avoiding the
dilemma by prohibiting A’s risk taking rather than through the abandonment of come-what-
may duties amounts to a prohibition on what may often be prudent risks. Although this
claim holds for both the lotteries and the rural road cases, I will illustrate it with reference
to the lotteries case.
In the lotteries case, if L1 were replaced with the more favourable lottery L
′
1: (p =
0.99, $500; 1 − p, $0), A would still be required to forgo the risky option. In the case,
A’s choice of L1 was deemed impermissible because it involved taking unfair advantage. As
already discussed, A takes advantage because A gains at B’s expense. A’s advantage is unfair
because A’s opportunities were at least as good as B’s and yet B must subsidise A in the
event of a loss that is the result of A’s own choice.
Yet, if it is unfair to subsidise A when A’s options are better off than those of B, this
unfairness must increase as the value of A’s options increases. Thus, the justification for
the prohibition against choosing L1 also justifies prohibiting more prudential risks. Some
reasonable risks may involve known, but unlikely, outcomes where we become impoverished.
Prohibiting all such risks may seem particularly demanding, and taking many of these risks
seems morally acceptable. More importantly, this prohibition exists only because the duties
requiring B to subsidise or rescue A are not responsibility-sensitive. The fact that B may be
required to unfairly aid A means that A must not put himself in a position to be unfairly
aided. Were the duties responsibility-sensitive, B would not be required to aid A if A became
disadvantaged through his own choice and, therefore, choosing the risky option would not
be prohibited. Thus, even if Goodin and Sample abandon the claim that exploitation may
be non-juridical, the come-what-may duties that underpin their accounts require A to forgo
prudential risk, an outcome that seems less desirable than modifying the duties to incorporate
responsibility.
The impermissibility of prudential risks highlights the fact that the fundamental prob-
lem with the accounts is their insensitivity to personal responsibility and not the claim that
there may be cases of disadvantage-generated non-juridical exploitation. It is the responsi-
bility=insensitive come-what-may duties that give rise to both problems. Thus, an attempt
to avoid the dilemma by prohibiting A from choosing the risky option is merely a stopgap
solution that does not address the root problem plaguing Sample’s and Goodin’s accounts.
4.4.5 Responses
There are a number of responses Sample and Goodin might give in defence of their positions.
In what follows I present three. The first claims that the dilemma loses its force once we
distinguish between conceptions of exploitation and moral codes prohibiting exploitation.
The second grants that the dilemma is problematic in the lotteries and rural roads cases, but
argues it does not apply in all possible cases or to all accounts employing ‘come-what-may’
duties. According to this response, modified cases and theories can avoid the dilemma. The
third response argues that the dilemma’s force is derived from the peculiarities of the cases,
in particular from the asymmetry of strategic advantage between A and B.
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Conceptions and Codes
The first response runs as follows:
The construction of a moral code and conceptual analysis are two separate endeav-
ours, with different desiderata. That a particular moral code is self-frustrating
may be reason for rejecting the code, but these are not reasons for rejecting a
particular conception of exploitation. Conceptions must be judged by how well
they handle our intuitions regarding particular cases. Adequate analyses pro-
vide necessary and sufficient conditions that capture all and only instances of a
concept, measured by our intuitive grasp of the concept. Conceptions may be
deemed inadequate in light of cases that show they fail to meet these demands.
The dilemma conflates the desiderata for adequate moral codes with the desider-
ata for adequate conceptions. The first horn attempts to provide a counterexam-
ple to two conceptions of exploitation while the second provides a problem for
a moral code designed to eliminate exploitation. By conflating critiques aimed
at separate endeavours, the dilemma fails to offer a unified argument against the
conceptual analyses of exploitation presented by Sample and Goodin. For exam-
ple, it does not speak against an analysis of the concept of murder that, one way
or another, the analysis encourages more murder, but this result would speak
against a moral code designed to prevent murder.
The apparent force of this objection is illusory because the purported distinction between
conception and code cannot be maintained in the case of exploitation. If exploitation is a
negatively moralised concept (as I argue in section 5.2), then exploitation entails wrongdoing
or badness. Any analysis of a moralised concept must therefore include a normative element,
that is, the analysis must contain elements that have action-guiding force. Thus, a conceptual
analysis of exploitation implies a moral code. Problems for the implied moral code are also
problems for the conception. It is true that, for presentational ease, the dilemma employs
both the language of conceptual analysis and that of normative ethics, and this combina-
tion may prove misleading, but the dilemma may be presented in language appropriate to
conceptual analysis.
The first horn is a claim at the conceptual level: the cases present possible counterex-
amples that the theories must incorporate. A failure to label A’s choice-subsidy action
‘exploitation’ would leave the theories incapable of incorporating a paradigmatic case. But
the second horn can also be made at the conceptual level. If exploitation is a negatively
moralised concept, then conceptions must contain the normative claim that exploitation is
impermissible. Yet, a conception that includes cases that are self-frustrating cannot con-
sistently claim exploitation is impermissible, for in self-frustrating cases the elimination of
one instance of exploitation brings about another. Such a normative account can provide no
guide to action. It offers no principle by which we should judge which of A or B should back
down. Surely this is a mark against the analysis of a moralised concept.
Consider the response’s appeal to murder. While it may be correct that the fact that a
particular conception encourages more murder does not count against the conception, this
example mischaracterises the self-frustrating objection. The self-frustrating objection to MD
theories is not that they provide incentives to exploit, but rather that they claim two logically
exhaustive actions are both impermissible. The self-frustrating objection applied to murder
would involve a case where A’s failure to murder B results in A’s being murdered by B.
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Suppose A is at the bottom of a well and B is falling towards him. If A does not use his
ray gun to disintegrate B, A will be killed.87 Suppose A’s use of the ray gun is permissible
as an act of self defence; had he not used it, B would have murdered him. But in this case
we would not say that A murdered B, for murder implies wrongdoing and the use of the gun
was permissible. Then suppose A’s use of the ray gun is impermissible: If A uses the gun,
A murders B. But we would not then say that if A does not use the gun, B murders A. Of
course, if A does not use the gun, B will kill A, but saying that B murdered A would mean
that the conception of murder employed was self-frustrating. It would require that neither A
nor B could avoid wrongdoing without being wronged. Thus, the self-frustration objection
applies to conceptions of murder as well as conceptions of exploitation.
Repair and Restatement
The second form of response involves limiting the damage of the dilemma. Sample and
Goodin may acknowledge that the dilemma can be generated by their accounts, but they
might argue it can be avoided in other cases or that minor modifications to their accounts may
dissolve the dilemma. In what follows I consider three such modificaitons, the intentionality
approach, the demandingness challenge, and an attempt to weaken Sample’s BN constraint.
The Intentionality Approach. Part of the initial intuition that A exploits B when he
chooses L1 and the rural route may stem from the fact that A wouldn’t have made that
choice if B were not present. In the lotteries case, it is B’s subsidy that makes the choice of
L1 rational; in the rural roads case, the fact that B lives along the route gives A incentive
to take the risky path. Because A knows B is there to help, A takes advantage of B.
This approach makes A’s intention criterial for exploitation. If A takes risks because of B’s
subsidy, A intends to take unfair advantage of B; if A would take these risks irrespective of
B’s presence, it does not seem that A intentionally takes advantage of B.
If instead of the original cases we consider cases where A would have taken the risky
option regardless of whether B was present, we may no longer conclude that A exploits B
when choosing the risky option since A does not intend to gain from B. If A does not exploit
B when choosing the risky option, the dilemma can be avoided. As they are originally stated,
neither Sample’s nor Goodin’s account makes an agent’s intention criterial for exploitation.
Thus this approach involves modifying the accounts to include an intentionality condition.
The strategy of the intentionality condition is to claim that exploitation requires inten-
tionality, but that A lacks the relevant intention in some versions of the lotteries and rural
roads cases and thus cannot be said to exploit B. If A does not exploit B, the self-frustrating
objection can be avoided, permitting dilemma-free cases of non-juridical exploitation. The
problem with this approach is that it seems difficult to maintain the claim that A lacks the
relevant intention.
Whether A exploits B is not determined at the point of A’s choosing the risky option.
Suppose A chooses the risky option because B will subsidise him—that is, he intends to take
unfair advantage of her—but A either gets lucky or upon losing chooses to forgo the subsidy.
In either case A does not exploit B. Thus, A’s intention at the initial point of choice between
the risky and certain options is not sufficient for A’s exploiting B. Now suppose A does not
know that B will subsidise him, but chooses the risky option anyway. However, upon losing
A discovers that B is there and that she will subsidise him. A accepts the subsidy, despite
87See Nozick (1974, p.34)
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knowing that he is responsible for his own loss. Here since A was better off than B, but
lost through his own choice and still accepts the subsidy, A takes unfair advantage of B. A’s
intending to exploit B at the initial point of choice is not necessary for A to exploit B.
If A’s intending to exploit B at the initial point of choice is neither necessary nor sufficient
for A’s actually exploiting B, why is it that part of our intuition that A exploits B seems to
stem from the fact that A chooses because he knows B will subsidise him? There seem to be
two reasons. First, in the case where A’s choice depends on B’s subsidy, we can say that A
intends to exploit B. He intentionally puts himself in a position that may lead to his taking
unfair advantage of B. While A only actually exploits B by accepting the subsidy, whether
he finds himself in this position by design or accident may make A’s action more grievous.
Second, we may believe that A’s intending an action makes that action more likely. A is
more likely to actually exploit B if A intends to exploit B.88
Since A’s actually exploiting B occurs at the point of subsidy, then at the point of choice,
A can only intend to exploit B. If intentionality is criterial for exploitation, and A exploits
at the point of subsidy, then we must examine whether A’s intentions at the point of subsidy
are intentional. And in the two cases I have presented, it seems they always are. A cannot
request cheap rescue or the BN subsidy from B without intending to take advantage of B;
in other words, A cannot request subsidy from B without intending to receive the subsidy
from B. The request for a better wage or a cheap rescue is an intentional action on A’s part
and, therefore, A never lacks the relevant intention. Thus, even if intentionality is criterial
for exploitation and A would have taken the risky option without knowing of B’s presence,
we can still say that A exploits B when A loses a known risk and intentionally requests a
subsidy or rescue. If A exploits B in such cases, then the self-frustrating objection remains.89
The Demandingness Challenge. Consider the following case of what seems to be non-
juridical exploitation:
C10: The old well.
Suppose that there is an old well on A’s farm. A takes measures to close off the
well, but he knows he should have it properly sealed and capped. One evening
while out for a walk A’s flashlight dies and, stumbling home, he falls into the
well. The next day B discovers A in the well, offering to save A only if A pays
$10,000.
Surely, the old well presents a case where B exploits A. And since there seems to be nothing
unjust about A’s predicament, it must be a case of non-juridical exploitation. While B might
be entitled to charge A the cost of rescue, B’s $10,000 request is simply too demanding.
Although it is likely true that $10,000 is too much, the conclusion that the old well presents
a legitimate case of non-juridical exploitation moves too quickly. The parameters of the case
are less well defined than those in the original dilemma generating cases.
First, as a preliminary, note that there is nothing intrinsically amiss with the $10,000
figure itself. Were A and B billionaires, our intuition that $10,000 was exploitative might
88Note that when A chooses L1 because he knows B must subsidise him, the incentive for this choice is
provided by BN. We know this because when BN is not present, both L1 and L2 are rationalisable (rationally
permissible). The response in 4.4.5 challenged whether we must abandon conceptions that encourage the
kind of conduct they are designed to proscribe. Although encouraging self-undermining behaviour may not
be sufficient for abandoning an account of exploitation, it must, all else equal, count against a conception
that it is self-undermining.
89Paul Bou-Habib has pointed out an alternative approach to me. We may grant the claim that intention-
ality is necessary for exploitation, but if A is vulnerable without intending to exploit B, then we may also
say that it is unjust to fail to subsidise him.
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be less strong. The figure represents, inter alia, the degree of sacrifice B asks of A; whether
$10,000 represents an impossible, large, small, or merely incidental sacrifice depends on
the context and endowments of the transactors, an obvious fact that is, nevertheless, often
obscured. Let us suppose then that the $10,000 means the same thing to A and B that it
does to most of us: it represents a significant sacrifice to A and a significant boon to B. In
this case, the original conclusion that $10,000 is too much retains its force.
Second, it is not clear that A is fully responsible for his having ended up in the well. We
may presume he had a vague idea that there was a small chance of a mishap involving the
well and may have known that his flashlight batteries were running low, but it is not the
case that he chose between two options with well defined outcomes and probabilities. Had
A clearly understood that he was taking a gamble involving, say, probability of p = 0.10 of
finding himself in the well with the consequence that he would then have to pay B $10,000
for rescue and a probability of 1 − p that he would enjoy his walk, the cost of catastrophe
discounted by its probability ($1000 in this case) might have led A to choose differently. If
A would have chosen differently with full information, then it does not seem that he can be
held fully responsible for his choice. Much of our intuition that B exploits A, I believe, arises
from our belief that in the old well case A is not, in fact, fully responsible for his choice. If A
would not have altered his choice with full information, then our intuition that B exploits A
is diminished. In fact, if knowing the risks, A takes a chance that leads to a loss and, having
lost, demands a better deal from B, it begins to look like A is the exploiter.
Third, there is an important question regarding the stakes of A’s choice. As Serena
Olsaretti points out, even if A is fully responsible for his choice, this does not mean that
‘anything goes’ with respect to its consequences. While the grounds of responsibility concern
“the features of people that we can. . . hold them responsible for”, there is a further question
of stakes, which asks, “Just what costs should attach to whatever features constitute the
justifiable grounds of responsibility?”90 Olsaretti argues that in many cases the consequences
of choices for which people are responsible are indeterminate; there is no clearly defined set of
consequences that are the direct result of the responsible choice. However, while it is tempting
to use Olsaretti’s distinction to underpin the claim that B’s $10,000 claim is exploitation, it is
not the solution the supporter of non-juridical exploitation is seeking. Although non-laissez-
faire principles of stakes are possible, these principles form part of an account of justice.91
Thus an appeal to a principle of stakes is an appeal to justice, undermining the existence of
non-juridical exploitation.
B’s request of $10,000 for rescue is too demanding if the old well case is taken at its (un-
derspecified) face value. But the demandingness objection loses force with the requirement
that A’s choice is an informed and responsible choice and without an appeal to justice-based
principles of stakes.
Simultaneity and Symmetry
The final response is that the dilemma’s force is a product of the asymmetry of advantage
in the lottery case. Perhaps the dilemma exists only because B is bound to L2 in the first
case, or her home’s location in the second. This response is, in fact, correct. The dilemma
does depend on asymmetry. But this response is not well-motivated, for if exploitation is
taking unfair advantage, then one transactor must receive more than they should from the
90Olsaretti (2009, p.170)
91Olsaretti (2009, p.165)
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other. If there are only two transactors, then it cannot be the case that they both receive
more than they should because (in the context of a subjective value theory in which goods
are commensurable) gains and losses of advantage in two-person transactions are a zero-
sum game. Thus, if A and B are in strategically equivalent situations, neither can take
unfair advantage of the other. Some form of unequal advantage, in one respect or another,
is necessary for the existence of exploitation. This fact alone is sufficient to answer the
objection. However, it is worth considering a version of the lotteries case where A and B are
in symmetric situations because the case presents a new problem for come-what-may duties,
above and beyond the original dilemma. Consider the following simultaneous version of the
lotteries case.
C11: The lotteries (simultaneous).
Suppose in the first stage B is no longer committed to L2 and A and B face
a simultaneous choice between L1 and L2. Neither player knows the other’s
lottery choice. As before, the second stage remains sequential—the wealthy
player may decide to employ the poor and if players are equally wealthy they
may work cooperatively—and BN holds.
In order to determine the rational choice of lottery for each player, we must first determine
the outcomes of the four possible strategy combinations: 〈L1, L1〉, 〈L1, L2〉, 〈L2, L1〉, and
〈L2, L2〉. We know from the discussion of the original case that if the player’s strategies were
〈L2, L2〉, the outcomes would be ($55.50, $55.50) and that the outcome of 〈L1, L2〉 would be
($58, $53). Since neither player’s situation differs from the other in the simultaneous lotteries
case, the outcome of the reciprocal situation, 〈L2, L1〉, is just the reverse: ($53, $58). All
that remains is to determine the outcome of both players choosing L1, that is, 〈L1, L1〉.
If both players choose the risky lottery we know there are four equiprobable possibilities:
1) A wins and B wins, 2) A wins and B loses, 3) A loses and B wins, and 4) both lose. From
the original case we know that it is rational for the players to work, employ, and cooperate.
In the first possibility both players win. Thus, the outcome for each is $100 from the lottery,
plus $5.50 from the cooperative venture, i.e., $105.50. In the second, A wins and B loses.
The outcome for A is $100 from the lottery and $1 from employing B, i.e., $101 and the
outcome for B is $10 in wages. The third possibility is the reciprocal of the second: A’s
outcome is $10 and B’s is $101. Finally, in the fourth, both lose the lottery. Since neither
has any capital, neither can work for the other, and a cooperative venture is not possible.
The outcome is $0 for each player. Since each of these four scenarios is equiprobable, the
outcomes must be weighted by 0.25. Thus, the expected value of choosing L1 for each player
is $54.125. We can now complete the payoff table for the simultaneous game shown in table
4.2 below.
A
B
L1 L2
L1 $54.12, $54.12 $58, $53
L2 $53, $58 $55.50, $55.50
Table 4.2: Outcome matrix for case 11.
In this game, the Nash equilibrium (in blue) is 〈L1, L1〉. Thus, when BN is present, if
both players were to choose simultaneously without knowing the other’s choice, each would
rationally choose L1. Structurally, the game shown in table 4.2 is a Prisoner’s dilemma.
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If we consider a similar version of the game, where BN does not hold (C11b), the payouts
are as shown in table 4.3. Here, there are 3 Nash equilibria. Although both lotteries are
‘rationalisable’ in the sense that Nash equilibria exist under a choice of either lottery, 〈L2, L2〉
weakly dominates all other strategies.
A
B
L1 L2
L1 $54.12, $54.12 $55.50, $55.50
L2 $55.50, $55.50 $55.50, $55.50
Table 4.3: Outcome matrix for case 11b.
When A and B are in equivalent situations, that is, when the game they play is a simul-
taneous game (in stage one), the presence of BN leads to a game with a Prisoner’s dilemma
structure. When BN is not present (as in table 4.3), all Nash equilibria are strict Pareto
improvements over the Nash equilibrium that occurs when BN is present. The presence
of BN, on the whole, leads to outcomes that are worse for both A and B. So, although
neither player exploits the other in the simultaneous lottery case because neither is at a rel-
ative disadvantage, a comparison of versions of the case in which BN is, and is not, present
shows that the presence of BN leads to a worse outcome for everyone. In this sense, BN is
non-universalisable—neither player can rationally will that BN apply.92 Therefore, although
asymmetry in bargaining power is necessary to generate the dilemma cases, it is also neces-
sary for any kind of exploitation. Further, the analysis of symmetric cases shows that the
dilemma is not the only problem accounts based on come-what-may duties face. When the
asymmetry is removed, the presence of BN causes both players to do worse than they would
if they were not bound by BN. Here BN cannot be rationally willed.
Sample’s and Goodin’s accounts imply wrongful exploitation may be generated by sources
independent from injustice, in particular that exploitation may be brought about by taking
advantage of mere vulnerability, poverty, or disability. However, as I have argued, their
accounts face a dilemma. In all purported cases of disadvantage-based non-juridical ex-
ploitation, the accounts are either self-frustrating or, in order to avoid the self-frustrating
objection, they fail to capture a paradigmatic case of exploitation. Attempts to avoid the
dilemma by prohibiting actions that cause it both preclude the existence of non-juridical
exploitation and prohibit prudential risks. This strategy fails to recognise that the dilemma
arises because the accounts are not responsibility-sensitive. This diagnosis suggests that the
dilemma shows that exploitation must not only be located within the domain of injustice,
but also that only responsibility-sensitive accounts of justice can adequately ground theories
of exploitation.
92Strictly speaking, neither player can rationally will that BN apply for all players. But a player might
rationally will that BN apply for some players. A would presumably prefer that BN held when he lost the
lottery, but not when B lost. However, generally we think of basic moral principles as universally applicable.
Showing that all players would rationally prefer moral codes that universally exclude BN to those where BN
applied universally is sufficient to say that BN is not universalisable. Nevertheless, it is an interesting question
whether BN fails to be rationally will-able in this weaker (non-universal) sense. Although not included here,
it can be shown that in a meta-game where A and B must (simultaneously) decide whether to bind themselves
to BN and then play two kinds of sub-games like the simultaneous lottery case—one where BN holds and
one where it does not—in almost all cases A and B would not choose to bind themselves.
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4.5 Chapter 4 Summary
In this chapter I outlined two duty-based accounts of exploitation. Section 4.2 presented
Goodin’s account. Goodin (1986; 1987) claims that we have a duty to protect the vulnera-
ble when transacting with them; failure to do so amounts to exploitation. In section 4.3 I
considered Sample’s critique of Goodin and her own account. Sample argues that Goodin’s
consequentialist foundations are incompatible with his theory of exploitation. This incon-
sistency leaves Goodin ultimately unable to provide a coherent solution to the paradox of
exploitation. In place of Goodin’s theory, Sample (2003) argues for an account of exploitation
as degradation. According to Sample, we can degrade others when we transact with them by
taking advantage of previous injustices, failing to ensure their basic needs are satisfied, and
engaging in an exchange of a non-commodifiable good. In this section I also argued against
Sample’s claim that exploitation can be generated by trade in non-commodifiable goods.
The remainder of the chapter—section 4.4—focused on a dilemma for Goodin’s and Sam-
ple’s accounts. Here I presented two cases that create dilemmas for Sample’s and Goodin’s
accounts (subsections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2), showing that the accounts are either self-frustrating or
incomplete. In subsection 4.4.3 I argued that the cause of both dilemmas was the presence of
come-what-may duties in each account that are insensitive to personal responsibility. In 4.4.4
I showed that Sample and Goodin can avoid the dilemma by prohibiting A from choosing
risky options (at the expense of abandoning the implicit claim that non-juridical exploitation
exists); however, this solution is unacceptable because its prohibition on prudent risk-taking
is implausible. Abandoning the come-what-may duties that provide the foundations for their
respective accounts is a far more plausible resolution. In the final subsection (4.4.5) I con-
sidered three forms of reply to the dilemma, none of which succeed. The first alleges that
the dilemma depends on a conflation of conceptions with moral codes. However, because the
concept of exploitation is negatively moralised, a proper analysis must contain a moral code.
Modifications to the accounts that incorporate intentionality conditions, principle of stakes,
or that weaken the come-what-may duties, also do not succeed in avoiding the dilemma. Fi-
nally, I showed that, although the dilemma depends on asymmetric advantage, the existence
of exploitation also depends on asymmetric advantage. Removing the asymmetries in the
dilemma generating cases dissolves the problem by fiat. Here I also showed another reason
for rejecting the come-what-may duties: in a simultaneous version of the original lotteries
case we can see that the come-what-may duties are non-universalisable.
The theories of exploitation advanced by Sample and Goodin are well-motivated. They
are based on a desire to protect the disadvantaged in our societies from the harm of exploita-
tion. However, in claiming that exploitation may occur apart from injustice, the duties that
provide a foundation for their accounts reach too far. In failing to hold people responsible for
their freely chosen actions, these ‘come-what-may’ duties lead to situations where the truly
disadvantaged are exploited by the justly disadvantaged.
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Chapter 5
The Two Faces of Exploitation
5.1 Chapter 5 Introduction
Exploitation, it is claimed, involves taking unfair advantage.1 Within this general definition
are two separate overarching intuitions intended to account for our claims that an action is
exploitative. According to the first intuition, which we may call the distributive intuition,
exploitation is a matter of unfair distribution. It arises when the outcome of a particular
transaction is the result of an unjust pre-transfer distribution. Both Steiner and Roemer
provide conceptions of exploitation that prioritise the distributive intuition. Steiner claims
that a transaction is exploitative when (inter alia) unjust property rights violations cause
the outcome of the transaction to diverge from one in which the property rights violations
did not occur. Similarly, Roemer claims that a coalition is exploited when (inter alia) there
is a counterfactual situation in which the coalition would be better off, and its complement
worse off, if the coalition withdrew with some externally specified set of resources. On both
accounts, exploitation is a systemic phenomenon that results from a prior set of unjust
conditions that generate unfair distributions.
According to the second intuition, which we may call the advantage intuition, exploita-
tion involves the misuse of advantage. It arises when one transactor uses the disadvantage
of another for their own gain. Goodin and Sample2 each provide conceptions of exploita-
tion that prioritise the advantage intuition. For these theorists, exploitation involves using
another’s disadvantage or vulnerability for personal enrichment in situations where it is in-
appropriate, degrading, or disrespectful to do so. The advantage intuition captures the claim
that exploitation is not, or not only, determined by the distributive consequences of a trans-
action, but depends upon the attitudes, motivations, and intentions of the agents. Accounts
of exploitation based on the advantage intuition take exploitation to be “not a matter of how
things end up. . . [but] “a matter of how you got there.”3
Steiner and Roemer privilege the first intuition, claiming unjust pre-transfer distributions
are necessary and sufficient for exploitation. But as we’ve seen, these conceptions extend be-
yond our ordinary use of ‘exploitation’. For Roemer, both conditions of his property relations
account may be satisfied in cases that are, intuitively, non-exploitative, as Elster’s ‘religious
belief’ case shows. Even with the addition of limiting conditions, Roemer’s account may
1This ordinary language definition enjoys explicit support in Elster (1982); Goodin (1987); Steiner (1984,
1987, 2010); Sample (2003); Schweickart (1997); Tormey (1976); Walt (1984); Wertheimer (1996); implicit or
partial endorsement can be found in Miller (1987); Wolff (1999). Wood (1995) represents the most explicit
rejection of the ‘taking unfair advantage’ approach. I consider his position in the following section.
2Similar accounts, which I do not assess in detail, are provided by Allen Wood (1995) and Nicholas
Vrousalis (2013).
3Goodin (1987, p.181)
92
still overextend, without a properly specified dominance condition. For Steiner, A may be
non-culpably ignorant of his role as an exploiter, a role he plays only because of someone
else’s previous wrongdoing.4 Both of these overextensions can be seen as a failure to fully
incorporate the advantage taking intuition. According to both accounts, everyday transac-
tions of ordinary goods between friends with the best of intentions may be exploitations.
Again, while we may have reason to say that some of these ‘innocent’ transactions are in fact
morally problematic, they are not natural cases of exploitation in ordinary use.
The lesson from the overextension of Steiner’s and Roemer’s conceptions is that our
willingness to apply the label ‘exploitation’ to a transaction depends on something more than
maldistribution brought about by A’s interaction with B. Exploitation requires that A take
advantage of B. Elster claims that we take advantage of another “by adding an option to his
opportunity set that is better both for him and for [us] than the option preferred by him prior
to the expansion.”5 When ‘taking advantage’ is defined as a strict Pareto improvement, A can
be said to take advantage of B (and vice versa) when the two merely transact. But, used in
this sense, A and B ‘take advantage’ of each other in Steiner’s exploitative transactions. Thus,
Elster’s sense of ‘taking advantage’ cannot be the ‘something more’ that is required to limit
the extension of the distributive accounts.6 Rather, the required (stronger) sense seems to be
that involved in the conceptions outlined by Goodin, Sample, and Wood: “Inappropriately
seizing advantages”7, failing to constrain our behaviour towards others,8, and “playing on [or]
manipulating”9 the vulnerabilities of others are all examples of this stronger kind of taking
advantage. It is tempting—at least for Goodin and Sample—to think that, properly specified,
the taking advantage condition alone can characterise at least some cases of exploitation.
However, as I argued in chapter 4, conceptions that permit non-juridical exploitation are
either self-frustrating or incomplete. While “playing for advantage in situations in which
it is inappropriate to do so”,10 but where no injustice is involved, may be morally amiss
for other reasons, advantage taking without injustice is not equivalent to the ‘taking unfair
advantage’ definition of exploitation.
An adequate conception of exploitation must take both intuitions contained in the ordi-
nary language account seriously; both unfairness and advantage taking are necessary condi-
tions for transactions to be exploitative. An analysis of exploitation that incorporates the
advantage intuition and the distributive intuition can capture counterexamples that plague
accounts based on only one of the two intuitions. Of course, we should recall Arneson’s re-
minder in chapter 4 that without explication there will “be as many competing conceptions
of exploitation as theories of what persons owe to each other by way of fair treatment.”11 The
same can be said for ‘taking advantage’. Thus, a complete characterisation of exploitation
must provide some additional specification of these two conditions.
4Here I cite the problem of moral responsibility that Steiner’s account faces, although in my discussion
of this problem in chapter 2 I note that it may be solved by drawing a distinction between ‘morally bad’
transactions and ‘morally wrong’ transactions. However, unlike the addition of an intentionality or knowledge
condition, the distinction-based solution to the problem of moral responsibility does not also solve the problem
of synchronic pervasiveness. This problem, it seems, requires a reconsideration of the role of advantage taking.
5Elster (1982, p.364)
6Taken out of context, Elster’s sense of ‘taking advantage’ seems trivial. However, his quote is taken
from a passage in which he discusses problems of dependence and dominance for Roemer’s property relations
account. When ‘taking advantage’ in Elster’s sense is added to (PR1) and (PR2) it does successfully limit
the scope of Roemer’s theory. However, as I argued in chapter 3, this limitation is not sufficient.
7Goodin (1987, p.184)
8Sample (2003, p.62)
9Feinberg (1988, p.179)
10Goodin (1987, p.184)
11Arneson (1992, p.350)
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In addition, this approach to exploitation takes the ordinary language definition of “taking
unfair advantage” for granted, an assumption which is not altogether theoretically neutral,
since the inclusion of the normative element of ‘unfairness’ commits us to a negatively mor-
alised account of exploitation. While taking the ordinary language definition as a starting
point enjoys a near consensus among existing accounts, Allen Wood dissents from this ma-
jority view, arguing that exploitation is not a negatively moralised concept. Wood claims
that while exploitation is “nearly always a bad thing. . . its badness does not always consist
in its being unjust.”12 Although Wood is correct that the word ‘exploitation’ does admit
to a non-moralised sense, the moralised and use-based senses can be sharply distinguished.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider the reasons for rejecting Wood’s dissenting view
before moving on to a characterisation of the two necessary conditions.
Thus, the remainder of the chapter will proceed as follows. In the next section, 5.2,
I consider the relationship between injustice, exploitation, and moral permissibility. Here
I outline and reject Wood’s argument against the claim that exploitation is a (negatively)
moralised concept. In section 5.3 I consider the normative aspect of exploitation: unfairness.
I outline the various principles of fair transaction that appeared in the first four chapters,
introduce Alan Wertheimer’s fmv principle, and finally propose and defend a specification
of the unfairness condition in terms of a modified version of Steiner’s rights condition. Sec-
tion 5.4 provides a similar treatment of the advantage taking condition. In that section, I
argue that the sense of ‘advantage taking’ relevant to cases of exploitation can be given by
considering the epistemic state of the would-be exploiter. Finally, section 5.5 concludes with
my first full characterisation of exploitation and a summary of the chapter.
5.2 The Wrongfulness of Exploitation
What is the relationship among wrongful action, injustice, and exploitation? Is exploitation
necessarily morally amiss? Always unjust? The theories of exploitation examined thus far
have provided three different positions.
Allen Wood argues that exploitation does not have “wrongfulness or moral badness built
into its very meaning.” After all, he reasons, “there clearly do seem to be cases of exploitation
which we regard as innocent or even admirable. Nobody thinks it is wrong for a chess player
to exploit her opponent’s inattention in order to win the game.”13 Wood also argues that,
even in those cases where exploitation is morally wrong or bad, it can be so “even when it
involves no unfairness or injustice.”14
Ruth Sample disagrees with Wood’s first claim, arguing that exploitation is “an essentially
moralised or thick concept,”15 but, as we have seen, she accepts his second claim that ex-
ploitation can be morally amiss even when it is not unjust. She argues that “neglecting what
is necessary for [a] person’s well-being or flourishing” is a source of exploitation-generating
disrespect that is distinct from the disrespect involved in taking advantage of past injustice.16
Finally, Steiner disagrees with both of Wood’s claims. He writes both of the “injustice
12Wood (1995, p.2, emphasis added). Wood’s claim is that, properly understood, the ordinary language
definition of ‘exploitation’ is non-moralised. He is not claiming that our ordinary language definition is nega-
tively moralised and that it is therefore mistaken. Thus, his disagreement is with philosopher’s interpretation
of ordinary use.
13Wood (1995, pp.3–4)
14Wood (1995, p.17)
15Sample (2003, p.5)
16Sample (2003, p.57)
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Moralised Not Moralised
Always Unjust Steiner —
Not Always Unjust Sample Wood
Table 5.1: Justice, morality, and exploitation.
of exploitation”17 and the “wrongful gains and losses of an exploitation.”18 And, of course,
as we saw in the discussion of his characterising conditions, Steiner’s inclusion of the moral-
ised ‘rights condition’ (S1) ensures that the truth conditions of his account depend upon a
normative criterion.
The possible relationships between exploitation, injustice, and wrongful action are shown
in table 5.1. Since Steiner claims that exploitation is negatively moralised and unjust, he falls
in the top left corner. Sample also claims exploitation is negatively moralised, but because
she believes it is not always unjust, she is placed in the lower left corner. Finally, Wood
claims exploitation may, at times, be neither negatively moralised nor unjust. He belongs in
the lower right. Although my goal in what follows is (primarily) to evaluate the viability of
Wood’s heterodox position (bottom right), it is worth remarking briefly on the emptiness of
the top right quadrant.
5.2.1 Eliminating the Bottom-left and Upper-right Quadrants
It is tempting to explain this emptiness with the claim that the position is a conceptual
impossibility: it seems that unjust actions must be a subset of morally impermissible ac-
tions. Yet, as Steiner points out,19 this is not the case in a Kantian framework. For Kant,
moral permissibility depends upon the first formulation of the categorical imperative—which
is intensional—and justice depends upon the universal principle of justice—which is exten-
sional.20 “[I]t’s simply untrue that an action’s being a rights violation is a sufficient condition
of its moral impermissibility. Its injustice is such a condition only if justice is one of our
moral rules. But it needn’t be.”21 Thus, at least in a Kantian framework, the concepts of
justice and morality do not rule out actions in any of the four quadrants of table 5.1. Of
course, the fact that justice and morality do not, a priori, limit the possibilities for actions
does not mean there are no other considerations that may be brought to bear.
In particular, although justice needn’t be one of our moral rules, moral codes that consist
solely of action prescriptions, although not contradictory, can lead to situations where these
prescriptions make “obligatory the performance of two actions that [are] mutually frustrat-
17Steiner (1987, p.132, emphasis added)
18Steiner (2010, p.27, emphasis added). Although we know from the problem of moral responsibility
(outlined in section 2.3) that since Steiner’s account allows cases of unintentional exploitation, his account
must claim that in such cases exploitation is not morally wrong, but morally bad.
19Steiner writes, “If I force you to work for a deserving charity or steal your money on its behalf or,
indeed, force you to do something that’s in your own interest, I may be perfectly happy to universalize
my benevolent intention in doing so. I may include benevolence among my moral rules. [Thus my action
is morally permissible.] But that willingness in no way implies that my action is not a reduction of your
equal freedom and a subordination of your purposes to mine. [Thus my action is an unjust violation of your
rights.]”(Steiner, 1994, p.222)
20In particular, Steiner notes that “whether an act is just doesn’t depend on the intention with which it’s
done. It doesn’t depend on its having a certain intensional description. It depends, rather, on its having a
certain extensional description: that is, on whether it’s compatible with a certain distribution of freedom,
with a certain set of rights.”(Steiner, 1994, p.212). But the principle underlying the permissibility of action
“depends on that intensionally-described action’s relation to whatever moral rules we accept. . . ”(Steiner,
1994, p.222). Thus, since the criteria underlying the moral permissibility of actions is an intensional criteria
and the criteria underlying the justice of action is extensional, the two can come apart.
21Steiner (1994, p.223)
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ing.”22 When a moral code:
1. Consists solely of action prescriptions, i.e., contains no rules for rights and
2. Prescribes the performance of X by two individuals, but
3. The performance of X by each is obstructed by the other, then
C. Their duties to perform X entail that “they are each obligated to employ all available
measures necessary to remove the obstacle constituted by the other person’s acting.
And this obligation persists until the point where either (i) one of them has actually
prevailed. . . and the other is incapable of further ‘attempting’, or (ii) both are [so]
incapable. . . ”23
The inclusion of justice as one of our moral rules provides “an arbitration rule that supplies a
neutral, impartial and principled resolution of any deadlock [between other moral rules.]”24
Thus, if we want to avoid conflicts of mutual duties to perform morally prescribed actions—
surely a desiderata for good moral codes—our moral code must include justice as one of its
rules. And, if the moral code includes justice as one of its rules, then an action’s being a rights
violation is a sufficient condition of its moral impermissibility. Thus, if exploitation involves
a rights violation (and we want moral codes with provisions for dealing with deadlock), then
exploitation must be morally impermissible. Assuming we want moral codes with provisions
for dealing with deadlock, we have eliminated the top right quadrant, since under such codes
injustice implies wrongdoing.
However, this result is not particularly helpful since no one seriously defends an account of
exploitation that makes it unjust but not morally amiss. Yet, when combined with chapter 4’s
conclusion that accounts of purportedly non-juridical exploitation are either self-frustrating
or incomplete, we obtain a stronger result. If exploitations are always unjust and injustice
implies moral impermissibility, then exploitation must be impermissible. Neither the upper-
right nor the bottom-left quadrants are live possibilities.
With this result in place, it might seem that there is no need to consider Wood’s claim that
exploitation may be neither morally impermissible nor unjust. However, the result depends
on a crucial assumption that Wood rejects. Chapter 4’s conclusion that exploitation is always
unjust relied upon intuitions generated by the ordinary language definition that exploitation
is ‘taking unfair advantage’. But Wood rejects the claim that exploitation involves unfairness,
and so, he may reject both chapter 4’s conclusion and the derivative claim that exploitation
is also morally impermissible.
5.2.2 Eliminating Wood’s Non-moralised Exploitation
Of course, when it comes to the word ‘exploitation’ Wood’s position is correct. It is obvious
that uses of ‘exploitation’ do not always imply moral wrongdoing or injustice. ‘Exploiting
a mine’, ‘exploiting a chess move’, and ‘exploiting machinery’ are all expressions that imply
use, but not wrongful or unfair use. However, ‘exploitation’ used in this sense seems to
denote a different concept from that referenced by uses like ‘Sweatshops are exploitative’
or ‘Price gouging during disasters is exploitative.’ Prima facie, at least, exploitation in the
‘use’ sense (call this Su) and exploitation in the morally pejorative sense (call this Sm) seem
22Steiner (1974, p.199)
23Steiner (1974, pp.197–98)
24Steiner (1994, p.207)
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to be homonyms. While we may grant that Wood is correct that the word may be used in
either sense, the concept we are interested in is the concept referenced in Sm and there does
not seem to be any problem in drawing a distinction between the two.
The Nietzsche Argument
Wood disagrees, arguing that this distinction cannot be maintained. He asks, “why should
we suppose that ‘exploitation’ has a special meaning when applied to cases of injustice or
wrongdoing?”25 After all, he reasons, other terms too—Wood lists “ ‘appropriation’, ‘trans-
action’, ‘seizure’ ”—apply to acts that are sometimes, but not always, impermissible.26 Wood
argues against the claim that there exists a sense of exploitation, Sm, that is negatively mor-
alised by citing an example of Nietzsche’s use of the word. Nietzsche claims modern society’s
economic life “represents a maximum in the exploitation (Ausbeutung) of humanity”27, and,
contrary to our own moral intuitions, he also affirms, this state as admirable. The difference
in Nietzsche’s use and our own, Wood claims, cannot be semantic. Nietzsche is “using the
word in the same sense as we do when we more conventionally hold that it is bad or wrong.”28
Wood argues that both we and Nietzsche refer to the same concept, but Nietzsche’s values
differ from our own when he affirms exploitation; our disagreement with the moral stance
that Nietzsche expresses is only possible if he is “using the word in the same sense as we do
when we more conventionally hold that it is bad or wrong.”29
In order to evaluate Wood’s argument, let us first consider a similar case: suppose I say
of an object ‘it is red’, but you disagree with me. In normal cases of disagreement, our
disagreement about a certain property of the object requires that we have the same referent
in mind. So, in a case where the object is a ball, and I say ‘the ball is red’, but you disagree,
in order to be a disagreement about the ball’s colour, we must be speaking about the same
thing: the ball. Our disagreement is about the properties of the same referent. On the other
hand, in some cases, disagreement can come about because someone’s use is mistaken or
nonstandard. So, if I say ‘light with a wavelength between 620nm and 740nm is red’, but
you disagree, our disagreement comes about because you use red in some nonstandard way
or because you do not know this fact, for on my use, having a wavelength between 620nm
and 740nm is a necessary property of being red.30 Here we disagree about the constitutive
properties of the referent. So, the argument may be reconstructed as follows:
N1 If our disagreement with Nietzsche is of the first sort (disagreement about whether a
particular case actually has a property), then we must have the same concept in mind.
N2 And, Wood implies, since our disagreement with Nietzsche is of the first sort, not the
second (disagreement about the constitutive properties of the concept), we do have the
same concept—Sm—in mind.
C But since Nietzsche claims that Sm is morally admirable, Sm is not necessarily morally
amiss.
25Wood (1995, p.4)
26Wood (1995, p.4)
27Wood (1995, p.5)
28Wood (1995, p.5)
29Wood (1995, p.5)
30Of course, in some cases, for example, when the properties involved are vague (as in ‘X is tall’), the
disagreement may also be because we use one word to stand for a range of properties in various contexts.
97
Wood is correct that in order to disagree about the properties of a case we must be speaking
about the same referent.31 And it must also be the case that if a concept can be used in a
positive or morally neutral way, it is not negatively moralised. So the first and third lines
of the reconstructed argument are correct. However, Wood provides no argument for the
second premise and there is no reason to believe it is true.
Consider a related case. Suppose that in his lyrics the singer of a death metal band
claims that ‘murder is good’. This claim is, in a strict sense, contradictory, since ‘murder’
is, by definition, bad. But the singer’s lyrics are rhetorical. He uses the word ‘murder’,
which ordinarily contains both descriptive and evaluative elements, in a merely descriptive—
‘inverted comma’—sense.32 The intent of his lyrics is to affirm those acts characteristically
associated with the ordinary use of murder, e.g., the brutal killing of innocents. We could
restore meaning to the literal reading of the claim by rephrasing it as ‘what the folk call
‘murder’ is actually good.’ His lyrics are shocking because our evaluation of these events is
strongly negative; we do not accept his claim that such things are good.
Similarly, when Nietzsche claims that the ‘exploitation’ of humanity by the U¨bermenchen
is good, he makes a rhetorical claim. His use of exploitation is in the inverted comma
sense, picking out those particular cases characteristic of the negatively moralised sense in
ordinary use. Our disagreement and disgust with Nietzsche is over his affirmation of the
acts we associate with the exploitation of humanity (in the negatively moralised sense), e.g.
sweatshops, price gouging, and the like. And again, we may restore meaning to the literal
reading by rephrasing his claim as ‘what the masses call ‘exploitation’ (in the sense of Sm)
is good.’ In providing a competing hypothesis of the linguistic data, I have shown that
Wood’s case for his view is inconclusive at best. Wood’s Nietzsche example does not provide
a decisive argument against the orthodox position that exploitation admits to two senses,
Sm and Su.
Wrongful Because Exploitative
The Nietzsche example is not Wood’s only argument against the claim that the concept
denoted by exploitation in its Sm use is negatively moralised. He also claims that negatively
moralised accounts make it hard to understand arguments that an act is wrongful because it
is exploitative. He notes, “if I say that a practice is [Sm] exploitative. . . then my statement
already means that the practice is wrongful or bad, and thus that before using the term (in
that sense) I should already have shown that [it] is wrongful or bad.” The consequence of this
implication, Wood claims, is that “such a statement could be understood as categori[s]ing the
wrongfulness of the act. . . or as rhetorically emphasi[s]ing this wrongfulness to someone who
already believes the act is wrong but is suspected of giving this belief insufficient deliberative
weight.”33 He concludes that “the whole argument form which says that a practice is wrongful
because it is exploitative looks merely rhetorical, if not downright confused.”34
Wood’s first claim is largely true. Of course, we may not always be certain an act is
wrongful when we claim it is exploitative if are making a prima facie ascription of exploita-
tion, but it is true that when we claim an act is an all-things-considered exploitation, we
are committed to the claim that it is morally amiss (that is, Sm exploitation → morally
amiss). The consequences of this entailment are that ‘wrong because exploitative’ claims
31Leaving complications of vague predicates aside.
32Hare (1952)
33Wood (1995, p.6)
34Wood (1995, p.6)
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can only be rhetorical or categorical, but, Wood claims, that an act is exploitative provides
us with more than rhetoric or a way of categorising acts. It gives us a “substantive argu-
ment for considering the act wrongful.” Therefore, there is no negatively moralised sense of
exploitation.
One person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens: Wood (using modus tollens)
claims that if exploitation is negatively moralised then ‘wrong because exploitative’ claims
cannot be substantive. But since these claims are substantive, exploitation cannot be nega-
tively moralised. I disagree. I claim (using modus ponens) that because there is a negatively
moralised sense of exploitation and this implies that ‘wrong because exploitative’ claims
cannot be substantive, then these claims are not substantive. Wood implies both that if
‘wrong because exploitative’ claims are “at most” categorical or rhetorical, they are “con-
fused” or purposeless and that the ability to make substantive arguments for considering an
act wrongful because exploitative is important.35 But these implications are simply untrue.
First, ‘wrong because exploitative’ claims are not “downright confused”.36 Much of our
reasoning about particular cases involves categorisation. We may reason as follows: act x
is similar to act y, which we know to be a case of exploitation. Exploitation is morally
amiss; therefore if those properties that x shares with y include the properties that make y
exploitation, then x is morally amiss. Knowing that y is a case of exploitation tells us which
properties to look for in x in order to determine whether it too is exploitation and, therefore,
impermissible. Additionally, categorising the wrongdoing involved in an act is helpful in
determining how to apportion responsibility, make retributive transfers, or in weighing pro
tanto wrongs. Finally, many exploitation claims do, as Wood says, rhetorically emphasise
previously underweighted wrongs involved in a particular act. Exploitation claims used in
this way are not unimportant or confused.
Second, it is unclear why we should agree with Wood’s implication that it is desirable
to make substantive claims about an act’s wrongness by saying it is an exploitation. If
exploitation is negatively moralised, its wrongness is derived from one of its characterising
properties; if exploitation is not negatively moralised, then when it is wrong, it is so because of
the presence of a non-necessary property alongside the characterising properties. Suppose the
property in question is unfairness. If we believe that ‘exploitation’ admits to the two senses
Su and Sm, then we might plausibly claim that ‘exploitation’ as Su is taking advantage, while
exploitation as Sm is taking unfair advantage. The presence of unfairness in the latter sense
of ‘exploitation’ makes this sense of the word negatively moralised. Now consider Wood’s
position: exploitation admits to only one sense, and is therefore not necessarily wrong, but
when it is wrong, it is so because of unfairness. It is unclear why Wood’s approach is in
any way more desirable than the negatively moralised approach. The claim that the action
is wrongful still depends upon the presence of substantive moral considerations. The only
difference is whether these are implied in the claim that the action is exploitation or are made
alongside such a claim. If Wood’s approach is not essentially different from the negatively
moralised account, and the categorising and rhetorical roles of exploitation claims are as
significant as I argue, then my modus ponens should be preferred to his modus tollens.
Neither of Wood’s arguments against the orthodox claim that exploitation admits to two
senses, Su and Sm, is successful. Wood’s claim that interpreting Nietzsche’s use requires us
to abandon the claim that there are two senses of exploitation is inconclusive and his claim
that the negatively moralised sense makes ‘wrong because exploitative’ claims unintelligible
35Wood (1995, p.6)
36Wood (1995, p.6)
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is mistaken. Perhaps the strongest indictment against the non-moralised position is the
overwhelming consensus, based on common sense intuition, that a clear distinction can be
drawn between Su exploitation as ‘taking advantage of’ and Sm exploitation as ‘taking unfair
advantage of’. Thus, we can eliminate Wood’s position in the lower-right quadrant. With
only the upper-left quadrant of table 5.1 remaining, we can conclude that any acceptable
theory of exploitation must offer an analysis in which the concept is both negatively moralised
and a form of injustice. In the remainder of this chapter I will take the negatively moralised
ordinary language definition of exploitation as ‘taking unfair advantage’ as my starting point.
5.3 Unfair Transactions
So far, we have established that ‘taking unfair advantage’ is an appropriate starting point
for a conception of exploitation. Which is to say that we have not established very much,
for there are many accounts of both unfairness and advantage taking. Indeed, the concept
of fairness is likely thornier than the concept of exploitation. A full analysis of fairness is
impractical and would take us far afield from exploitation, but assessing those accounts of
fair transaction that have been used in past analyses of exploitation gives us a few starting
points. In 5.3.1 I review the principles of fair transaction that we have already seen before
introducing Alan Wertheimer’s ‘fair market value’ (fmv) approach in section 5.3.2.37 Here
I argue that not only does Wertheimer’s principle inherit the general complications of two-
part, or ‘dualist’, principles of justice, it also lacks justification. Ultimately, fmv provides
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for fair transaction and must be rejected. In 5.3.3
and 5.3.4 I defend rights against two possible counterexamples: cases of coercion and cases
of fraud. I conclude that rights provides the best principle of fair transaction.
5.3.1 Use, Contribution, and Rights
So far we have considered three accounts of fair transaction: rights (Sample and Steiner),
contribution (Roemer and Marx), and Goodin’s claim that exploitative transactions are
unfair because they involve playing for advantage in situations where it is inappropriate to
do so.”38 Such situations, Goodin claims, are any in which the other is “vulnerable”. As we
have already seen in chapter 4, Goodin’s unqualified use of vulnerable is implausible. His
general claim that the unfairness in exploitation involves inappropriate playing for advan-
tage is true, but trivial. Depending upon how we understand ‘inappropriate’, the claim is
compatible with both rights and contribution. And indeed, the analysis in chapter 4
should assure us that the only non-self-frustrating interpretation of ‘inappropriate’ is one that
makes Goodin’s account compatible with the remaining two principles. I have also argued
that contribution is equivalent to rights when Roemer’s withdrawal principle is specified
by a libertarian principle, that is, when a state in which there are no rights violations present
is used as the egalitarian baseline for the contribution principle. At this point we might
ask which we should prefer, contribution or rights, or indeed, whether it makes any dif-
ference. If the best versions of each are equivalent, then choosing one over the other makes
no normative difference. However, there are some practical reasons for preferring rights.
In his assessment of contribution, Alan Wertheimer notes that we can ask two ques-
tions about the principle, first, “Is it morally sound?”, and second, “[i]f so, how is it to be
37Wertheimer (1996)
38Goodin (1987, p.184, emphasis original)
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measured?”39 Of course, whether contribution is morally sound depends upon how it is
specified. Certain versions are more plausible than others, but Wertheimer believes that,
properly specified, the principle “may still carry moral weight.”40 Nevertheless, he believes
problems arise for the principle when we turn to the second question.
Wertheimer argues that “difficulties in the way of measuring an individual’s contribu-
tion. . . suggest that the principle of [contribution] is unlikely to provide a stable basis for
fair transactions upon which parties could reasonably concur” even if these measurement
problems “do not show that the concept of an individual’s contribution is incoherent.”41
The problems to which Wertheimer refers occur in (but are not limited to) neo-classical
accounts. A. C. Pigou argued that workers are exploited when “they are paid less than
the value which their marginal net product has to the firms employing them.”42 Pigou’s
detractors pointed out that production factors other than labour may also be exploited in
the sense he describes. Nevertheless, the exploitation of labour may, as Cohen (1988) argues,
be of primary moral concern. The central idea in the neo-classical definition is that workers
should be paid according to what they add to the firm’s output. But in many cases setting
the bar for exploitation at those rates falling below the marginal product of labour may
seem inappropriate. Since the marginal contribution of labour decreases as more workers are
added to the workforce, if B joins ‘late in the game’, her marginal contribution to output
may be minimal, even if she and A work an equal number of hours. As Sen argues, “To
read in that counterfactual marginal story what would happen if one more unit were applied,
given everything else, an identification of who has ‘in fact’ produced what in the total output
is to take the marginal calculus entirely beyond its purpose and depth.”43. Substituting the
average product of labour for the marginal product avoids the problem of decreasing returns,
but does not solve the problem of assigning wages based on individual effort.44
Of course, contribution also features prominently in Roemer’s account, and here too
measuring individual contribution presents problems. In economies with increasing returns
to scale, there may be no one individual that satisfies Roemer’s PR conditions. The output
produced when A and B combine each of their 1n shares is greater than twice the output
of each producing on their own. In order to deal with this problem, Roemer introduces the
idea of vulnerability and minimally exploited coalitions in place of exploitation tout court.
Minimally exploited coalitions are groups that satisfy the PR conditions that contain no
redundant members. In his assessment of Roemer, Miller writes, “This generalisation of the
exploitation criterion appears likely to work successfully for large economies. . . on the other
hand it may be more difficult to apply Roemer’s criterion to individual exchanges. . . How
would we construct the relevant counterfactual here?”45 The problems that Wertheimer and
Miller outline for the Roemerian and Pigou-Robinson versions of contribution are twofold.
In order to provide a theoretically complete account, those defending contribution must
define what counts as a morally relevant contribution and, if contribution is to be of any
practical use, they must also show how this morally relevant contribution can be measured.
Citing these measurement concerns, Wertheimer abandons contribution in favour of
his own principle of fair transaction, ‘fair market value’ (fmv), a position I consider in
39Wertheimer (1996, p.227)
40Wertheimer (1996, p.229)
41Wertheimer (1996, p.229)
42Pigou (1920, III.XIV.3)
43Sen (1992, p.119, emphasis original)
44When A works 5 hours and B 10 the average product is 7.5, more than A worked and less than B worked.
45Miller (1987, p.154)
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the following subsection. But the measurement concerns for contribution also give us a
practical reason for pursuing rights. In one sense, property rights are easy to measure.
Our modern legal apparatus is largely devoted to the definition and protection of alienable
assets. Extended definitions of property that include inalienable assets, like talents and
skills, present a greater challenge, but as Steiner argues, these skills and talents “are bought,
sold, and leased with considerable frequency. Accordingly, they clearly have an assessable
value.”46 Thus, inalienable assets can be folded into frameworks designed to handle more
conventional assets.
The most complicated measurement problem for rights involves the operationalisation of
the counterfactual that underpins the principle. Recall that rights claims that a transaction
is fair when there does not exist an unrectified property rights violation in the history of
exchanges leading to a transfer that makes one party worse off than they wuld be. If rights
is to be of practical use, then we require an account of what it means for ‘one party to be
worse off than they would be’. One such account is provided by Steiner’s conditions (2) and
(3). According to these conditions, B is worse off than she would be because of a past rights
violation when the rights violation makes at least one element of B’s original choice set, γ,
unfeasible, leaving her with a new choice set, δ (where δ ( γ), and B prefers the unfeasible
option in γ to her most preferred option in δ.47
When we consider rights alongside Goodin’s use-based account of fair transaction and
contribution, rights emerges as the most plausible of the three, both normatively and
practically. However, it faces a challenge from Wertheimer’s fair market value approach,
considered in the following subsection.
5.3.2 Fair Market Value
Wertheimer claims that, “for a certain range of cases”, fair transactions are those that take
place at the “fair market value. . . the price that an informed and unpressured seller would
receive from an informed and unpressured buyer if the [good] were sold on the market.”48
The ‘range of cases’ Wertheimer has in mind is non-obligatory, strictly Pareto-improving
transactions in which there are relatively few agents rather than perfectly competitive mar-
kets, since in the former (but not the latter) “there may be a large bargaining range.”49 In
perfectly competitive markets, all agents are price takers; there “A does not have the space to
transact with B at a different price, even if A would prefer to do so.”50 However, most actual
markets provide “at least some space in which agents can choose among a set of prices.”51
According to Wertheimer, when agents find themselves in markets that are not perfectly
competitive, they should act as if they were by transacting at the fair market value.
Wertheimer claims fmv is “a price at which neither party takes special unfair advantage
of particular defects in the other party’s decision-making capacity or special vulnerabilities
in the other party’s situation. It is a price at which the specific parties to this particular
transaction do not receive greater value than they would receive if they did not encounter
each other.”52 Wertheimer concludes that such an equilibrium price “may nor may not be
46Steiner (1999, p.144)
47In chapter 6, I consider a characterisation of exploitation based on this operationalisation of rights,
along with an alternative version of these principles.
48Wertheimer (1996, p.230)
49Wertheimer (1996, pp.216–17)
50Wertheimer (1996, p.233)
51Wertheimer (1996, p.233)
52Wertheimer (1996, p.232)
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a ‘just price’, all things considered, but it may well be a non-exploitative price, for neither
party takes unfair advantage of the other party.”53
FMV: A transaction is fair inter alia when it takes place at the “fair market value, . . . the
price that an informed and unpressured seller would receive from an informed and
unpressured buyer” if the good were sold in a competitive market with many buyers
and sellers.54
Without the ‘inter alia’ restriction, fmv is implausible. It is neither sufficient to assure
us that a transaction is fair nor is it not necessary for a transaction to be fair.
Suppose A steals B’s car and then offers to sell it back to her at the equilibrium price of
$10,000. Here fmv is satisfied, yet the transaction is certainly not fair; a fair price for the
car is $0, or even some negative amount to account for B’s loss of use. In this case, a ‘simple’
fmv is not sufficient for the fairness of a transaction. In order to avoid the insufficiency,
fmv must operate against a background of macro-level justice. There may be cases in which
A owes B a price that deviates from the market price because of past injustice. If fmv is
to be plausible, it must assume that there are no special reasons A and B owe each other
non-equilibrium prices.
Suppose in a village of ten people, five are butchers and five are candlestick makers. One
day, after months of research, an industrious butcher reveals that he has learned to bake
bread and begins selling rolls in his shop. Because he is the only butcher-turned-baker in
the village, his rolls sell for a higher price than they would if all of the other butchers also
sold rolls. Here a price that deviates from that which would exist in a perfectly competitive
market does not seems unfair. Exchange at fmv is not necessary for a transaction to be
fair. But Wertheimer recognises this. He writes, “given that ski areas build lift capacity to
accommodate peak (marginal) demand rather than average demand, it is not unreasonable
that weekend skiers pay a higher fee. . . Given that taxi drivers often spend a long time waiting
for a fare at the airport, a practice from which the passenger benefits by not having to wait
for a cab, one must include that waiting time in any calculation of a fair fare.”55 The quote
indicates Wertheimer understands that deviations from fmv may be fair when an individual
is entitled to the fruits of their labour. Of course, in order to determine which cases qualify
for this exemption, we must again refer to a broader macro-level principle of justice.
The market equilibrium price provides us with a criterion of fairness that operates, as
Wertheimer claims, in “a certain range of cases”, namely those in which other, broader,
principles of justice are already satisfied. This implies that macro-level principles of justice
are themselves insufficient to ensure the fairness of at least some transactions. Wertheimer’s
fmv assumes a ‘dualist’ approach to justice.
According to the dualist view, personal principles of fair transaction are separate from
more general principles of institutional justice and fairness. Representing this view, Rawls
writes, “The principles of justice for institutions must not be confused with the principles
which apply to individuals and their actions in particular circumstances. These two kinds of
principles apply to different subjects and must be discussed separately.”56 Thus, for dualists
like Rawls and Wertheimer, the satisfaction of macro-level principles of justice is not sufficient
to ensure the transaction is all things considered fair; it may fail to satisfy principles like
fmv. The opposing view, monism, “reject[s]. . . that there could be a plausible fundamental
53Wertheimer (1996, p.232)
54Wertheimer (1996, p.230)
55Wertheimer (1996, pp.226–227)
56Rawls (1971, pp.54–55)
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normative principle for the evaluation of legal and other institutions that does not apply in
the realm of personal conduct.”57 For monists, “the personal is political”, that is, principles
“about the just distribution of benefits and burdens in society, apply, wherever else they do,
to people’s legally unconstrained choices.”58
If dualism is false, then fmv fails as a principle of fair transaction. Both Liam Murphy
and G.A. Cohen argue fairly convincingly against the plausibility of dualist principles, but
their arguments are not decisive. Nor would it be appropriate to wade into such a broad
debate in the process of assessing fmv. An alternative approach to assessing fmv is to focus
on the sufficiency of rights, which applies both at the macro- and micro-levels. If rights is
sufficient to assure us that a transaction is fair, then there is no need to appeal to additional
principles like fmv. If rights is not sufficient to assure us that a transaction is fair, then we
may return to fmv in order to see whether it can bridge the sufficiency gap. In the following
two subsections I consider two problematic cases in which, at least prima facie, it seems that
rights cannot provide us with a plausible principle of fair transaction.
Before considering these cases, it is worth noting that as it stands fmv is in need of
further justification. While we may, as a convention, accept equilibrium prices as fair prices,
Sample claims this “is not the same as showing that they genuinely are fair. Wertheimer does
not explain why the market price should be regarded as the fair price and why non-market
prices are exploitative.”59 There is no reason to believe that market prices are themselves
intrinsically fair. Rather, it seems that if they are fair they are so because they embody
other properties: reciprocity, equality, anonymity, and the like.60 Thus, hypothetical markets
appear to only embody other principles that operate on the micro-level. If the failure of
rights warrants a return to fmv the latter must be justified in order to be convincing as a
principle of fair transaction. For now though, I will turn to the first problem case for rights:
coercive transactions.
5.3.3 Coercion
Challenges to rights concern primarily its sufficiency as a principle for fair transaction. In
particular, cases involving coercion and fraud present problems for the principle. But before
examining these potential problem cases, recall a case the principle handles easily: the car
auction case that appeared in chapter 2. There B wants to sell her car at an auction that
includes buyers A and C. Although C had the highest reservation price and would have paid
up to $1000 for the car, he discovers his wallet has been stolen and A wins the car for $600
instead. B now receives $600 for her car, rather than $810 (that is, one bid-interval more
than the second highest reserve price). Intuitively, this result is unfair to B.61 This intuition
is easily captured by rights, which claims a transaction is fair iff it is not the case that
an unrectified property rights violation in the history of exchanges leading to the transfer
makes at least one (more preferred) element of one party’s choice set unfeasible. Because an
unrectified property rights violation does make a more preferred element of B’s choice set
57Murphy (1998, p.254)
58Cohen (1997, p.3)
59Sample (2003, pp.23–24)
60David Miller, who endorses his own version of fmv, also fails to provide justification for the principle. Like
Wertheimer, Miller argues that the benchmark for a fair transaction “is one which occurs at an equilibrium
price.” (Miller, 1987, p.156). Miller claims this is determined both by “natural facts about the world such as
the amount and type of labour needed to extract raw materials[,]. . . the tastes of the population, . . . and the
availability of skills and talents” and by “the basic entitlements of individuals participating in the market,
including entitlements to natural resources and personal assets.” (Miller, 1987, p.156)
61Of course, as we’ve seen, answering the question of who is responsible for this unfairness is a more
complicated affair.
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unfeasible, the transaction in which A receives B’s car for $600 is unfair. Now let’s turn to
the first of the three difficult cases for rights: coercion.
Consider the following intuitively unfair transaction.
C12: The drowning woman.
Suppose B is about to drown, but A sees her and promises to rescue her only if
she first agrees to pay him $10,000.62
While the case has many features in common with the car auction, it also contains an
extra feature: not only does A get more than he ought, but in the drowning woman case—
unlike in the car auction—A is also obliged63 to transact with B. There are two mistaken
applications of rights to this case that must be resisted.
First, we may be tempted to claim that if A is obliged to save B, then B has a correlative
right to be saved. The violation of the right to be saved is the way in which the principle
rights is violated in the drowning woman case. This is too quick. Although it may be true
that B has a right to be saved, B’s right to be saved has not been violated when A exploits
her in the case. Since unfair transactions are transactions, anytime A transacts unfairly with
B, A has already discharged an obligation to save B. In other words, A cannot both fail to
save B and charge her too much for saving her.
Second, we may be tempted to claim that in the drowning woman case B has a right to be
saved at a lower price—perhaps splitting the cost of rescue with A. When A saves B for more
than this price, the transaction is unfair. This is also incorrect. Although it may be true
that B has a right to a better price, this is simply another way of claiming that B has a right
to a fair transaction. If we have a right to a fair transaction, then all unfair transactions will
trivially involve rights violations because they are themselves rights violations. But Steiner’s
rights condition is not a vacuous condition; it explains why a transaction is exploitative: the
outcome is unfair because of some other (and previous) rights violation. Neither a right to
be saved nor a right to fair transaction shows that rights can capture the drowning woman
case. In order to show that the principle can explain the unfairness of the drowning case, we
must identify some other rights violation.
Note that this is also true of the car auction case. There, the rights principle is violated,
not by the violation of a right to a lower price, nor by the violation of a right to transact, but
by the violation of C’s (property) right to his wallet. Because the drowning case provides
no indication of whether B’s dire situation was brought about by a past property rights
violation, as it stands, we cannot determine whether the transaction is unfair by reference
to rights.
Assessing the Drowning Woman Case
Because this indeterminacy is not present in the intuitive claim that the transaction is unfair,
it may appear that rights has failed to adequately account for the first problem case. This
conclusion would be premature. Although the drowning woman case is intuitively unfair,
this intuition implicitly assumes—so I claim—the presence of a past rights violation. But B
may, or may not, be in the water because of a past right violation. Her dire straits may have
come about in one of three ways: B may be in the water through her own fault, through
someone else’s fault (either A himself or a third party, C), or through no one’s (nature’s)
fault, that is, her situation is a case of bad brute luck.
63At least within certain bounds—A is not obliged to save B if the cost to A is extremely high, for example.
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First, when B is drowning through the fault of another individual—either A or C—
identifying the rights violation is straightforward. If A (or C) pushed her in the water, then
A’s charging $10,000 for rescue is both intuitively unfair and unfair by rights. In cases
where a third party is the rights violator, determining which actions are permissible for A
becomes more complicated, as we saw in chapter 2’s ‘problem of moral responsibility’, but
rights still shows the transaction to be unfair.
Second, as we’ve seen in chapter 4, if B is fully responsible for her predicament and
aware of the stakes involved, then it cannot be the case that the transaction was unfair. For
example, if B has some reason for venturing into the water, but knows both that the cost
of rescue is $10,000 and that the odds of needing rescue are, say, p = 0.5, then, contrary to
our initial intuitive assessment, it does not seem at all unfair for A to charge her $10,000 for
rescue.
Finally, if B’s predicament is the result of bad brute luck, incorporating the drowning
case into a liberal theory of exploitation is more difficult. Nevertheless, it is clear that with
an expansive account of property rights, rights gives results in the drowning woman case
that are in line with our ordinary intuitions.
While this analysis shows how rights may account for the unfairness of the drowning
woman case when it is unfair, it does not explain why the case seems to differ morally
from the car auction case. In order to explain the moral difference we must distinguish two
questions about the cases: ‘Why are the cases unfair?’ and ‘How is the unfairness used in
each case?’
The reason (why) we may say cases are unfair is the same for the car auction and the
drowning woman case. B is entitled to do as well as she would have done had her rights not
been violated. It is the answer to the question of how A uses B’s unjustly disadvantaged
situation that generates the difference between the two cases. In the car auction, A uses B’s
unjust disadvantage to make an unfair offer—an offer lower than B would have accepted,
absent a past rights violation. In the drowning woman case, A uses B’s unjust disadvantage
to make an unfair threat. Unlike the car auction, this is a case of coercive exploitation.
Coercive Exploitation
In the most general sense, coercive proposals are those in which A attempts to bring about
a state of affairs where B does β by saying that if B β’s, A will α, but if B does not β,
A will ω. Of course, as many writers have argued, this is not sufficient for coercion, since
this structure also holds for ordinary exchanges. Wertheimer notes that coercion is often
taken to require that A’s proposal is a threat, not an offer: “the dominant philosophical
view about coercion is. . . that threats coerce whereas offers do not [and]. . . the crux of the
distinction between threats and offers is [that]. . . A threatens B by proposing to make B
worse off relative to some baseline; A makes an offer to B by proposing to make B better off
relative to some baseline.”64 Of course, according to this distinction, whether a particular
proposal is a threat or an offer will depend upon the baseline. From one perspective, we
might say that A makes an offer to make B better off by saving her, since B’s situation will,
of course, be markedly improved after A rescues her. On the other hand, if A is obliged
to rescue B, then compared to a baseline that includes A’s rescue, he threatens to make B
worse off. Wertheimer, following Nozick (1969), notes that these two perspectives mark a
distinction between moral and statistical baselines:
64Wertheimer (1987, p.202)
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Under the statistical test, whether A is making an offer or a threat will depend
on what is ‘normal’ in their society. . . In some societies it may be likely that A
will rescue B [in the drowning woman case]; in other societies, not. Under the
moral test, whether A is making an offer or a threat will depend on whether A
is morally required to rescue B. If he is, then B’s baseline includes A’s beneficial
intervention, and A’s proposal is a threat. If he is not, then A’s proposal is an
offer.65
In order to clarify the baseline that is being employed, we may call those coercion claims
that employ moral baselines ‘wrongful coercions’. If A is, by hypothesis, obliged to rescue
B, then when A proposes to leave B in the water unless she pays him $10,000 he coerces
her into an unfair transaction. It is the coercive nature of A’s proposal in the drowning case
that generates the moral difference between that case and the car auction. The drowning
woman case involves an unfair transaction that is also wrongfully coercive, while the unfair
transaction in the car auction is of the ‘ordinary’ variety.66
The primary lesson of the analysis is that whether a transaction is obligatory does not
determine whether it is unfair. Rather, if a transaction is obligatory and the terms are
unfair, then it is very likely that the advantaged party also used coercion as a means of
securing these unfair terms. Wrongfully coercive unfair transactions involve two forms of
wrongdoing—unfairness and coercion—both of which depend upon underlying violations
or abuses of rights, but neither of which imply the other. Thus, a failure to discharge an
obligation and coercion both may be used in unfair transactions, but, the final test of whether
the transaction is unfair is specified by the rights principle.
5.3.4 Fraud
The second potential problem case for rights is fraud. Fraud may be seen as a form of
imperfect consent, so, before discussing fraud itself, it is worth considering various forms of
imperfect consent. At the limit, imperfect consent is non-consent. Unilateral transactions
that are non-consensual are generally referred to as thefts. Of course, that a transaction is
unilateral and non-consensual is not sufficient for it to be a theft: thefts also require that
the dispossessed had a right to the transferred goods. The recovery of stolen property is not
theft. But showing that rights conforms to our intuitions in non-consensual transactions is
not difficult; more difficult cases of imperfect consent involve transactions where consent is
partial. Partially consensual transaction may come about in an number of ways.
Partial Consent
One approach to partial consent ties consent to the properties of the transaction. We may
say that although a transactor consents to the transaction, there is another, closely related
transaction, the terms of which she prefers to those of the actual transaction. Her consent
to the related transaction is greater than her consent to the actual transaction. But if this
is all that is meant by partial consent, most transactions are partially consensual, since we
can almost always imagine another situation with better terms.
65Wertheimer (1987, p.207)
66We might be tempted to think that although threats do not generate the unfairness of exploitative
transactions, they are at least indicative of exploitation. But this is incorrect. A may threaten B without
actually exploiting her because B may not respond to the threat. If A allows B to drown, he has done
something very wrong, but he has not exploited her, he has only attempted to exploit her.
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Another approach ties consent to a transactor’s information set. We may say that al-
though a transactor consents to the transaction, if she had known some piece of information
(i), she would not have consented to the transaction. Some, but not all, cases of imperfect
information involve asymmetric information where one person knows more than the other.
When cases involve asymmetric information, we often call the transaction unfair. For exam-
ple, suppose A, who is risk averse, trades a lottery ticket with odds p = 12 , $100; 1 − p, $0
to B for $45. While B consents to the transaction when she doesn’t know the outcome of
the lottery, she would not consent to the transaction if she were to learn that the ticket was
not a winning ticket. There is nothing unfair about the transaction when neither A nor B
know the outcome of the lottery. However, we would say that the transaction was unfair if
A knew the outcome of the lottery was a loss.
But not all transactions involving asymmetric information are unfair. Suppose A, who
has invested time and effort developing a skill at recognising valuable baseball cards discovers
a card he knows collectors would pay $20 for while he browsing at his local flea market. The
seller, B, who does not know of the card’s potential value to collectors, has priced it at $10.
While B would not sell the card to A for $10 if she knew what he knew, it does not seem unfair
for A to use his extra information to reap a benefit from the effort he invested in developing
his skill. So, some transactions may be partially consensual in the sense that the transactor’s
giving consent depends on their not knowing i. Were they to learn i, they would withdraw
their consent. So, some transactions involve imperfect information, some cases of imperfect
information involve asymmetric information, and some cases of asymmetric information are
unfair. When are these cases unfair?
According to rights, asymmetries of information are unfair iff B doesn’t know i because
of a past property rights violation. So, if B would have priced the baseball card higher but
didn’t because A stole her price guide, the transaction is unfair. But if B simply doesn’t
care very much about baseball cards and it is her own preferences that have made it the
case that she does not know about the value to a collector, the transaction with A is not
unfair.67 So far, so good: rights delivers intuitively acceptable results for many cases of
partial consent in cases involving asymmetric information. However, cases of asymmetric
information involving fraud present a problem for the rights principle.
The Problem of Fraud
Consider the following case:
C13: The lemon.
A is selling his car, which he knows is a lemon. B offers A $1,000 for the car,
on the condition that it is in good working order. A lies and assures B that it
is. B purchases the car and it breaks down on the drive home.
As with disadvantage, a lack of information may be brought about by three sources:
ourselves, others, or the world. In the baseball card case, this lack of information is B’s fault.
She simply doesn’t care about baseball cards. Here it is not unfair that she does not receive
the gains of A’s skill. On the other hand, had A stolen her price guide, B’s lack of information
would have been unfair and the unfairness would have been A’s fault. The situation presented
in the lemon case is slightly different.68 A does not prevent B from obtaining information
67Steiner (1987)
68A rather interesting real-life ‘lemon case’ actually involves baseball cards. The “Gretzky Honus Wagner
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that would alter her consent. Rather, he misinforms her; he gives her bad information. The
lemon case presents a problem for rights because, while A’s misinformation places B at a
disadvantage, it is not straightforwardly clear that A violates B’s property rights when he
misinforms her. Thus, prima facie, rights cannot condemn fraud.
This is the conclusion reached by James Child (1994), who argues that “the basic moral
principles of libertarianism do not support a prohibition of fraud. . . Not only does a no-fraud
requirement not follow from libertarian first principles, it is inconsistent with them.”69 Child
concludes that “the only doctrine compatible with a libertarian theory of transactions is the
most ‘hard boiled’ version of caveat emptor.”70 Child argues libertarians are committed
only to two basic moral axioms: self-ownership (A1) and ownership of private property (A2).
These two fundamental rights71 imply two second-order rights of defence: first, the right to
defend oneself, and second, the right to defend one’s property against force, threats of force,
coercion, and seizure. Finally, the domain to which these rights and their correlative obliga-
tions apply is the domain of moral agents who possess what Child calls ‘general competence’,
including the capacities:
MA1 “to acquire, understand and appraise information, which includes considering its prob-
ability of truth or falsity and its relevance;
MA2 to entertain a stable set of preferences by which choice among various options with
various payoffs can be made; and
MA3 in light of this information and these values, to consider choices and weigh possible
risks, costs, and benefits of these choices. This includes the risk and cost of acting on
false information.”72
For moral agents who fulfil (1)–(3), illegitimate transfers include transfers using force, trans-
fers with threats of force, and theft by stealth73, but according to Child, fraudulent transfers,
which do not fall into one of these three categories, are not prohibited by the fundamental
libertarian rights: “in [the lemon case, B’s] right to self-ownership, management, or con-
trol was not compromised. [S]he was not forced to yield the [car],. . . was not threatened by
force or violence,. . . was aware a transaction was proposed, . . . had an opportunity to en-
gage [her] market competence fully, . . . had every opportunity to be critical, even s[c]eptical
of the story[,]. . . [but she] was not.”74 Thus, Child concludes, “libertarians have no moral
machinery for deriving the . . . fraud standard.”75
T-206” baseball card holds the distinction of bringing the highest price at auction for any baseball card. It
last sold September 6, 2007 for $2.8 million. However, controversy surrounds the card since—it is alleged—
the card was altered by memorabilia trader Bill Mastro. Mastro allegedly cut down from its origianl size in
order to disguise flaws along the card’s border. Mastro was indicted by the FBI for defrauding bidders July
25, 2012. According to the FBI press release, the indictment claims that “Mastro allegedly failed to disclose
that he had altered the Wagner T-206 card by cutting the sides in a manner that, if disclosed, would have
significantly reduced the value of the card” (U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2012).
69Child (1994, p.722)
70Child (1994, p.723)
71Or we may say ‘one fundamental right’ if the right to the ownership of private property is derived
from self-ownership, but nothing in the following arguments depends on how we count these ‘fundamental
principles’.
72Child (1994, p.730)
73Child (1994, pp.731–33)
74Child (1994, pp.733-34)
75Child (1994, p.734)
109
Three Flawed Responses to the Lemon Case
There are two simple responses the libertarian might give to the lemon case. The first
response to Child’s argument is to claim that the lemon case involves the destruction of
property, in violation of A2. If information is a form of private property, then A’s destruction
of B’s justly held information is a violation of A2. Provided the status of information as
private property does not depend on the medium in which it is stored, then this applies not
only to information B may have stored externally (on a piece of paper, for example), but also
information stored in her mind. Thus, when A destroys information in B’s mind, he violates
A2.
Unfortunately, it is not clear76 that fraud involves the destruction of information. When
A gives B bad information he does not destroy B’s information by force, but rather provides
B with new information that she must assess. Whether B decides A’s information is credible
and should replace or supplement her previous information is B’s own choice. Neither A1
nor A2 are sufficient to condemn the transaction that takes place in the lemon case. Thus,
these basic libertarian moral axioms must be augmented by a ‘no-fraud’ clause. As Child
remarks, “every libertarian I know of introduces a fraud standard, or what. . . amounts to the
same thing, a requirement for fully voluntary exchange.”77
The second response involves the addition of a ‘no-fraud’ clause to the fundamental
libertarian principles. For example, Nozick argues that the state is justified in using its power
to protect citizens “against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on. . . ”78 For
Nozick, fraud is a form of injustice in transfer. Child argues this approach is not open to
the libertarian. Not only can libertarians “not derive a fraud standard from their moral first
principles, but also. . . it is inconsistent with those principles.”79 Child does not argue that
a no-fraud clause is directly inconsistent, but rather that it is inconsistent when combined
with other considerations. His argument contains two steps. First, he argues that because
the no-fraud clause is ad hoc and the libertarian’s commitment to self-ownership acts as a
‘presumptive trump’ on axioms that would limit it, the burden of proof is shifted to the
libertarian. In the second step, Child argues that if the admission of A3 is ad hoc, then “we
have no non-arbitrary criteria for keeping out A4, A5,. . . , An.”
80 And, while one additional
axiom is not inconsistent with A1 and A2, “the conjunction of A3 through An is, that is, you
cannot chip away at A1 and A2 too much. . . without destroying A1 and A2, and with them
goes the whole game.”81 Not only are A1 nor A2 insufficient to condemn the transaction that
takes place in the lemon case, but the addition of a no-fraud clause seems to open the door to
a slippery slope of unacceptable limitations on libertarianism’s fundamental commitments.
Neither simple response appears successful.
A third, more nuanced response is that if fraud becomes widespread, markets for true
information would appear, with an equilibrium between truthful information and fraudulent
information emerging. Suppose that this does in fact occur. Initially both fraudulent and
76In certain cases we may say that when A provides B with new information he destroys her old information.
Suppose B is trying to remember a phone number for a short period of time by repeating it under her breath
until she writes it down. A mischeviously forces B forget the number by loudly repeating a sequence of
random numbers. In this case, A destroys B’s information by overwriting it by force. Here we may claim
that A violates A2; however, this case differs significantly from the lemon case. Indeed, the phone number
case is not one we would typically call a case of fraud.
77Child (1994, p.738)
78Nozick (1974, p.5, emphasis added)
79Child (1994, p.735, emphasis added)
80Child (1994, p.736)
81Child (1994, p.736, emphasis added)
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truthful markets exist. The uncertainty involved in fraud would drive prices down in fraud-
ulent markets. Buyers could decide whether they wanted to pay more for a guarantee of
quality, or less and risk possible fraud. Of course, the truthful markets would require an
enforcement mechanism, guaranteeing the quality of their goods. Absent an enforcement
mechanism, buyers in the truthful markets would have no recourse for reversing purchases
they made from invading fraudulent sellers. Fraudulent sellers would thus have an incentive
to invade the truthful markets and uncertainty about quality introduced by the invading
fraudulent sellers would drive prices down in the (formerly) truthful markets. Without an
enforcement mechanism, such markets cannot be maintained. One possible enforcement
mechanism is a contract. Child writes,
. . . [suppose] private parties will prevent fraud by contract. For certifying the
truth of information given upon sale would be a kind of warranty, and war-
ranties are contracts. Thus, a libertarian state can enforce warranted truth in
pre-transaction communication. Given this, soon no one would deal with those
who refuse to so warrant their representations. This is a promising move for the
libertarian.82
This is promising perhaps, but ultimately the appeal to contracts is unsuccessful because it
is question-begging. Child himself acknowledges this failure, asking, “Whence comes the au-
thority to enforce contracts if a breach of contract involves no violation of the two libertarian
rights?”83 Suppose A and B sign a no-fraud contract. A has an incentive to defraud B by
failing to honour the contract, as the game theoretic analysis shows. Suppose he does so.
This breach of contract is a form of fraud. When B accepts a contract from A, she engages
in an exchange with him—B promises to provide x and A promises to provide y; however, in
breaching the contract A does not provide y. B would not have accepted the contract had
she known A would not honour it and her belief that A would honour the contract is based
on A’s lie that he would do so. Yet, as we have already seen, lying is not prohibited by either
the right to self-ownership or the right to property-ownership.
At most, we may claim that A has done something wrongful. That is, he has violated a
principle of general morality, but they cannot claim that A has violated libertarian political
morality. So while, it might be possible to say that B herself is permitted to try to enforce
the contract with A, libertarians cannot also endorse the claim that the state is permitted to
help B reclaim her property. Nor can they allow that B might threaten to violate A’s rights
to self- or resource-ownership in order to reclaim her property. At most she might threaten
to damage A’s reputation as a transactor by informing others of his behaviour. This may
somewhat reduce the occurrence of fraud, but without the ability to justify state enforcement
of contracts, these threats lose much of their force.
Without a prohibition on fraud, contracts certifying the truth of information in a sale can-
not themselves be enforced. And without such contracts, independent markets for honest and
fraudulent dealings cannot be sustained. These markets require an independent enforcement
mechanism that allows those who are defrauded to reverse their fraudulent transaction. Such
independent enforcement mechanisms require collective state action. Thus, this response also
fails.
82Child (1994, p.734)
83Child (1994, p.735)
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A Successful Response
Child claims libertarians (1) do not and (2) cannot prohibit fraudulent transactions. While
the first claim is correct, the second is an open question.
Claim (2), Child’s inconsistency argument, actually contains two problems and one im-
plicit assumption. The first problem—the basic inconsistency thesis—is also the most ex-
plicit. Child implies that fraud cannot be meaningfully morally distinguished from a large
number other situations in which an individual’s responsibility for the outcome of the trans-
action may be excused. Therefore, any acceptable justification for the addition of a no-fraud
clause also justifies prohibitions on an intolerably large number of other self-ownership-
limiting principles. However, the plausibility of this argument depends on an implicit as-
sumption that the justification for the inclusion of a no-fraud clause must take the form of a
single distinguishing property.
This calls for some elaboration. It is likely that cases of fraud can be morally distinguished
from, for example, non-fraud lying in the marketplace by appealing to some property of
fraud that is not present in non-fraud lying. It is also likely that cases of fraud can be
morally distinguished from non-market lies by, again, appealing to a property of fraud not
present in non-market cases. However, it is much less likely that the same property will
allow libertarians to distinguish fraud from not only these two cases, but all other closely
related cases (An). If the only acceptable justification for the no-fraud clause must avoid the
inconsistency thesis by appealing to one property that distinguishes fraud from related cases,
then it seems unlikely that libertarians will be able to meet the challenge presented by the
inconsistency thesis. However, if libertarians can provide a justification for the inclusion of a
no-fraud clause by piecing together a conjunctive list of distinguishing properties that apply
to all possible An, then it is much more likely that they will be able to avoid the problems
of the inconsistency thesis.
In other words, Child’s implicit assumption is that what I will call a ‘conjunctive justi-
fication’ would not be an acceptable justification for a libertarian prohibition on fraud. If
a justification contains n conjuncts because different properties are necessary to distinguish
each additional An, then the assumption that a conjunctive justification is unacceptable is
less controversial.84 However, between the ‘unified’ case in which one property distinguishes
fraud from all other related cases and the fully ‘disaggregated’ case in which n properties
distinguish fraud from n cases, lies another possibility. It may be that an appeal to relatively
few properties may distinguish a no-fraud clause from most other, but not all, self-ownership-
limiting principles. In this case, libertarians could prohibit fraud and a few closely related
acts without intolerably limiting self-ownership and property rights. Of course, it remains
for libertarians to provide an acceptable s conjunctive justification.
Yet, even if libertarians do so, they are not in the clear. Lurking within his remarks
about the inconsistency argument is a second problem that Child does not emphasise. Not
all added principles are equally demanding—some are more demanding than others. As
Child correctly notes, “a general duty of veracity enforceable by the state . . . is surely a
libertarian nightmare.”85 This ‘nightmare’ arises not from the addition of many minor self-
ownership-limiting prohibitions, but from one very demanding prohibition. This we may
call the ‘demandingness challenge’: If the justification for a prohibition on fraud also entails
84Although, moral particularists would presumably reject the assumption since, according to many forms
of particularism, any justification of a principle that forbids fraud in all cases, would always require an infinite
conjunction because, for particularists there can be no one principle that forbids fraud in all cases.
85Child (1994, p.737)
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the addition of another limiting principle, then if this principle is overly demanding for a
theory of political morality, the libertarian cannot justify prohibiting fraud without being
committed to an implausibly demanding account of political morality.86 Thus, it is not
enough for libertarians to show they can provide a justification for a prohibition on fraud
that avoids the inconsistency thesis. If the justification for prohibiting fraud does not apply
narrowly to fraud, then libertarians must also ensure that any other prohibitions entailed by
the justification are not overly demanding.
The Distinctiveness of Fraud In defence of the inconsistency thesis, Child argues that
fraud is difficult to distinguish “from non-market truth telling”, “non-fraud lying” and “other
moral problems.”87 Yet, as I argue below, distinguishing fraud from these related cases is
rather straightforward.
The first of Child’s three categories—non-market truth telling—is the most problematic.
Although a general state-enforced duty to veracity would prohibit fraud, it would also fail
the demandingness challenge. Child is correct that there is, prima facie no reason to limit
the prohibition of misinformation to market contexts. Injustice resulting from fraud may
occur, not only in market-based economic transactions, but also in political and personal
domains. But the move from non-market truth-telling to worries about a state-enforced
duty to truthfulness is too quick. A successful no-fraud clause would, inter alia, distinguish
those cases of lying—inside and outside of markets—that would justify state intervention from
those that would not, thus limiting state intervention to an acceptable number of cases. Child
shows the libertarian must provide a justification that avoids the demandingness challenge,
but he does not provide a reason to believe that the libertarian cannot do so. Worries about
non-market truth telling simply provide an example of a related prohibition that a successful
justification of a no-fraud clause must exclude.
Second, consider non-fraud lying. Child claims that “not all lying in the sale of a product
is fraud. . . in negotiations a query ‘what is your lowest price?’ will almost always be met
with a lie, at least early on,” but, he wonders, “how can fraud be differentiated from these
sorts of market misrepresentations?”88 He argues that “no libertarian would say that the
state is justly empowered to see that you tell the truth in this case.”89 Here Child elides an
important distinction between the relative bargaining positions of the transactors and the
properties of the goods being exchanged. Unlike the latter, lies about the former do not have
the negative practical consequence of threatening market stability. Indeed, such behaviour
is common in most markets. Practically speaking, the libertarian has no need to prohibit A
from lying about his bargaining position. More importantly though, even if the libertarian
grants that there are no moral grounds for prohibiting fraud without also prohibiting lies
about bargaining positions, it does not follow that the state is thereby “justly empowered to
see that [A] tell[s] the truth” about his bargaining position.90 A may be entitled to withhold
strategic bargaining information from B even if he is not permitted to misinform her. Child
fails to distinguish between a right to lie, a right to conceal information, and a duty to tell
86Much depends on what counts as implausibly demanding. What is over-demanding for the libertarian
might be tolerable for those who do not subscribe to a libertarian theory of political morality. Answering the
demandingness challenge is a more acute problem for the libertarian than it is for other accounts of political
morality. However, regardless of the demandingness standard, certain duties—such as a general duty to
veracity—will be overdemanding for any account.
87Child (1994, p.737)
88Child (1994, p.737)
89Child (1994, p.737)
90Child (1994, p.737, emphasis added)
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the truth. The libertarian may prohibit lies without granting the state powers to enforce
truth-telling.
Finally, Child lists a number of additional cases he claims a ban on fraud would prohibit:
a. “What about innocent mistakes by either party resulting in a ‘bad bargain’ for one?
b. What about transactions which transpire at exorbitant and unfair prices?
c. What about transactions stemming from unequal bargaining power, including those
entered under economic duress?
d. Why not rescind transactions the consequences of which do not work out as planned
by one party? How can you ban fraud without banning these transactions?”91
To each of these cases the libertarian can provide a response. In the case of (a), we
must ask why the transactor made an innocent mistake. If it was because she was worse
off through some previous property rights violation, then the transaction is unjust; if the
mistake her own fault, then she is responsible for the ensuing ‘bad bargain’. For (b), we
must ask whether the worse-off transactor has a right to a better price. If not, there are
no libertarian grounds on which such transactions can be prohibited. If a price is unfair in
libertarian terms, then it must be the result of previous (property) rights violations. Most
importantly, however, transactions falling in (b) do not involve misinformation and may be
distinguished from fraud in this way. A similar response may be given to (c). We must ask
whether the worse-off had a right to different bargaining power or a right to not be under
duress. If they did, then the transactions that follow are not morally binding; if they did
not, then there are no libertarian grounds for prohibiting these transactions. Finally, fraud
differs from type (d) transactions because, unlike in the purchase of most lottery tickets for
example, the uncertainty involved in fraud is asymmetric and introduced by the defrauding
party through deceit.92 Prohibitions on fraud do not extend to all transactions that are
unattractive to one party ex post. Fraud is closely related to transaction types (a) through
(d), but can be easily distinguished from each, primarily because none of these cases involve
deceit. The slippery slope is slippery only if we are blind to important differences between
the cases.
Fraud can be distinguished from each of these related cases by appealing to the deceit
involved in fraud. Thus, a prohibition on fraud does not invite a large number of self- or
property-ownership limiting principles. The inconsistency thesis is not the central problem a
prohibition on fraud presents for the libertarian. Rather, the hard problem for the libertarian
is the demandingness challenge. Libertarians must find a way to prohibit fraud without
prohibiting deceit tout court because a general prohibition on deceit—even if it does not
imply a state enforceable duty to veracity—is overly demanding for a theory of political
91Child (1994, pp.736–37, lettering added)
92Of course, the sale of lottery tickets can involve assymetric information introduced by the seller, along
with a form of imperfect consent (since, if buyers knew their ticket was a losing one they would not agree to
purchase it). This may occur when A manufactures scratch cards with serial numbers and knows which card
is the winning card. While such lotteries can be distinguished from fraud becase they do not involve deceit,
it is worth pointing out that they also involve a different form of consent than do cases of fraud.
In lotteries, ticket buyers know that there may be such assymetries and yet they consent to the purchase.
Although they do not know whether the ticket they buy is a winner or loser, they know they lack this
information. And, importantly, those who buy lottery tickets argree to this situation—it is constitutive of
lotteries. Lottery buyers know they don’t know and consent to this state. However, when A lies to B about
the quality of the car he sells her, he intends to put B in a situation where she does not know that she
lacks full information about the car and this is an informational state to which B would not consensually
agree to be placed in. Unlike lottery ticket buyers, the defrauded don’t know that they don’t know relevant
information and (wouldn’t consent to not knowing).
114
morality. Yet, the fact that deceit is not only necessary for fraud, but also is what seems to
make fraud unjust complicates the task of finding a justification for a prohibition on fraud
that does not also apply to deceit.
Further, it does not follow from the moral distinctiveness of particular cases that those
properties that justify a state imposed prohibition of one case will not entail a prohibition
of related cases. As the demandingness challenge makes clear, the number of related cases is
relatively unimportant; what matters is the collective demandingness of the related cases, be
they one or many. I have shown that none of the above examples definitively establish either
part (inconsistency or demandingness) of Child’s second claim. But whether libertarians
can justify a prohibition on fraud without intolerably undermining their basic commitments
remains an open question, to which I will now turn.
Justifying a Prohibition on Fraud In what follows I argue that by appealing to both
the wrongfulness of fraud and its negative social effects libertarians can provide a justification
for a prohibition on fraud that applies narrowly to fraudulent transactions. A prohibition
on fraud need not entail any further restrictions on the rights to self- or property-ownership.
Since libertarians have already (incorrectly) assumed that their basic principles entail a pro-
hibition on fraud, the exclusion of the ability to defraud others from the scope of permissible
actions does not represent a restriction on individuals rights to self- or property ownership
that is greater than restrictions already in place in existing libertarian accounts.
The demandingness challenge is the most difficult problem for the justification of a pro-
hibition on fraud. It seems impossible to justify a prohibition on fraud without appealing to
the wrongfulness or unfairness of deceit; yet a state imposed prohibition on deceit is overly
demanding for libertarians. However, it may it may be possible to prohibit fraud without
prohibiting deceit tout court. Libertarians may justify the inclusion of a prohibition on fraud
by claiming that fraud is an act that combines wrongfulness in what I have called ‘general
morality’ with consequences that undermine social stability. This is a ‘conjunctive justifica-
tion’ of the sort that I claim Child implicitly assumes is unacceptable; yet, as I will show,
it manages to avoid both a new form of the inconsistency thesis and the demandingness
challenge.
According to many general moral theories, lying is, pro tanto, wrongful. Most libertar-
ians (and their opponents) will concede this claim. However, the mere fact that an act is
prohibited by general moral principles does not provide sufficient reason to prohibit the act
in a theory of political morality. Ordinarily, state enforced prohibitions on acts like adultery,
betrayal, and deceit seem inappropriate and heavy handed. While we may grant that such
acts are indeed wrongful, we are nevertheless alarmed by reports of states that have imposed
sanctions on such acts. Of course, some acts prohibited by theories of general morality also
merit state enforced prohibitions. Murder, rape, and theft are not only wrongful, they are
unjust, and prohibited by theories of political morality.
In order for an act that is prohibited by general morality to be prohibited by political
morality, it must satisfy some additional criteria. Although libertarians can appeal to the
violation of self-ownership in order to justify prohibitions of rape and murder, the funda-
mental question is why the proper domain for self-ownership is political morality. A rough
answer to the question can be found in the contractarian tradition: a respect for rights to
self-ownership and property ownership allows us to avoid a ‘state of nature’. Only when we
can own and improve land and resources without constant threat of theft and violence is
115
a stable society possible. Although both historical and contemporary contractarians93 have
outlined similar justifications for principles of political morality, perhaps none has been more
influential on modern libertarianism than John Locke, who argues that “government, being
for the preservation of every man’s right and property, by preserving him from the violence
or injury of others, is for the good of the governed: for the magistrate’s sword being for
a terror to evil doers, and by that terror to [e]nforce men to observe the positive laws of
the society, made conformable to the laws of nature, for the public good”.94 The important
social effects of these rights (and their enforcement) justifies their addition to the domain of
political morality. I am not claiming that rights to self-ownership and property ownership
are necessary (or sufficient) for the emergence of a stable society, after all, contractarianism
takes many forms. Rather, the argument is that an appeal to the important effects of the
basic libertarian principles provides the libertarian with a justification for including these
principles in the domain of political morality and this justification may, in part, also justify
a prohibition on fraud.
Appeals to stability and social import allow us to differentiate sub-classes of violations of
general morality. So, although a general prohibition on betrayal would be over-demanding
for a theory of political morality, a prohibition on treason—the betrayal of the state—would
not. Although the kind of wrongdoing involved in both treason and more pedestrian forms
of betrayal is the same, we can single out treason for prohibition at the political level by
noting that it threatens social stability in a way that ordinary betrayal does not.
By now the analogy with fraud should be obvious. Although a general prohibition of deceit
would be overly demanding for a theory of political morality, libertarians can distinguish
fraud from mere deceit by noting that deceit threatens to undermine the important institution
of the market only in cases of fraud. Since markets are central social institutions for the
libertarian, acts that threaten their stability may be prohibited, but since more pedestrian
forms of deceit do not threaten markets, they are not prohibited.
Yet, this appeal to the negative effects of fraudulent transactions, is only one side of the
argument. Although the market stability granted by a no-fraud clause is a necessary compo-
nent of its justification, it is not sufficient to justify a libertarian prohibition on fraud. One
can imagine many other actions that might also be prohibited by appealing to the positive
social effects of the prohibition.95 Indeed, such arguments might justify an intolerably large
set of self-ownership limiting prohibitions. Without a second component in the justification,
the problems brought by the inconsistency thesis resurface.
Libertarians might argue that the severity of the effect of fraud and the import of markets
distinguishes it from related cases. While this diminishes the force of the inconsistency thesis,
it does not exclude the possibility of state enforcement of significant personal sacrifices if
their social effects are significant. Such situations are surely contrary to the libertarian
ethos. Libertarians want a theory of political morality that grants only minimal powers to
the state. Fraudulent transactions are problematic for the libertarian both because they
undermine the effectiveness of markets and because they cannot be prohibited by appealing
to existing libertarian principles. Libertarians must sacrifice either markets or their moral
minimalism; of the two, the latter seems the best choice. However, in the spirit of minimalism,
libertarians should endorse a justification for a no-fraud clause that departs the least from
their original framework. A justification that appeals only to the severe effects of fraud will
93Classic examples include Hobbes (1996), Narveson (1988), and Gauthier (1986).
94Locke (1764, §92)
95In fact, prohibition (of alcohol) is one that comes to mind.
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not accomplish this task, something more must be added.
Libertarians can claim they are justified in prohibiting fraud not simply because it un-
dermines a social institution, or even because it does so severely, but also because fraud
involves a violation of general morality. That is, the wrongfulness of the deceit involved
in fraud is also a necessary component of the justification for a no-fraud clause. Not all
acts that undermine important social institutions should be prohibited by political moral-
ity, only those that are also wrongful according to general morality.96 An appeal to acts
prohibited by general morality allows the libertarian to avoid the inconsistency thesis. Not
only does this restrict the scope of acts with negative social effects, it restricts the scope to
acts that individuals have independent reasons (provided by general morality) to refrain from
performing. Conversely, not all acts that violate principles of general morality should also
be prohibited by a theory of political morality, only those wrongful acts that also severely
threaten important social institutions should be prohibited. An appeal to the negative social
effects of fraudulent transactions allows libertarians to avoid the demandingness challenge.
They can avoid prohibiting deceit tout court, by appealing to the social effects of deceit
involved in fraudulent transactions. Therefore, both components are necessary and jointly
sufficient to justify the inclusion of a no-fraud clause within the libertarian theory of political
morality. Taken together, they allow libertarians to prohibit fraud while avoiding both the
demandingness challenge and the inconsistency thesis.97 When rights is supplemented by
this no-fraud clause, it can successfully handle cases like the lemon case.
I have argued that rights is preferable to contribution on practical grounds and to
use on normative grounds. Wertheimer’s fmv principle lacks full justification since market
prices seem to be a proxy for other notions of fairness that Wertheimer does not specify. More
importantly, though, the existence of a micro-level principle like fmv implies that macro-
level principles like rights cannot account for all cases of unfairness. Yet, as I argued in
subsections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, rights (when supplemented with a no-fraud clause) can account
for all forms of unfairness within the domain of transactions between moral persons. Neither
coercion nor fraud gives us reason to employ a micro-level principle like fmv. Further, since
fmv presupposes a macro-level principle like rights, it acts only as a refinement on such
principles. Thus, at this point, it seems appropriate to continue with rights as the working
principle of fair transaction, supplementing it with fmv only if problems of insufficiency
arise. For now, though, I will turn to the second face of exploitation: taking advantage.
5.4 Taking Advantage
Jon Elster argues that the definition of exploitation as ‘taking unfair advantage’ embodies
. . . a causal and a normative aspect. The normative aspect is that of unfairness,
defined with reference to some theory of justice. . . The causal aspect of exploita-
tion is that of taking advantage of someone: when I derive a benefit from another
96This solution applies only to problem fraud presents for libertarianism as a theory of political morality.
Some libertarians (such as Peter Vallentyne) advance the framework as a general moral theory. Those
defending libertarianism as a general moral theory cannot claim that lying is wrongful according to general
moral theories since their own framework is a general theory and does not prohibit lies.
97Although writers like Milton Friedman might be receptive to this justification of a fraud prohibition,
non-conseqnentialist libertarians, e.g. Nozick, may be more resistant. However, this resistance is purchased
at the price of the plausibility of their theory. Since, as I have argued, fraud is unjust and undermines
markets, a prohibition on fraud is essential for libertarians. And since existing principles do not prohibit
fraud, this leaves these libertarians with a significant problem. I thank Mike Otsuka for pressing me on this
point.
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person being placed in such a situation that his best option is to act in a way
that is to my benefit. Taking advantage of someone allows me to expand the
opportunity set of the person of whom I am taking advantage, by making him an
offer, but it does not allow me to restrict it by threats and similar means.98
As I noted in chapter 3, Steiner and Roemer both provide systemic accounts in which the
conditions that generate the normative aspect (maldistribution) are prior to the systemic or
institutional elements that bring it about. For Goodin and Sample, the priority of causal
and normative conditions is inverted. According to these duty-based accounts, the partic-
ular source of an individual’s vulnerability is not normatively important; all vulnerability
creates the opportunity for exploitation. What makes a particular transaction exploitative
is the use of these vulnerabilities to gain benefit. For the duty-based accounts, injustice
can create vulnerability, but it is not necessary for exploitation. I have already shown that
this non-juridical approach to exploitation is mistaken: non-juridical accounts are either
self-frustrating or incomplete. A transaction is an exploitation only if the vulnerabilities
that are taken advantage of have arisen through injustice (unfairness). Elster’s claim that
exploitation requires an unfair distribution is correct and, in the previous section, I argued
that rights is the best of many principles of fair transaction.
Just as there are many principles of fair transaction, there are many specifications of
what it means to ‘take advantage’. In the present section I consider three senses of ‘tak-
ing advantage’. Elster’s Pareto-based account, a vulnerability-based interpretation, and an
awareness-based interpretation. Although each is appropriate in certain contexts, I argue
that the advantage taking involved in exploitation is best captured by the awareness-based
interpretation.
5.4.1 Advantage as (Strict) Pareto Improvement
According to the above quote from Elster, we take advantage of someone by “adding an option
to his opportunity set that is better both for him and for [us] than the option preferred by him
prior to the expansion.”99 Advantage taking in this sense is equivalent to offering someone
a strictly Pareto-improving transaction. Strictly speaking this cannot be correct; the offer
may be rejected, in which case, no advantage would accrue to either party. So it seems
that we actually take advantage in Elster’s sense when we offer a strictly Pareto-improving
transaction and the transaction, in fact, occurs. That is, for Elster (with this repair), A
takes advantage when the following two conditions are satisfied:
(A1) A’s preferences are better satisfied by transacting with B than they would be if he did
not transact with B,
(A2) B’s preferences are better satisfied by transacting with A than they would be if she did
not transact with A.
When these two conditions are both satisfied, the transaction is a strictly Pareto-improving
transaction. A and B take advantage of each other’s preferences when both gain from the
transaction. That is, A and B each gain because of the other’s preferences.
Elster’s preference-based account of advantage taking coheres with one widely used sense
of ‘advantage taking’. Unfortunately, this sense adds nothing to the unfairness conditions
98Elster (1982)
99Elster (1982, p.364)
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used in Steiner’s original account. Preference-based advantage taking is trivially satisfied
anytime A and B engage in a strictly Pareto-improving transaction, fair or otherwise. Ac-
cording to Elster’s sense of ‘taking advantage’, the ‘taking advantage’ portion of the ordinary
language definition of exploitation as ‘taking unfair advantage’ is redundant. When we em-
ploy Elster’s sense of ‘taking advantage’, exploitation is simply a strictly Pareto-improving
transaction in which the rights principle is violated. As we have already seen in the analysis
of Steiner’s account, the scope of this conception of exploitation is far wider than ordinary
use. We require a more restrictive sense of taking advantage if this condition is to limit the
scope of exploitation. Some further condition must be added to (A1) and (A2).
5.4.2 Vulnerability-Based Advantage
Elster claims that taking advantage is the causal component of exploitation. His own account
is causal in the sense that A’s preference for B’s money over his car and B’s preference for
A’s car over her money are both necessary conditions for an ordinary transaction. If either
party’s preferences were reversed (i.e., A would rather keep his car), the transaction would
not occur (at least not consensually). But we can also distinguish a stronger sense of taking
advantage. It may be the case that transacting with B results in a gain for A only because
B has been unjustly disadvantaged. Consider the following case:
C14: The unemployed.
Suppose that A runs a factory that produces widgets. The cost of widget pro-
duction means that A cannot pay his workers more than $10 per hour without
making a loss. Suppose that B previously worked at a job she enjoyed for $40
per hour, but because of a violation of her property rights, she has lost her job.
Now that she is unemployed, B prefers to work for A for $10 per hour over
remaining unemployed.
Prior to the property rights violation, A and B would not have transacted, but now that
B is unjustly disadvantaged—vulnerable—she transacts with A. That is:
(A1) A’s preferences are better satisfied by transacting with B than they would be if he did
not transact with B,
(A2) B’s preferences are better satisfied by transacting with A than they would be if she did
not transact with A, and
(A3) The satisfaction of Steiner’s conditions (1)–(4) was necessary for A and B to transact.
Here A takes advantage of B’s unjust vulnerability (or disadvantage) in order to gain. Accord-
ing to this sense of advantage taking, B’s unjust vulnerability is necessary for the transaction
to occur. The vulnerability-based sense of advantage taking is stronger than, and implies, the
preference-based sense. When A works for B for $10, (A1)–(A3) are satisfied, but obviously
not all those transactions satisfying (A1) and (A2) also satisfy (A3). This sense of advantage
taking also, of course, has the advantage of (at least partially) incorporating Sample’s and
Goodin’s claims that exploitation involves the mistreatment of vulnerable people.
Despite its initial attractiveness, (A3) is too strong. Suppose that in addition to her $40
per hour job, B wants to make some spending money on the side, working occasionally for A
for $10 per hour. However, before beginning to work for A, a property rights violation causes
B to lose her higher-paying job. Knowing that she is desperate for money, A reduces his offer
to $5 per hour and B reluctantly accepts. It seems natural to say that A exploits B here,
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and, indeed, that A takes advantage of B’s unjust vulnerability; yet (A3) is not satisfied. In
the absence of the rights violation, A and B would still transact (but not on the same terms).
It seems that we require a sense of exploitation that is stronger than the conjunction of (A1)
and (A2), but weaker than (A1)–(A3).
5.4.3 Advantage as Awareness
Consider again the second case of the unemployed. What strikes us as exploitative about
the case is not only that B is forced to work for A for less because of a rights violation,
but also that A adjusts his offer because of the advantage in bargaining power the rights
violation gives him. Exploitation, it seems, does not merely depend on the conditions that
cause B to enter into an unfair transaction. A’s response to B’s condition—as Goodin and
Sample remind us—is also important in our ordinary judgement that a particular transaction
is exploitative. The idea that exploitation requires an intentionality condition has appeared
through the first half of the thesis. An intentionality condition provides one way in which
A’s attitudes towards B can be captured. Consider the following:
(A4) A intentionally engages in a transaction in which rights is violated.
Although promising, like (A3), (A4) is too strong. In general, we may claim that an agent is
morally responsible for the side-effect of an intentional action without committing ourselves to
the claim that the side-effect itself was an intentional action (indeed, Alfred Mele (2001) has
argued that these side-effects of intentional actions are never brought about intentionally).
This general claim seems true for advantage taking in possible cases of exploitation. Suppose
A knows that B chooses to work for him for $5 per hour only because of a past rights violation,
but in hiring B, A does not intend to exploit, harm, transact unfairly, or act towards B in
an impermissible manner. Rather, A intends to make a profit by producing widgets.
Yet, provided A is aware of B’s plight, he does not passively or ignorantly take advantage
of B in the sense characterised by (A1) and (A2). When A knows about B’s situation,
regardless of whether the reason on which he acts is tied to the fact that rights is violated,
he actively takes advantage of B.100 In some cases where (A4) is not satisfied, A still seems
to take advantage of her unjust disadvantage in a stronger sense than that characterised by
(A1) and (A2) when he hires her for $5. We must replace the ‘intentionally’ that appears in
(A4) with ‘knowingly’.
However, this too is too strong. It does not matter whether A’s belief that Steiner’s
conditions are satisfied is justified,101 but only that A believes they are satisfied and that it is
true that they are satisfied. Suppose A truly believes transacting with B would be a violation
of the rights principle, but his belief is based on an incredible backstory that in no way
relates to the true reason that the transaction would violate rights. Nevertheless, rights
is violated, the transaction is unfair, and A truly believes this (but given the information on
which his belief is based he oughtn’t to believe it). Does A still exploit B when he transacts
with her in a way that violates rights? What is at stake here are two possible relationships
100We may be sceptical about the claim that the intention behind A’s action is not suspect. Indeed, the
so-called Knobe effect, first outlined by Joshua Knobe, shows that there is an asymmetry in our willingness to
ascribe intentionality: “people. . . seem considerably more willing to say that a side-effect was brought about
intentionally when they regard that side-effect as bad than when they regard it as good.”(Knobe, 2003, p.193)
101Of course, the characterisation of knowledge as ‘justified, true belief’ is problematic. See, for example,
Gettier (1963) and the many papers that extend and generalise Gettier’s problem. The point here is that
what does matter is only that A has a belief that the conditions are satisfied and that this belief is true.
That it is justified, or justified and satisfies additional robustness conditions, is not necessary for A to take
advantage in the sense I am outlining.
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between the unfairness condition and the advantage condition. Does exploitation require
only that the conditions on both sides are satisfied, or does it require that the state of the
world that makes it such that rights is violated is the same state that leads to A’s true
belief (A5) that it is violated? Or, to put the issue another way, in giving up the requirement
that A’s true belief is justified, have we weakened the advantage condition too much? I do
not think so. His true belief seems sufficient to give him a reason to constrain his actions.
A’s true belief about B’s plight gives him a reason to modify his behaviour towards her.
Even if A’s intention in engaging in the transaction includes no reference to the violation
of rights, when he ignores the reason to modify his behaviour generated by his awareness
of B’s situation, he understands that the kind of advantage he has over B is more than the
sense of advantage characterised by (A1) and (A2). In other words, when A’s true belief
gives him a reason to not transact, and yet he transacts, he can be said to actively ‘take’
the advantage that B’s disadvantage places before him. Thus, the sense of taking advantage
relevant to the context of exploitation seems to be given by the following:
(A5) A truly believes that he engages in a transaction that is unfair according to rights.102
A actively takes advantage of B when A is aware103—truly believes—he receives an advantage
from B. Weakening the condition by removing the belief component leaves us with only
Elster’s sense of taking advantage; weakening the condition by removing the truth component
leaves us with a case where A only attempts to take advantage of B, but does not in fact
take advantage of B. On the other hand, strengthening the condition by requiring either that
A knows or that A intends to engage in a transaction in which rights is violated is overly
restrictive. It rules out the possibility of A’s ‘taking advantage’ of B when A is aware that he
receives a benefit from B’s unjust disadvantage, but either lacks justification for this belief
or focuses his attention on other reasons for transacting.
5.5 Chapter 5 Summary
In this chapter I argued, in section 5.2, that—contra Wood—exploitation is best captured
by the ordinary language definition of ‘taking unfair advantage’ and is therefore a negatively
moralised concept. In section 5.3 I claimed that the unfairness involved in exploitation is
best captured by the rights principle of fair transaction.
Finally, in section 5.4 I claimed that the advantage taking component of exploitation is
best captured by the ‘awareness-based’ sense of advantage taking, which is operationalised by
(A5). When the claim in rights that a past rights violation “makes one party worse off than
they would be” is operationalised using my modified conditions for Steinerian exploitation
(1)–(4) and (A5) is added to these conditions, we obtain the following working account of
exploitation:
A exploits B in the bilateral and voluntary transaction φ just in case:
(1) there exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in the history of
exchanges leading to φ that
102There are two possible readings of A5. According to one, the content of A’s belief must actually reference
the rights principle. Not only does A believe that the transaction is one that we would ordinarily call unfair,
he knows the wording of the rights condition and believes the transaction satisfies this condition. According
to the second, weaker reading, A5 requires that A truely believes he engages in a transaction that is what
we would ordinarily call unfair and this transaction also happens to satisfy the rights condition. This is the
reading that applies to A5, not only in its present rendering, but in subsequent renderings, when the general
rights is replaced with various operationalisations of the principle.
103In my use, awareness is simply equivant to true belief. Thanks to Julian Fink for the suggestion of
‘awareness’ in this condition.
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(2) makes at least one element of B’s original104 (and finite) feasible set, γB , unfeasible,
leaving her with a new feasible set, δB (where δB ( γB),
(3) B prefers the unfeasible option in γ to her most preferred option in δ,
(4) A’s egoistic preferences:
(a) are better satisfied in φ because γ is restricted to δ,
(b) and if (1)–(3) also hold for A, then the positive change in the degree of satisfaction
of A’s preferences, given (1)–(3) hold for B, is strictly greater than any positive
change in the degree of satisfaction of B’s preferences, given (1)–(3) hold for A.105
(A5) A truly believes (is aware) that he engages in a transaction in which (1)–(4) are satis-
fied.106
In the following chapter I discuss and assess this working characterisation of exploitation.
104It is possible to interpret ‘original’ in condition (2) as original in either a temporal or modal sense. Here
and in the remainder of the thesis, ‘original’ should be interpreted in the modal sense: exploitation requires
that B’s feasible set is reduced from the feasible set that would have been available to her had the rights
violation not occurred.
105Note that condition (4b) presupposes the ability to make interpersonal comparisons of preference satis-
faction. Although we have little trouble making interpersonal comparisons in practice, whether our doing so
is justified is a difficult theoretically issue (see Robbins (1932, 1938)). Two justifications for the theoretical
legitimacy of interpersonal comparisons have been suggested by (Hausman, 1995) and (Harsanyi, 1955), how-
ever, Hausman’s approach, as he acknowledges, is ethically indefensible and Harsanyi’s approach, as some
latter commentators have observed, is unsatisfactory.
In condition (4b) and its later variants (G4b, G4′b, G4′′b) I do not favour any particular approach to the
theoretical problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility over any other, I simply suppose that, though
the theoretical problems are interesting, they do not significantly affect our ability to make interpersonal
comparisons in practice. The import of pointing out the necessity of interpersonal comparisons is to show that
the informational requirements of this account of exploitation are richer than certain other moral concepts;
i.e. the Pareto principle.
106For my purposes the reference in (A5) to A’s beliefs is to his actual beliefs, not merely those that he
might be expected to have. This rules out the possibility of the occurance of exploitation in cases where A’s
mistaken beliefs are caused by negligence. I discuss the difference made by the reference to actual beliefs in
more detail in 6.2.1.
Note that a more generalised account of exploitation can be obtained by leaving the interpretation of
‘beliefs’ unspecified.
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Chapter 6
Refining the Working Conception
6.1 Chapter 6 Introduction
Chapter 5 closed with a working account of exploitation. On this account, exploitation’s
unfairness is captured by the rights principle of fair transaction—in particular, the op-
erationalisation of rights given by my revised conditions of Steinerian exploitation. The
advantage taking aspect of exploitation is captured by condition (A5): A takes advantage
of B in an exploitative transaction when he is aware that the transaction he engages in is
unfair, but nevertheless fails to constrain his actions.
In this chapter I assess the working characterisation in section 6.2. The first part of
the section considers the features of the working characterisation. I consider the role of
negligence in exploitation and the possibility of mutual exploitation and also show that
the account solves the problems of moral responsibility and the pervasiveness issues we
encountered in the analysis of Steiner’s and Roemer’s accounts. In the second part of the
section I present a problem of obligation for the working characterisation. Sections 6.3
considers two unsuccessful solutions to this problem and 6.4 presents a successful solution that
abandons the preference satisfaction-based fairness conditions. Here I argue that an account
of exploitation that can function in deontically imperfect situations must make reference to
a non-outcome-based non-exploitative baseline. I advocate a bargaining-based baseline and
develop a second characterisation of exploitation that avoids the problems of the first while
retaining its positive features. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Assessing the Working Characterisation
Before considering the features of the working account, I will briefly comment on its charac-
terising conditions. Recall from the previous chapter that A exploits B in the bilateral and
voluntary transaction φ just in case:
(F1) there exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in the history of
exchanges leading to φ that
(F2) makes at least one element of B’s original (and finite) feasible set, γB , unfeasible,
leaving her with a new feasible set, δB (where δB ( γB),
(F3) B prefers the unfeasible option in γ to her most preferred option in δ,
(G4) A’s egoistic preferences:
(a) are better satisfied in φ because γ is restricted to δ,
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(b) and if (F1)–(F3) also hold for A, then the positive change in the degree of satis-
faction of A’s preferences, given (F1)–(F3) hold for B, is strictly greater than any
positive change in the degree of satisfaction of B’s preferences, given (F1)–(F3)
hold for A.
(A5) A truly believes (is aware) that he engages in a transaction in which (F1)–(G4) are
satisfied.
In this presentation, the original revised Steinerian conditions have been re-labelled according
to their role (fairness, gain, advantage). The unfairness of exploitation to B is captured by
conditions (F1)–(F3). B is unfairly worse off when a past property rights violation (F1)
causes her to lose options (F2) that she preferred to the options that are available after the
rights violation (F3). While these conditions alone characterise a transaction that is unfair
to B, they do not say anything about whether A gains from the unfairness.
Exploitation requires not only that B is worse off than she should be, but also that A
gains from B being worse off. This intuition is captured by (G4), the gain condition. (G4a)
requires that A gains from B’s being disadvantaged by (F1)–(F3), and that he gains in the
right way. Schadenfreude is (arguably) not exploitation. If the only additional gain A receives
from B’s situation satisfying (F1)–(F3) is the satisfaction of his preference to see B worse off
when transacting with him, we would not normally describe A’s action as one of exploitation,
but of spite. Although the concept could be extended to cover cases involving non-egoistic
preferences, most of the time we think of the gain that A receives as being a form of material
gain. Sometimes we extend this notion to include egoistic preference satisfaction, but rarely
would we take it to include non-egoistic preference satisfaction.
In some cases, it is possible for conditions (F1)–(F3) to hold for both A and B. For exam-
ple, suppose A and B both live in an apartment complex that has been the target of arson.
The arson may make both worse off in a way that satisfies (F1)–(F3). Supposing the two
then transact, if they are equally disadvantaged neither can exploit the other. Exploitation
depends on the relative disadvantage of one of the transactors. Thus, in order for A to
exploit B, the arson must have left B relatively worse off—according to (F1)–(F3)—than A.
Condition (G4b) adds this restriction.
Finally, as we saw in chapter 5, in cases of exploitation, the advantage that A takes of
B is best captured by A5. A takes advantage of B when he truly believes he engages in a
transaction in which (F1)–(G4) hold. That is, he truly believes that in transacting with B,
his preferences will be better satisfied than they would have been, and B’s preferences will
be less well satisfied than they would have been, because of a past property rights violation.
This working characterisation of exploitation has many benefits. It solves the pervasive-
ness issues plaguing Steiner’s and Roemer’s accounts, it solves the problem of moral respon-
sibility presented by unintentional exploitation, and it incorporates the intuition shared by
Goodin, Sample, and Wood that exploitation involves some form of active advantage taking
while also avoiding the pitfalls of non-juridical exploitation. It also excludes the possibility
of mutual exploitation and negligent exploitation. In the subsections that follow I address
these benefits and exclusions, beginning with the latter.
6.2.1 Excluding Mutual Exploitation and Negligence
Mutual Exploitation. First consider the exclusion of mutual exploitation. Although
paradigmatic cases of exploitation are asymmetric, some writers have also defended the
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existence of mutual exploitation. Judith Tormey writes “we do, after all, commonly describe
persons as standing in a relation of mutual exploitation (A exploits B relative to x; B exploits
A relative to y). . . In mutual exploitation each gets more than a fair share of some burdens (or
benefits) and less than a fair share of others.”1 While Tormey’s claim that we often speak of
mutual exploitation is correct, this does not entail that such talk is coherent. The existence
of mutual exploitation requires the existence of two incommensurable domains of value, for
although A may gain unfairly from B in domain x and B may gain unfairly from A in domain
y, if there exists a domain z common to both x and y, the relative gains of A and B can
be weighed on the common scale. If overall A gains more than B, we can claim that on the
whole, A exploits B. We might also say that A x-exploits B and B y-exploits A, but this does
not entail that they both all-things-considered exploit each other. Such forms of exploitation
are possible even in a preference satisfaction framework; x and y may simply be labels for
two different transactions. However, in a uni-dimensional value theory (or a value theory
with multiple, commensurable dimensions), mutual exploitation in a single transaction is
impossible, because on such a value theory, advantage is a zero-sum game. The value theory
underpinning both Steiner’s account of exploitation and the above characterisation is that
of subjective preference satisfaction. Therefore, it does not allow for mutual exploitation.
Nevertheless, the working conception of exploitation outlined above is not as starkly op-
posed to mutual exploitation as it may seem. If mutual exploitation is possible, then the
structure of exploitation in each particular incommensurable dimension of value is surely
similar to that characterised by (F1)–(A5). The preference-based value theory would be re-
placed by (or augmented with) another value (incommensurable with preference satisfaction)
for the second dimension, but the basic conditions of unfairness and awareness would remain
the same. Therefore, the basic structure of the working conception is compatible with many
theories of value and can account for different kinds of intuitions about exploitation when
combined with different theories of value.2
Negligence. The second remark concerns the existence of cases in which (A5) is not sat-
isfied, but only because A is negligent. In such cases, although A ought to truly believe
(F1)–(G4) hold, he does not. There are two responses we might give to such cases. First, we
might simply add a negligence disjunction to (A5). The condition is satisfied when either A
truly believes (F1)–(G4) hold, or when he ought to truly believe they hold. Alternatively,
we might claim that because (A5) is not, in fact, satisfied, A does not exploit B. Rather, he
is guilty of a negligent and unfair transaction. Much like murder can be distinguished from
manslaughter by ‘malice aforethought’—the intention to kill or harm—we may claim that
exploitation requires A to truly believe he is engaging in an unfair transaction.
The debate between these two approaches is more than merely terminological. Since
A is culpable for his negligence, exploitation would remain wrongful with and without the
addition of a negligence disjunct to (A5). However, the fact that exploitation seems to
be closely related to intentional action in ordinary use provides one reason for excluding the
negligence disjunct. But a stronger reason for excluding the negligence disjunct is provided by
the fact that its inclusion would require an account of negligence. Whether A exploits B does
not seem to depend on whether A ought to have known that a particular transaction satisfied
(F1)–(G4). An account of exploitation should not depend on an account of negligence. By
excluding the negligence disjunct, the independence of exploitation is maintained. Further,
1Tormey (1976, p.212)
2Thanks to Sebastian Ko¨ehler for pointing this out to me.
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as I noted above, excluding negligent and unfair transactions from the scope of exploitation
does not exonerate the negligent transactor, it merely classifies the transactions as a different
kind of normative transaction.
6.2.2 Solving Responsibility and Pervasiveness Problems
Pervasiveness. As we saw in chapters 2 and 3, both Steiner and Roemer provide accounts
of exploitation that make its presence pervasive. The inclusion of (A5) in the working concep-
tion limits the scope of exploitation to those cases in which A is aware that the transaction
is unfair to B. This circumscription excludes what we might normally consider ‘ordinary
transactions’ from the scope of exploitation. We would not ordinarily call transactions like
the purchase of a loaf of bread from the store, dog-sitting in exchange for a bottle of wine,
etc., exploitative transactions. Yet, neither Roemer’s account, Steiner’s original account, nor
my revised version of his account, provide a way to exclude these cases from the scope of
exploitation. Of course, we may be unaware that there is actually something unfair about
these seemingly ordinary transactions, but we would not normally call them exploitations.
The addition of (A5) restricts exploitation to those unfair transactions in which A is aware
that the transaction is out of the ordinary—in particular, to those situations in which he is
aware that it is unfair. The addition of (A5) does not deny the normative significance of
unfair transactions; indeed, the unfairness characterised by (F1)–(G4) supplies the core nor-
mative content of the conception I have outlined. What my account denies is that we should
call transactions satisfying (F1)–(G4) exploitation rather than simply labelling them ‘unfair
transactions’. This is, of course, merely a matter of convention. We may label transactions
satisfying any number of properties ‘exploitation’. But if our labelling is to be useful, it
should bear at least some resemblance to our ordinary use of the concept. The justification
for calling (F1)–(A5) ‘exploitation’ is a topic to which I return in section 7.3.1.
Moral Responsibility. The addition of (A5) not only restricts the domain of exploita-
tion, it also offers a solution to the problem of moral responsibility for Steiner’s theory of
exploitation. Recall from chapter 2 that the problem had the following form:
The Problem of Moral Responsibility.
P1 Steiner’s theory permits non-culpably (¬C) ignorant (¬K) exploitation (E).
P2 On Steiner’s theory exploitation is a negatively moralised concept, which means if
exploitation occurs, then it is wrong (W ).
P3 If an action is wrong, then there is at least one person who is morally responsible
(R) for the action.
P4 If a person is morally responsible for an action they performed, then they acted
either intentionally or from culpable ignorance.
P5 If a person acted intentionally, then they must know (K) they performed the action.
In my discussion in chapter 2, I argued that consistency may be restored to the five premises
through what I called the ‘badness solution’. Contrary to the implication of P2, negatively
moralised concepts are those that imply badness or wrongdoing. By modifying P2 to include
a ‘badness’ disjunction (E → W ∨ B) in the consequent, the inconsistency is removed.
However, in that section I also briefly outlined an ‘intentional condition solution’, noting
that there are those that may disagree with the badness solution, not because the solution
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itself fails, but rather because the problem of moral responsibility sets out in the wrong
direction before P2. If we think that exploitation must be intentional, then the ‘obvious’
solution to the paradox will be to abandon the first premise. In my brief discussion of
the ‘intentional condition solution’ I noted two drawbacks: it limits the scope of a theory
of exploitation and, because it necessitates modifications to the minimal ethical framework
that underlies Steiner’s original approach to exploitation, it is strongly revisionary.
The first of these concerns is not a problem; rather, because Steiner’s original approach
was both diachronically and synchronically pervasive, the limited scope brought by the ad-
dition of (A5) is—as we have just seen—a virtue. The second concern is a problem only
for those committed to classical liberalism’s moral minimalism. Steiner has shown that even
within this framework classical liberals have a reason to be concerned with exploitation. If
classical liberalism cannot incorporate the augmentations necessary to capture the trust fun-
der case3 (section 2.2), then they must restrict their concern to a subset of what we might
ordinarily call exploitation. This, I suggest, is a problem for the classical liberal, not for a
conception of exploitation that draws on a more extensive moral framework.4
Of course, as the discussion of (A5) makes clear, intentionality is too strong as a necessary
condition for exploitation. I have claimed that the weaker requirement that A has a true
belief that B is disadvantaged is, when combined with the other four conditions, sufficient
for the truth of the claim that A exploits B. This ‘awareness’ is sufficient to hold A morally
responsible for his actions toward B. If A is aware that he is engaging in an unfair transaction
with B, then, provided that justice is one of our moral rules,5 A has a moral reason to
constrain his own advantage when transacting with B. When A truly believes B is unjustly
disadvantaged, his failure to constrain his own unjust advantage engages with his judgment-
sensitive attitudes and thus warrants a negative moral appraisal of A.6 Thus, we may say
that A is attributively responsible for exploiting B. Whether (and to what extent) A may
also be substantively responsible for the exploitation (e.g., should bear some of the cost of
rectifying the unfairness) is a further question that I do not consider in this chapter.
6.2.3 The Problem of Obligation
The working conception of exploitation characterised by (F1)–(A5) excludes negligence and
mutual exploitation from its scope, solves the problem of moral responsibility, and limits the
concept to transactions that are more naturally described as exploitation. I have argued that
these features are all, in one way or another, virtues of the working conception. However, it
also faces a significant challenge. The obligations implied by the conditions (F2) and (F3)
are unduly strong in cases of non-obligatory transactions in which the only non-exploitative
trade lies above A’s reserve price. Ultimately, these overly demanding obligations undermine
the plausibility of the fairness conditions contained in the working conception. The remaining
parts of this section outline this ‘problem of obligation’ and a solution is explored in the next
section.
3Recall that in the case B owns an investment that pays her a dividend of $100,000 per annum, an amount
that allows her to realise a fairly comfortable standard of living. B values her leisure time, but is not opposed
to work. Given the dividend, B is willing to work only if she can secure a salary greater than $40,000.
However, no such jobs are available, so B is unemployed. One day C steals B’s investment, putting an end to
her dividend. Having lost her income, B must now find work. The only job she can secure is to work for A.
Although A usually pays employees in B’s position $30,000, knowing that B needs a job and that the next
best job B could obtain pays less than $20,000, A pays B only $20,000.
4Whether my full account of exploitation is compatible with a stark-budget liberalism is a topic that I
return to, briefly, in chapter 7.
5See the discussion in §5.2.1, Steiner (1994, pp.222–23), and Kramer (et. al., pp.282–83).
6See Scanlon (1998, p.248) and subsection2.3.2.
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Consider the following case in which a transaction between A and C is non-obligatory,
neither is under any obligation to transact with the other, and in which the non-exploitative
price lies above A’s reserve price.7
C15: (Upsetting) The apple cart.
Suppose that every Saturday C drives his apple cart to B’s village and sells
apples in the market. Every Saturday B buys 10 apples for $1 each. One
Saturday C’s apple cart is stolen. When B arrives at the market her only
alternative for apples is A, who charges $2 per apple. Because A’s apple selling
operation is smaller than C’s, she does not enjoy economies of scale. A’s break
even price for an apple is $1.50. Finally, suppose that the most B would be
willing to pay for each apple is $2.50.
In order to avoid exploiting B, A has two options. Since the transaction is non-obligatory
(by hypothesis), A may simply refrain from transacting with B. Alternatively, he may engage
in a fair transaction with B. Since the transaction is unfair to B when she receives less than
she would have because of an antecedent property rights violation, it must be fair to B
only if she receives what she would have, had the property rights violation not occurred.
The conditions that specify the sense in which B receives less than she would have are (F2)
and (F3). According to these conditions, B receives less than she would have when a rights
violation makes a previously feasible and more preferred alternative unfeasible. Therefore,
in order for B to receive what she would have (and thus for the transaction to be fair), A
must transact with B on terms that restore her feasible set to the original γB . That is, in
order to ensure (F2) and (F3) do not hold, A must offer his apples to B for $1 each. Faced
with the options of either not transacting or making a loss, a rational and morally motivated
A will choose to refrain from transacting with B since this is the morally permissible option
that maximises his own welfare.
Here we have a problem. We know from the reserve prices listed in the apple cart case
that, given a choice between selling B 10 apples for $20 and not transacting, A would prefer
to sell the apples. Additionally, given a choice between buying 10 apples for $20 and not
transacting, B would prefer to buy the apples. Unfortunately, the only morally permissible
options, according to the working conception of exploitation, are either to not transact, or to
exchange 10 apples for $10. The moral constraints imposed by (F1)–(A5) are worse for both
A and B and better for no one. If (at least a portion of) the wrongfulness of exploitation
stems from the harm to B when compared to a non-exploitative baseline, then the greater
harm of a no transaction situation must also be, if not morally wrong, morally bad. Moral
obligations that encourage the badness of a ‘no transaction’ situation are surely unacceptable.
Further, the problem represented by the apple cart case is not limited to special cases. In any
non-obligatory transaction in which the only non-exploitative trade lies beyond A’s reserve
price, A (if morally motivated and rational) will choose to refrain from transacting. It seems
clear that the conditional obligations implied by (F2) and (F3) are too strong. The following
section outlines two unsuccessful attempts to solve the problem of obligation.
7We may also assume that A and C provide identical products. Of course, from an economic perspective,
this means that A’s continued existence in the market is puzzling. Perhaps a more plausible version of the
case places A and C in different village markets and the rights violation does not involve the theft of C’s
apple cart, but rather a barrier along B’s path to C’s village. Since this (arguably) more plausible version is
also more complex, I will not concern myself with a realistic explanation of the existence of different apple
prices in the same village. We may simply take the prices as given.
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6.3 Unsuccessful Solutions to the Problem of Obligation
In many ways the problem of obligation is similar to the extended problem that the dilemma
in chapter 4 creates for Goodin’s and Sample’s accounts. Goodin and Sample can avoid
the dilemma by prohibiting A from taking prudent risks, but not only is this solution too
stringent, it is not well-motivated. The source of the problem is not A’s risk taking, but
the insensitivity to personal responsibility of the come-what-may duties that underpin the
accounts. In the problem of obligation, A can avoid the overly demanding fairness obliga-
tions implied by (F2) and (F3) by simply refraining from transaction with B, but like the
prohibition on prudent risks, this does not address the root cause of the problem.
This section outlines two possible solutions to the problem of obligation that the working
conception of exploitation faces. The first argues for a ‘piecemeal’ account of fairness where
different obligations apply in different contexts. The second argues that the problem pre-
sented by the apple cart case can be solved by restricting the scope of exploitation to exclude
such cases. Unfortunately, as we will see, neither solution is acceptable.
6.3.1 Piecemeal Fairness
Initially, we might claim that exploitation is not always a strongly moralised concept. Al-
though most cases of exploitation are wrongful, some are merely morally bad. In cases where
the only non-exploitative trade lies beyond A’s reserve price, A’s pro tanto obligation to re-
frain from exploiting B is overridden by feasibility constraints and concerns about welfare.
Thus, in most exploitative situations, the obligations implied by (F2) and (F3) apply, but in
apple cart cases A may charge B any price.
This approach is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, part of the motivation for including
the advantage condition A5 is to capture the intuition that exploitation is not only morally
bad, but also morally wrong. Second, and more importantly, this solution—like the claim
that A can avoid the demanding obligation by not transacting—fails to address the root cause
of the problem, namely, a defect in (F2) and (F3). Surely, it is not the case that anything
goes if the only non-exploitative trade according to (F1)–(A5) lies beyond A’s reserve price.
Provided there is range of prices over which A and B may bargain, it seems that there
must be some subset of this range that represents a fair price, weighing the rights violation,
feasibility constraints, and welfare concerns all together. If this is the case, then perhaps a
different piecemeal approach to (F2) and (F3) would provide a more comprehensive solution
to the problem.
A more plausible piecemeal solution may claim that when A can—without making a loss—
offer B a price that means the original (F2) and (F3), then A should offer this price. However,
if the ‘fair according to (F2) and (F3) price’ lies beyond8 A’s reserve price, then alternative
conditions apply that allow A to offer B a price within the range of both transactors’ reserve
prices.
In the apple cart case, this range is $1.50 to $2.50 per apple. A number of options suggest
themselves here. We may say that A should receive a price that is as close to the price she
would have received had the rights violation not occurred. In the apple case, this is $1.50.
But since $1.50 is A’s reserve price, he will be indifferent between transacting at $1.50 and
not transacting. Requiring a price at which A is indifferent to transacting is only marginally
better than requiring a price at which A prefers to not transact. In both cases the transaction
8Either above, or below, depending on whether A is the buyer or seller.
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may fail to occur, which would leave both worse off.9 Perhaps, in order to ensure A engages
in the transaction, the principle that applies in these cases should provide him with some
small incentive to transact. We may say that in the apple case A should offer B a price of
$1.51 per apple (or not transact). Here both A and B are better off transacting.
And yet, judged from one perspective, this is unfair to A. Why should he give B a price
that is less than he would charge another customer ($2) simply because someone has stolen
a third party’s (C’s) apple cart? A has not changed his prices in order to capitalise on B’s
disadvantage. In fact, if A is only permitted to charge B $1.51 for an apple, it seems that A
does worse than he would have because of a past rights violation. Why should A, rather than
B, pay for the rights violator’s wrongdoing? According to this line of reasoning, A should
receive $2 per apple.
However, judged from another perspective, $2 is unfair. It is not true that A does worse
than he would have had the rights violation not occurred, because, had the rights violation
not occurred, B would not have transacted with A at all. Although $1.51 is less than other
customers are charged, it is more than A would have received from B and it is a price at
which A makes a profit.
Yet again, $1.51 is also dubious. The requirement that A gain (however little) from the
transaction means that A profits from B’s disadvantage. A’s refusal to trade without profit,
in a sense, holds B hostage to A’s demands. It seems odd to say that A should receive
some gain if he trades with B, but the fact that the transaction is non-obligatory means that
without such gain A has no incentive to transact. Although the ‘normal’ obligations of (F2)
and (F3) in non-apple cart cases seem acceptable, none of the salient options for obligations
that apply in apple cart cases are unproblematic. Without incentivising A, he may opt to
not transact, which is bad for both, but when we do incentivise A, he profits from B’s unfair
disadvantage. No matter the approach, the piecemeal solution is unsatisfactory.
6.3.2 A Change of Scope
At this point we may want to change tack. In the piecemeal solution, justifications for each
of the two plausible secondary obligations undermine the other. Further, these issues do
not even address the looming question of whether that particular solution is ad hoc. Rather
than developing two-part obligations, we might want to avoid the problem of obligation by
excluding the apple cart case (and similar cases) from the scope of the working conception.
According to this approach, the apple cart case would be a kind of unfair transaction, much
like Steinerian exploitation without the addition of the advantage condition (A5). Of course,
as Wertheimer notes, “we would still have to ask what should be said about [these] transac-
tions, whether and why they are wrong, and whether or why they should be prohibited.”10
However, by restricting the scope of exploitation, these tasks would not form part of the
analysis of exploitation.
The apple cart and similar cases could be excluded from the set of exploitative trans-
actions by an additional advantage condition. However, this is not merely an exclusion of
convenience; there are reasons to think that there is a moral difference between apple cart
cases and other forms of transaction. There is a sense in which A ‘could not have done
otherwise’ in the apple cart case that, we might argue, excuses him from moral responsi-
bility for wrongdoing. Consider the following options open to A in the apple cart case: A
9Alternatively, we could assume that there is a small cost () to transacting. In this case, A would not
transact at $1.50, since a price of $1.50−  is a loss-making transaction for him.
10Wertheimer (1996, p.259)
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could give B a non-exploitative price ($1), not transact, or charge his normal price ($2). Not
transacting is the least preferred option by both A and B; both can agree that some form
of transaction is better than not transacting. Suppose A gives B the non-exploitative price
of $1 per apple. In this case, although B is not harmed by the transaction (when compared
to a no rights violation baseline), A is! A is worse off than he would have been had the
rights violation not occurred because his break even price is $1.50. A should not be obliged
to shoulder the burden of the antecedent rights violation any more than B. Requiring that A
give B the non-exploitative price burdens an innocent bystander.11 But if A charged every
other customer $2, then charging B $2 means that he does not take special advantage of B,
even if he takes advantage of her in the sense of the original (A5). We might claim that
exploitation requires an additional advantage condition. Not only must (A5) hold—A truly
believes (F1)–(G4) obtain—but the following condition must also be satisfied:
(A6) A modifies the terms of his transaction in response to this true belief.12
When (A5) and (A6) are satisfied, A takes advantage of B in a stronger sense than he does
when only (A5) holds. He modifies his price in order to maximise his own gain from B’s dis-
advantage. (A6) gives us a reason to claim that A does not take wrongful advantage/exploit
B when selling the apples to him for $2. Note that regardless of whether (A6) represents a
plausible additional constraint, it is clear that the weight of A’s wrongdoing in transactions
where (A6) is satisfied is stronger than it is in those cases where only the weaker (A5) holds.
When A does not modify his price in response to B’s disadvantage, we might claim that
he acts permissibly because his other options—not transacting or offering a non-exploitative
price—are respectively worse for B and non-obligatory. Recall that in the apple cart case,
B would pay up to $2.50 for an apple. She would therefore prefer paying $2.50 to not
transacting. Since not transacting is permissible, and (at least part of) the wrongfulness of
exploitation stems from the harm to B, then if B is harmed less when paying $2 than she
would be when not transacting, it seems permissible for A to charge her the same price he
would charge anyone else. He is not taking special advantage of B’s unjust vulnerability.
Although this ‘change of scope’ solution is more plausible than the piecemeal approach,
it too, is problematic. First, the ‘could not have done otherwise’ argument that attempts to
justify the claim that A is not guilty of wrongdoing in transactions satisfying the weaker (A5)
is flawed. While it is true that (A6) implies greater wrongdoing, the claim that A could not
have done otherwise depends on a false trichotomy. Of course, if A’s only options were $1,
no transaction, or $2, then we might plausibly claim that he could not have done otherwise.
But A’s options are not so limited; he may also offer B $1.51 (or a number of other prices).
A could have done otherwise (while still profiting). However, determining precisely what he
should have done—i.e., which price between $1.50 and $2 A should offer B—returns us to
the problems of the piecemeal solution. None of the prices between $1.50 and $2 seem to be
free from problems.
Second, while the fact that A does not alter his price in the apple cart case makes him
seem innocent relative to transactions in which he does alter his price to take advantage of
B’s unjust disadvantage, in other cases A’s failure to alter his price in B’s favour seems to
be a natural case of exploitation. Consider the following:
11There are certain similarities between the present case and Judith Thomson’s (1991) discussion of self-
defence.
12Note that (A6) is similar to (but differs slightly from) the ‘because of’ contained in the vulnerability-based
sense of advantage taking characterised by (A3).
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C16: Stuck in the mud.
Certain ‘unmaintained’ dirt roads in Nebraska become irresistible to teenagers
on ATVs when heavy rains turn the roads into a soupy mess. Farmers that
live along these roads dislike the ATVs because they cut deep ruts in the roads
they use to access their homes and fields. In an attempt at deterrence, many
area farmers charge $100 for extracting those ATVs that inevitably become
stuck in the mud, even though the cost of rescue to the farmer is much less
than $100.
Suppose a past property rights violation forces B to travel on an ATV down A’s
unmaintained road and she becomes stuck. Although B explains her situation
to A (and so he truly believes (F1)–(G4) hold), he maintains his $100 price for
extracting her ATV.
Although A does not raise his price in response to B’s unjust disadvantage, his failure
to constrain the terms he offers her in light of her situation seems to be a natural case of
exploitation. Further, although nothing about the case indicates that A has any obligation
to pull B out—there is no imminent threat to her safety—if he does help her, he should not
charge $100.
Not only is A not excused from wrongdoing in cases involving (A5), because he could do
otherwise, but also, as the stuck in the mud case suggests, it seems natural to claim that A
exploits B in these cases. Solving the problem of obligation by excluding the apple cart cases
from the scope of exploitation is unsatisfactory. Such cases seem to be natural examples of
exploitation. Although additional wrongdoing may be present in cases satisfying the stronger
(A6), that condition is not necessary for exploitation.
The problems of the piecemeal solution suggests that no non-controversial and immedi-
ately obvious secondary principle can govern cases like the apple cart case. Of course, this
does not mean that such a principle cannot be found, but it does mean that the selection
and justification of a secondary principle is not a straightforward task. The failure of the
change of scope solution suggests that strengthening the conditions in order to exclude cases
like the apple cart case from the scope of exploitation will arbitrarily exclude natural cases
from the scope of exploitation.
Despite their failures, the discussion of these two possible solutions suggests a range of
acceptable prices in the apple cart case. We are looking for a principle that does not require
A to pay B the price she would have received absent the rights violation, for, provided the
transaction is non-obligatory, this will result in a no-transaction situation. On the other
hand, as the stuck in the mud case shows, the principle must not entirely absolve A of
responsibility to modify his price in light of B’s disadvantage. The solution to the problem of
obligation presented in the following section attempts to strike just this balance by modifying
the fairness conditions of the working conception. Ultimately, regardless of the merits of the
piecemeal and chance of scope solutions the following bargaining-based account provides a
solution that is both unified and more explanatory than either.
6.4 Bargaining-Based Exploitation
In chapter 2 we saw that a generalisation of the fairness principles solved the problem for
Steiner’s account presented by the trust funder case. Steiner claimed that B was exploited
just in case she received less from transaction φ than she would have in another transaction
ψ which was identical to φ, save for the absence of the antecedent rights violation. However,
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the trust funder case showed this account to be insufficiently general since, in some cases, had
the rights violation not occurred, there would be no transaction. Steiner’s operationalisation
of the claim in rights that an antecedent rights violation ‘makes one party worse off than
they would be’ needed to be broadened. (F2) and (F3) provided this broader account. By
generalising the domain of the fairness conditions to (F2) and (F3), I shifted what B receives
less of from ‘benefits from transacting’ to ‘preferences satisfied.’ B can’t receive less benefit
from transacting if she doesn’t, in fact, transact. But in these cases her preferences may still
be less well satisfied.
The apple cart case reveals that the degree to which B’s preferences are satisfied is
also an inappropriate currency for grounding the counterfactual by which the fairness of
a transaction is judged. In particular, the inadequacy of (F2) and (F3) stems from their
insensitivity to changes in the economic environment. When a rights violation alters the
economic environment in which B transacts, obliging those in the new environment to satisfy
her preferences to the same degree that they would have been satisfied in the previous
environment is too demanding. Yet, the demandingness of the obligation does not aversely
affect A—provided the transaction is non-obligatory he can (and will in apple cart cases)
choose to not transact rather than to fairly (by (F2) and (F3)) transact. In this case, the
demandingness of the obligation aversely affects only B, the very person the obligation is
designed to protect. What we require is a currency for the counterfactual that is sensitive to
changes in the economic environment.
In the section that follows I propose a further generalisation of (F2) and (F3) that shifts
the currency of the counterfactual from preferences to bargaining power. The first subsection
(6.4.1) shows how this generalisation solves the problem of obligation and considers its mer-
its. In 6.4.2 I fill in some of the details of the account, arguing that an approach to bargaining
power derived from the status quo point is appropriate for understanding exploitation. Sub-
section 6.4.3 revisits the question from the previous chapter (subsection 5.3.2) about the
need for micro-level principles of fairness like fmv. Here I present a number of bargaining
solutions and argue that neither these solutions nor fmv is necessary for a transaction to be
fair.
6.4.1 The Bargaining-Based Solution
The appropriate currency for capturing the apple cart case is bargaining power. While A
may not be able to offer B a price that C would have offered her ($1), he can treat her as
if her bargaining power had not been compromised by the antecedent rights violation. By
bargaining as if B’s bargaining power were as strong as it would have been absent the rights
violation, B does no worse than she would have done in a transaction with A had the rights
violation not occurred.
Suppose C’s apple cart was not stolen and he turned up at the market. However, for some
reason,13 B decides to shop at A’s stall instead of C’s. In this scenario, B’s bargaining power
is strong. In order to obtain a better price from A she may always threaten to shop at C’s
booth instead. In this case, B would be able to bargain to a price of $1.51, an outcome that is
far better for her than a no-transaction scenario. At $1.51 and above A gains by transacting
with B. By appealing to bargaining power, we ground the counterfactual that determines
the fairness of the transaction in a currency that is sensitive to changes in the economic
13Since we assume that A and C offer identical products, B’s choice to shop at A’s stall would be irrational,
but this detail does not affect the point being made here.
133
constraints, thus making A’s obligation (when he chooses to transact) less demanding. This
generalisation grants B not the same outcome that she would have received had the rights
violation not occurred, but the same power to influence the outcome.
In order to solve the problem of obligation, we must replace (F2) and (F3) with (F2′)
and (F3′).14 With the revision in place, A exploits B in transaction φ just in case:
(F1) there exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in the history of
exchanges leading to φ that
(F2′) reduces B’s bargaining power, and
(F3′) the degree to which B’s preferences are satisfied in φ is less than it would be had B’s
bargaining power not been reduced.
(G4′) A’s egoistic preferences:
(a) are better satisfied in φ because B’s bargaining power is limited and
(b) if (F1)–(F3′) also hold for A, then the reduction in A’s bargaining power is less
than the reduction in B’s bargaining power, and finally
(A5′) A truly believes that (F1)–(G4′) hold for φ.
When A truly believes that (F1)–(G4′) are true of φ, then in order to not exploit B, A
must treat B as if (F2′) and (F3′) do not hold. This modified account has some attractive
properties: it is a more general version of my previous account and also of Steiner’s original
account, it places a stronger rhetorical emphasis on the defect in A’s attitude that is necessary
for exploitation, and finally, it goes some way towards incorporating a notion of power in
my account of exploitation. However, like the other solutions, the bargaining power-based
solution faces problems.
Strengths
Generality. First, (F2′) and (F3′) are more general than counterfactuals based on either
degree of preference satisfaction or transactions since these are simply special cases of (F2′)
and (F3′). Suppose that A’s break even point was $0.50 (rather than $1.50) in the apple
cart case. In this case, if A restored B’s bargaining power to the pre-rights violation level, B
would obtain an apple from A for $1. Why? If A treated B as if B’s bargaining power were
not reduced by the rights violation, then he would treat her as if she could also transact with
C. Since C charges $1 for an apple, A would be forced to charge B no more than $1 as well.
Since there is no other seller offering apples for less than $1, any threat B might make in
the hope of further reducing A’s price would not be credible. Thus the exchange would take
place at $1. In this case, B’s preferences would be satisfied to the same degree that they
would have been, had the rights violation not occurred.
Similarly, we might imagine a case where A normally charges $1 per apple, but after
someone steals B’s wallet, A charges her $2 (in the form of an IOU). This is a case in which
Steiner’s original counterfactual works: in order to not exploit B, the price A charges in the
post-rights violation transaction should be equal to the price he would charge in the pre-
rights violation transaction. And this, in turn, is equivalent to treating B as if her bargaining
14The wording of (G4) and (A5) has also changed to reflect the shift to bargaining power and the reference
to the revised fairness conditions, so these must also be updated to (G4′ and (A5′). Nevertheless, these
conditions have not changed substantively.
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power had not decreased due to the rights violation. The new conditions (F2′) and (F3′) can
be applied to cases in which both Steiner’s original account and the conditions (F2) and (F3)
apply, but as the trust funder and apple cart cases show, the opposite does not hold. The
new conditions are more general than either of the previous operationalisations of rights.
Attitudes. Second, the rhetorical flavour of (F2′) and (F3′) emphasises some of Sample’s
and Goodin’s concerns about exploitation that are not as apparent in the ‘degree of prefer-
ence satisfaction’ approach. Unlike Roemer and Steiner, Sample and Goodin place a strong
emphasis on the fact that exploitation involves a mistreatment of B by A that is deeper
than a mere failure to ensure a fair outcome. Exploitation for the latter two involves a
defective attitude. Goodin writes, “Sleeping sentries are guilty of all sorts of moral delicts,
but exploitation is not one of them. It is . . . the flagrant violation of the norm, rather than
of a mere failure to discharge the responsibility it lays upon us. This is a fundamentally
process-based notion.”15 Similarly, Sample argues, “exploitation is interaction for the sake
advantage in a way that fails to respect the value of our interactor—that is, in a way that
degrades her.”16 While we have already seen that it is a mistake to claim that the use of
these attitudes to drive a hard bargain is sufficient for exploitation, they are, contrary to
Steiner’s and Roemer’s accounts, necessary for exploitation. And while they are formally
captured by the advantage condition (A5), the modified fairness conditions (F2′) and (F3′)
better emphasise the way in which A’s failure to constrain his unjustly strengthened bar-
gaining power is a manifestation of these attitudes. Fairness in the sense of (F2′) and (F3′)
requires A to relinquish or rein in a form of power he has over B. When A is aware (A5′)
of his unjust power advantage, but does not alter his behaviour, he shows an attitude of
disrespect towards B and a willingness to ‘push her to the limit’.17
Power. Finally, critics of Roemer’s PR account (as well as Roemer himself) have argued
that because Roemer’s criterion “is neutral with respect to social features of states, appealing
only to their material features”, it is insufficient to capture our ordinary understanding of
exploitation.18 As we saw, Roemer argues for the inclusion of a dominance condition that
would require the coalition S′ to be in a relation of dominance to S, but he leaves the condition
undefined. Recently, Veneziani has argued that accounts of exploitation must “go beyond
Roemer to incorporate a notion of power” and that “a notion of power, or dominance, is
an essential part of exploitive relations.”19 While he references Wood’s (1995) emphasis
on vulnerability and Paul Warren’s (1997) claim that exploitation should focus on unequal
power, Veneziani does not himself offer an account of how power might be incorporated
into a theory of exploitation. Yet, the emphasis on bargaining power in (F2′) and (F3′)
seems to do just this. Characterising the fairness of the transaction in terms of B’s unjustly
weak bargaining power, and conversely A’s unjustly strong bargaining power, successfully
incorporates a notion of power into an account of exploitation. Further, as we saw, (F2′) and
(F3′) do not define a particular material outcome as the non-exploitative baseline; rather,
15Goodin (1987, pp.188–89, emphasis added)
16Sample (2003, p.84, emphasis added)
17The English ‘exploitation’ may be translated into two words in German, either as ‘Ausnutzen’ or ‘Aus-
beuten’. According to the Duden dictionary (Clark, 1999), the latter of these may mean “systematisch nutzen,
ausscho¨pfen”, that is, ‘to use systematically, to the last drop’. Rendering exploitation as the failure of A to
curtail his unjust power advantage in the sense of (F2′) and (F3′) captures this ‘to the last drop’ connotation
nicely.
18Sensat (1984, p.24)
19Veneziani (2013)
135
they allow the non-exploitative baseline to vary along with the economic constraints the
agents face in post-rights violation transactions.
Objections
Despite these three benefits, certain features of the bargaining power-based solution seem
unsatisfactory.
Isn’t B Still Wronged? The first objection is that, although weakening A’s obligations
allows B to avoid ‘no transaction’ scenarios, in cases like the apple cart case the weaker
obligation means that she still does worse (her preferences are less well satisfied) than she
would have because of an antecedent rights violation. Surely there is something morally
amiss when, for example, an antecedent rights violation forces B to pay $1.50, rather than
$1, for her apple.
The difference between the original (F2) and (F3) and the modified versions is that
the modified versions offer an account of fairness in deontically imperfect situations, while
the original versions operate in deontically perfect situations. Given that A and B find
themselves in a deontically imperfect world, a fair transaction is one in which A ignores B’s
unjust disadvantage. However, as the objection indicates, B will not receive as much from
A when he restores her bargaining power as she would if A faced the obligation implied by
the original fairness conditions. Yet, as we saw, placing this obligation on A means that in
some cases he does worse than he would have because of a past rights violation.20 This too
is unacceptable. If it is unfair for B to ‘pay’ for the antecedent rights violation, it must also
be unfair for A to ‘pay’. Thus, there are two kinds of fairness relevant to cases like the apple
cart case. These senses coincide in ‘ordinary’ (non-apple cart) cases.
The first sense, denoted by the original (F2) and (F3), is a deontically perfect sense of
fairness. The transaction is fair in a deontically perfect sense when B’s welfare (judged by
the degree to which her subjective preferences are satisfied) is as it would have been had the
rights violation not occurred. The second sense, denoted by the modified (F2′) and (F3′), is a
deontically imperfect sense of fairness. The transaction is fair in this sense when A fulfils his
obligation to treat B’s bargaining power as if it had not been reduced by the rights violation.
A exploits B only if the transaction is not fair in the deontically imperfect sense.
But why should the deontically imperfect sense of fairness be the sense that is necessary
for exploitation? The answer is that if we are committed to exploitation as both a strongly
moralised concept and a relational concept, then we must be committed to the claim that it
is unfair in the deontically imperfect sense. Although some accounts of exploitation, such as
Roemer’s, are non-relational, defining only the predicates ‘is exploited’ and ‘is an exploiter’,21
ordinarily when we say that B is exploited, we mean it as a relation: B is exploited by a
person or group. While the claim that A exploits B because the transaction is not fair in
the deontically perfect sense preserves the relational property of exploitation, we cannot also
claim that A acts wrongly when he does not offer B terms that are fair in the deontically
perfect sense because, as we saw, A cannot be obliged to offer B these terms. Since I have
argued that exploitation is a strongly moralised concept, the sense of fairness relevant to
exploitation is the deontically imperfect sense.
20This happens when absent an antecedent rights violation B would have received a price that is loss-making
for A.
21Elster (1982, p.363)
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There is something to the objection that B does worse than she ‘should’ even if she is not
exploited according to the revised conditions. B remains entitled to the satisfaction of her
preferences that would have obtained absent the rights violation, but it is not A who is obliged
to ensure that B’s preferences are satisfied to the appropriate degree. Rather, I suggest, it
is the original rights violator.22 Thus, like many of the other forms of transaction we have
considered, transactions that are not exploitative according to the revised conditions, but
that are still unfair in the deontically perfect sense, are normatively significant. They give us
pro tanto reasons for action. But, I have argued, since we ordinarily consider exploitation to
be strongly moralised and relational, these transactions should not be labelled exploitation.
Wasn’t $1.51 Unfair? In my discussion of the piecemeal solution I argued that A’s offer
of $1.51 was unacceptable because requiring that A make a profit in order to transact with
B means that A gains from B’s disadvantage. I claimed that A’s refusal to trade without
profit holds B hostage to A’s demands. These claims still hold. It is not the price that is a
problem for the piecemeal solution, but the justification. In the bargaining power solution it
is B, not A, who dictates the $1.51 price by using her restored bargaining power to bargain
A down from the original $2 asking price. Of course, she cannot push a rational A past
his indifference point of $1.50, but restoring bargaining power to B allows her a degree of
autonomy not found in the piecemeal solution.
Additionally, it is important to note two differences between the bargaining power so-
lution and the piecemeal solution. First, the bargaining power solution does not argue for
a particular fair price. Rather, it focuses on B’s capacity to obtain a price, on her oppor-
tunity for advantage. Thus, the ‘fair price’ is not a fixed price or proportion, but depends
on the transactors’ relative bargaining power before the rights violation. Second, unlike the
two-part piecemeal approach, the bargaining power solution provides a unified benchmark
for fair transactions that applies to both apple cart and non-apple cart cases.
Can A Strategically Avoid Exploitation? Because A is not obliged to ensure that
B’s preferences are satisfied to the degree that they would have been satisfied absent a
rights violation when doing so would harm him, A has an incentive to ensure that satisfying
B’s preferences would harm him. That is, transactors in A’s position in the apple cart
case have an incentive to ensure their cost of production is high if they want to avoid the
charge of exploitation. Of course, in many cases there are also countervailing incentives to
ensure their cost of production is low. In the apple cart case, the presence of the cheaper
seller C in the market (pre-apple cart theft) provided A with a reason to try to cut the
cost of production of his apples from $1.50 to $1. However, in more complex situations
companies may have a number of inputs over which the cost of production is distributed:
machinery, assembly line salaries, managerial salaries, utility expenses, etc. Firms may
increase managerial salaries while claiming that they cannot afford to pay their line workers
non-exploitative prices without making a loss. As with the question of negligent exploitation,
we have two possible responses to such strategic allocation of costs. We may add a rider to the
fairness conditions that explicitly includes such behaviour within the scope of exploitation, or
22Of course, the original rights violator may be long dead. I am unsure what should be said about such
cases where he has disappeared (one way or another). But, at any rate, I have argued that whether the
transaction is fair in the deontically perfect sense has no bearing on whether it is exploitative. Therefore,
determining who is obliged to ensure B is treated fairly in the deontically perfect sense, should the rights
violator be dead, is beyond the scope of the present project. However, for a related analysis of the distribution
of responsibility for injustice within a group, see Steiner (1994, pp.266-69).
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we may exclude the behaviour. And as is the case with negligence, excluding the behaviour
from the scope of exploitation does not entail that the behaviour is not wrongful, only that it
should not be labelled exploitation. My response to this problem is therefore the same as the
negligence case: when individuals attempt to avoid exploitation through the manipulation
of their costs, we should allow that when they do manage to avoid satisfying (F2′) and (F3′)
they avoid exploitation. But, importantly, they do not avoid wrongdoing.
What Is Bargaining Power? The final objection is more difficult to respond to than
the first two. The primary problem with using bargaining power as the currency for the
counterfactual in the fairness conditions is that it does not offer an appropriately informative
explanation of exploitation. Absent a detailed account of what, exactly, bargaining power
is, the claim that A exploits B when he, inter alia, takes advantage of her unjustly weak
bargaining power is analogous to the claim that A exploits B when he takes advantage of her
unjust disadvantage. But this much we already know. Indeed, Steiner prefaces his (1987)
account with the claim that “[a]n exploitative exchange in the most general (and non-theory-
relative) sense, is one which issues from an unfair distribution of bargaining power.”23 He
goes on to offer an account of what unfair bargaining power is within the framework of stark-
budget liberalism: “An unfair distribution of bargaining power is a distribution of valuable
possessions that contravenes a classical liberal set of property rights.”24 And, expanding
further, he offers his familiar transaction-based fairness conditions. B is exploited when
selling a product in a bilateral and voluntary transaction only if (1) someone would have bid
higher than A for B’s product, but (2) the reason he did not “is that someone’s rights had
been previously violated.”25
There are two points to take away from Steiner’s claims. The first is that a strict in-
terpretation of the stark-budget liberalism framework within which Steiner is working is
incompatible with the idea of power as an opportunity for advantage. Steiner claims that
for stark-budget liberalism “power consists in valuable possessions and unfairness consists in
rights-violations.”26 The conceptions of exploitation based on the modified (F2′) and (F3′)
do not interpret power as valuable possessions, but rather as an individual’s ability to se-
cure preference-satisfying outcomes for herself. Thus, (F2′ and F3′ seem to be incompatible
with a strict interpretation of power according to stark-budget liberalism. If these modified
versions are required to explain the natural claim that A exploits B in the trust funder and
apple cart cases, then it seems that an account of exploitation within the framework of stark-
budget liberalism cannot cover many cases of exploitation. This is not a significant defeat
for libertarianism in general though, for left-libertarian frameworks that extend the scope of
property rights are, it would seem, compatible with even the bargaining power-based account
of exploitation. Although the bargaining power solution may not conform with stark-budget
libertarianism, it is not illiberal.
The second point is that in order to offer an informative account of exploitation, fairness
conditions based on bargaining power must also provide an account of what bargaining
power. In order to incorporate the anomalies of the trust funder and apple cart case, we
find ourselves, rather curiously, back where Steiner began: bargaining power. We have no
particular explanation of how, exactly, bargaining power should be understood. The need
23Steiner (1987, p.133)
24Steiner (1987, p.133)
25Steiner (1987, p.133)
26Steiner (1987, p.133)
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for an account of bargaining power does not mean that the bargaining power-based solution
fails. Rather, it means that without an account of bargaining power it is incomplete. The
following section provides an account that can meet this objection and, ultimately, ground a
bargaining-based account of exploitation.
6.4.2 Characterising Bargaining Power
Before considering how bargaining power is best characterised in the context of exploitation,
we must first take a slight detour to discuss bargaining problems and their solutions. Below
I outline two-person cooperative games, or bargaining problems, and one prominent solution
concept, the Nash bargaining solution.
Bargaining Problems
Transactions between two individuals that are consensual and strictly Pareto-improving are
a form of two-person cooperative game. Since both transactors gain from transacting when
compared to a no-transaction baseline, each has an incentive to agree upon some distribution
of the gains from trade, but, since both are also concerned to maximise their own welfare, each
has an incentive to bargain for a distribution that favours their own interests. Bargaining
problems are a form of two-person cooperative games. Bargaining problems between A and
B can be characterised by each individual’s status quo27 (0), a set of Pareto-improving points
S28 called the feasible set, each individual’s utility function (which shapes the feasible set),
and a solution concept, which is a function mapping the feasible set and non-agreement point
to a (usually unique and Pareto optimal) point in the feasible set S.29 Players begin with
utilities at the status quo point and bargain to a Pareto superior point in the feasible set.
The point that rational bargainers would end up at is the outcome, which is given by a
particular solution concept.
So, in the figure below, A and B each have linear utility functions, the status quo is
denoted by 0, and the feasible set of Pareto-improving transactions is denoted by S. By
acting jointly (trading), A and B can achieve any point in S, but, since points on the red
frontier line jointly dominate30 all points in the interior, if A and B are rational they will
focus only on trades corresponding to points on the frontier.
Some game theorists, most notably Von Neumann and Morgenstern, believe that further
restrictions cannot be placed on the outcome of bargaining problems. They argue that all we
can say about rational bargainers is that they will choose a point on the frontier; which point
is chosen depends upon the players’ psychologies.31 However, Nash (1950), Zeuthen (1930),
Harsanyi (1956), and Barry (1991) all argue for a particular solution to bargaining problems,
specifically, the Nash bargaining solution. These writers argue that rational bargainers will
end up at a point on the frontier characterised by the following two conditions (where : µA
27Also called the non-agreement point.
28A few definitions for the technically inclined reader. The set S is convex and compact. A set is convex
(in Euclidian space) iff a line drawn between any two points in the set lies entirely within the set. A set
is compact (again, in Euclidian space) iff it is closed and bounded. A set is closed iff it contains all of its
limit points (it contains its border) and a set is bounded iff it has a border on all sides (and is therefore not
infinite). In other words, the set S is like a ‘normal’ shape: it is closed on all sides by a border and the points
on the borders are included in the set.
29Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975, p.514)
30A point (µA, µB) in S is ‘jointly dominated’ by another (µ
′
A, µ
′
B) if both µ
′
A ≥ µA and µ′B ≥ µB (Luce
and Raiffa, 1989, p.117)
31Luce and Raiffa (1989, p.118)
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is A’s utility, µAN is A’s utility at the Nash solution point, µB is B’s utility, and µBN is B’s
utility at the Nash solution point).32
(NC1) µA > 0 and µB > 0
(NC2) µANµBN ≥ µAµB , for all (µA, µB) in S, such that, µA ≥ 0 and µB ≥ 0
Here the status quo point is assigned a utility of 0. Condition (NC1) stipulates that
the point that the bargainers agree upon will be a strict Pareto improvement—better for
A (µA > 0) and better for B (µB > 0)—over the status quo point (0). Condition (NC2)
stipulates that the Nash solution is the unique point in the set of all of these Pareto improving
points that maximises the product of the utilities of A and B for a particular division. That
is, the Nash solution is the division at the points µAN and µBN and the product of these
two points (µAN ∗ µBN) is greater than the product of any other two Pareto improving
points in the feasible set.33
As an example consider the three points x, n, and y in figure 6.1 below. At point x, A’s
utility gain (when compared to o) is 0.6 and B’s is 0.4.34 The product of these utilities is
0.24. The product of the utilities at point y (0.3, 0.7) is 0.21. The product of the utilities at
the Nash solution, point n is 0.25 and is greater than the product of the utilities at x and y
and indeed, any other point in the feasible set S. Another way of putting the same point is
that the solution picks the point on the Pareto frontier that maximises the area of a rectangle
drawn from that point to the origin. In figure 6.1, this point is, again, that denoted by n.
o
S
n
y
x
µB
µA
Figure 6.1: A basic bargaining problem.
There are three strong justifications for the Nash bargaining solution. Nash shows that
his is the only solution concept that satisfies utility invariance, Pareto optimality, symmetry,
and independence conditions35 that, he argues, ideal rational agents would select, were they
to select axioms to guide distribution in a bargaining problem. Since rational agents not
involved in a bargain would select these conditions, they may be thought of as impartially
rational. Thus, Nash argues that the Nash solution provides a ‘fair’ division that reflects
the reasonable expectations of rational bargainers. Zeuthen and Harsanyi argue that if A
and B each propose a distribution, the player whose relative loss is smaller should concede.
Through a series of such alternating demands, Zeuthen and Harsanyi show that the players
32Luce and Raiffa (1989, p.126)
33Barry (1991, p.14)
34Note that these points are not necessarily interpersonally comperable. The claims that A gains 0.6 and
B gains 0.4 need not be made with reference to a shared scale of utility.
35Nash argues that we want solutions to the bargaining problem that are invariant with respect to util-
ity transformation (utility invariance), yield the same results when the game places A and B in completely
symmetric situations (symmetry), and, if the feasible set is expanded in a way that leaves the status quo
unchanged, then the bargaining solution is either unchanged or lies in the expanded part of the set (indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives). Point n is the only point on the Pareto frontier (Pareto optimality) that
satisfies these conditions.
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will converge upon n. This justification emphasises Nash’s claim that the solution gives each
individual as much as they can rationally expect to gain. Finally, Barry argues that if A
and B hire a third party, or arbitrator, to estimate their respective utility functions, “each
side will refuse to accept any arbitrator whose decision it expects to be less favourable than
the outcome of direct bargaining . . . [A]n arbitrator who is acceptable to both sides must
be one whose decisions approximate the Nash solution.”36 Successful arbitrators are those
who, over time, give distributions equivalent to the Nash solution. Erratic arbitrators are a
gamble that will be vetoed by both parties, and arbitrators using solutions other than the
Nash solution will be vetoed by one of the parties. However, since arbitration takes time
and resources, and rational agents are utility maximisers, they will (when possible) dispense
with the arbitrator and agree upon the division recommended by the Nash solution.
Although the Nash solution is perhaps the most widely accepted bargaining solution,
it is not the only solution. Many other solutions to bargaining problems exist; among the
most prominent are the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solution, which maintains the ratios of
maximum gain for each agent, and the egalitarian bargaining solution, in which each receives
the utility denoted by the maximum point of equal coordinates. The figure below shows the
Nash (n), Kalai-Smorodinsky (k), and egalitarian (e) bargaining solutions.37 In the following
subsection I discuss each of these three bargaining solutions as possible micro-level principles
of fair transaction. However, for now I will return to the task at hand, the characterisation
of bargaining power.
e n
k
o
µA
µB
Figure 6.2: Three bargaining solutions.
Bargaining Power
Bargaining power, in a pre-theoretical sense, refers to an individual’s relative advantage
and influence over the other when trading, bargaining, debating, etc. Consider a classic
bargaining problem in which A and B must decide on a division of $100 in an hour or neither
receives anything. Intuitively, A has more bargaining power than B if A knows that B needs
$20 (to pay a debt, for example) even if she wants as much of the $100 as she can get. When
B’s utility for money is non-linear in this way and A knows this, then A has more bargaining
power than B. Since B needs $20 to pay her debt, she attaches a higher utility to the first
$20 than to the next $20. A can push hard for a distribution close to ($20, $80),38 knowing
that B wants to ensure she receives at least $20. Of course, non-linear utility is not always a
disadvantage in bargaining. We may imagine that B needs $80 to pay her debt. If receiving
$20 or $50 is nearly as bad as receiving nothing, and A knows this about B, then B has the
36Barry (1991, pp.26–27)
37Note that in bargaining problems like that depicted in figure 6.1 these solutions coincide.
38Payoffs are listed as (A, B).
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upper hand. Therefore, bargaining power is shaped, at least in part, by the agents’ utility
functions.
Bargaining power is also shaped by the location of each individual’s status quo point.
Suppose again that A and B must decide on the division of $100. As before, if they do not
reach a decision in an hour A receives nothing, but this time B must pay (a third party)
$5. Since the consequences of non-agreement are costly for B, she will be more likely to
accept less than half of the $100. Her bargaining power is reduced. And, conversely, if B is
guaranteed $50 if no agreement is reached, then she will push for more than half of the $100.
In the latter case, provided A and B both have linear utilities for money, the Nash bargaining
solution is ($25, $75). Graphically, shifts in the non-agreement point may be represented by
moving the axis of one or both players (from o to o2). When B’s non-agreement point is
shifted up, the Nash39 bargaining solution shifts from n1 to n2, a distribution that favours
B, as shown in figure 6.3.
o2
n1
n2
o
µB
µA
Figure 6.3: Shifting the status quo.
As we’ve seen, bargaining solutions are functions that map the non-agreement point
and feasible set into a point in the feasible set (which, for our purposes, is unique and on
the Pareto frontier). It is not surprising then that the outcome of a bargaining problem
may be influenced by the non-agreement point and utility functions since the shape of S is
determined by these variables. It remains to determine which of the two (or if both) offer
the best characterisation of bargaining power in the context of exploitation.
Bargaining Power and the Status Quo
Let’s consider what we are looking for. The bargaining-based versions of the fairness condi-
tions, (F2′) and (F3′), provide a particular operationalisation of the rights principle of fair
transaction that is general enough to account for both the trust funder and apple cart cases.
It is superior to both Steiner’s original operationalisation in terms of counterfactual transac-
tions and the degree of preference satisfaction-based ((F2) and (F3)) conditions. However,
without an analysis of what, exactly, bargaining power is, the revised fairness conditions
cannot provide an appropriately informative explanation of exploitation. Since the revised
conditions are an operationalisation of the rights principle, the account of bargaining power
that we are looking for must be appropriate to the rights principle. rights claims that a
transaction is fair when there is no antecedent property rights violation that makes one party
worse off than they would be (absent the violation) in a transaction.
In most cases,40 a person’s ‘being worse off than they would be because of a property rights
violation’ involves a shift in their status quo point rather than a shift in their preferences.
39And in this particular case, the other two solution concepts.
40In chapter 2 footnote 16, I note that liberals may want to distinguish between an agent’s ‘true’ preferences
and her ‘adaptive’ or post-rights violation preferences, by for example taking ‘meta-preferences’—preferences
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Indeed, my example of preference change in the bargaining power discussion may be re-
interpreted as a status quo alteration to bargaining power. It may be that B always has
non-linear preferences for money when she is indebted to someone. In this case, we may say
that her bargaining power is weak because her status quo is in a non-linear region of her utility
function. If she had no debt, then her status quo point would have shifted upwards to a point
at which she might be expected to have a linear utility for money. True cases of preference
change that cannot be re-described in this way are, arguably, rare. We may operationalise
rights by claiming that a transaction is unfair to B if and only if an antecedent property
rights violation reduces her bargaining power by altering her status quo point in such a way
that the proportion of the gains B receives from the transaction is lower than it would have
been had the rights violation not occurred. This gives us the following revised (and final)
characterisation of exploitation:
A exploits B in the bilateral, voluntary and Pareto-improving transaction φ just in case:
(F1) there exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in the history of
exchanges leading to φ that
(F2′′) reduces B’s bargaining power by altering her status quo point, and
(F3′′) the degree to which B’s preferences are satisfied in φ is less than it would be had B’s
bargaining power not been reduced (by the alteration of her status quo point).
(G4′′) A’s egoistic preferences:
(a) are better satisfied in φ because B’s bargaining power is limited by her altered
status quo point and
(b) if (F1)–(F3′′) also hold for A, then the reduction in A’s bargaining power is less
than the reduction in B’s bargaining power, and finally
(A5′′) A truly believes that (F1)–(G4′′) hold for φ.
In the apple cart case, when we require A to act as if B’s bargaining power had not
been compromised, we require him to restore her status quo point to a pre-property rights
violation level (but, because the revised fairness conditions are in terms of bargaining power,
we do not require A to extend to B the same offer that C would have). We may call this
pre-rights violation level B’s moral baseline (mB). This shift in the actual status quo point
to the moral baseline is shown on the left in figure 6.4 below.
Condition (G4′′b) says that if both A and B are disadvantaged by a property rights vi-
olation (not necessarily the same one), then A exploits B only if (inter alia) the negative
effect of a rights violation on B’s status quo is greater than the negative effect of a rights
violation on A’s status quo. In the graph on the right in figure 6.4, both A and B are disad-
vantageously affected by a past property rights violation; however, A is more disadvantaged
than B because the distance between his moral and actual baselines is greater. Thus in the
situation depicted by that graph, when B does not constrain her unfair advantage, if the
other conditions for exploitation are also met, she exploits A when she transacts with him.
But is the restoration of the moral status quo baseline all that is required for a transaction
to be fair? Nash argued that his bargaining solution provided a ‘fair’ solution; in the fig-
ures in this chapter (6.2 excluded) both the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
over preference orderings—as given. Thus, in some cases a property rights violtaion might also impact an
individual’s preferences. However, this is a further ‘epicycle’ that may be applied to the basic case of unjustly
diminished bargaining power which I believe applies most directly to the agent’s status quo point.
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Figure 6.4: Adjusting for property rights violations.
solution coincide with the Nash solution. Yet the final conditions for bargaining-based ex-
ploitation do not require that transactions take place at these points. According to the final
characterisation of exploitation, any point in the grey region of figure 6.5 is a fair (and thus
non-exploitative) transaction. This includes point n1, the point at which rational agents
would have coincided if no adjustments were made for unjustly diminished status quo points.
It seems that the final characterisation of exploitation is too weak. Perhaps additional,
micro-level principles of fairness are required.
mB
mA
n1
µA
µB
n2
o
o2
Figure 6.5: Many fair transactions.
6.4.3 Revisiting Micro-Level Fairness
In chapter 5, I considered Wertheimer’s fmv principle of fair transaction. fmv is a micro-
level principle of fair transaction. As a micro-level principle, it operates against a background
of institutional justice. If a situation is unjust on a macro-level, fmv provides neither neces-
sary nor sufficient conditions for fair transaction. However, according to Wertheimer, when
background conditions are fair, then a fair transaction is one that takes place at the “fair
market value[,]. . . the price that an informed and unpressured seller would receive from an
informed and unpressured buyer if the [good] were sold on the market.”41 In my discus-
sion of fmv I offered two critiques. The first was that fmv does not itself embody any
deep principles of fairness—or at least Wertheimer gives us no reason to believe that this
is the case. Rather, fmv acts as a proxy for other more fundamental values that gives us
a practical baseline for determining whether a transaction is fair. Since fmv is not itself a
plausible moral principle, we should look to the deeper principles that it instantiates in order
to find a plausible micro-level principle. Second, I argued that it is unclear that there is any
need for micro-level principles of justice, since it is not straightforwardly clear that rights
41Wertheimer (1996, p.230)
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(a macro-level principle) is insufficient to guarantee a transaction’s fairness. The ability of
rights to handle both fraud (with the addition of a no-fraud clause) and coercion provided
further evidence for the cogency of the claim that it was sufficient.
However, at the end of subsection 6.4.2 we saw that the status quo approach to the
bargaining power operationalisation of rights does not rule out some outcomes that might
have occurred with no adjustment of the status quo. Agents may select the distribution
denoted by n1 in figure 6.5 both before and after adjustments for background unfairness (in
the form of adjustments to the status quo point) are made. There is some reason to think
that rights is insufficient to ensure that a transaction is fair. Further micro-level principles
of fairness may be necessary in order to ensure the sufficiency of the rights principle.
Unfortunately for fmv, its lack of justification as a principle of fair transaction means
that it is not a good candidate for a micro-level principle. However, above we saw three
alternatives that might serve as a micro-level principle: the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and
egalitarian bargaining solutions. Each of these solutions provides justification for its position,
but the Nash solution in particular provides the kind of justification that fmv lacked: an
axiomatic appeal to deeper principles of fairness. We may call macro-level principles of
justice based on (any) rational bargaining solutions the bargaining principle of fairness.
Wertheimer is aware of the appeal of bargaining and considers it a possible alternative to
his own fmv account. However, he argues that it faces two problems: first, the multitude
of bargaining solutions suggests that “bargaining theorists do not agree as to whether there
is a determinate answer to the [division problem]” and, second, “even if there is a solution
to what rational self-interest-maximi[s]ing bargainers would do,” it is not clear that “this
solution provides any guidance with respect to the criteria for a fair transaction.”42
We can allay the first of Wertheimer’s concerns by considering bargaining problems in
which the egalitarian, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Nash solutions coincide, such as the one pre-
sented in figure 6.5. If the distribution denoted by n2 (after the status quo point is moved) is
not the only fair distributions, then no particular version of bargaining will be necessary for
fair transaction. If n2 is the only fair solution, then we can consider the merits of individual
bargaining solutions. However, considering these additional bargaining problems will not be
necessary since, I will argue, Wertheimer’s second concern is correct. Bargaining does not
provide plausible principles of fair transaction for two reasons.
First, the alleged insufficiency of the status quo approach to the bargaining power op-
erationalisation of rights is mistaken. The insufficiency charge stems from the fact that
n1 may be a fair distribution both before and after the status quo adjustments have been
made. The thought is that if the adjustments make no difference in the outcome of the
transaction, then further constraints on permissible outcomes are required. But this com-
parison of ‘before adjustment’ and ‘after adjustment’ outcomes involves a change not only
in the status quo point, but also the bargaining strategies of the agents. If the agents select
n1 before adjustment, they act rationally according to the solution concepts. If they select
n1 after the adjustment, they act irrationally. When we fix the bargaining strategies by
requiring the agents to be rational in both bargaining problems, the agents will choose n1
before the restrictions and n2 after the restrictions. The restrictions do make a difference
in the distribution of gains. Similarly, we may consider the problem from the perspective
of transactions that are fair according to (F2′) and (F3′). Consider figure 6.5 and suppose
that no antecedent rights violations have occurred. In this case, according to the conditions,
42Wertheimer (1996, emphasis added)
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any distribution within the feasible set is fair. Now suppose two rights violations occur that
require shifting the status quo point to o2. Here the set of fair transactions is restricted to
the grey region. Again, the restrictions do make a difference in the distribution of gains.
The restrictions fail to make a difference only if the bargaining strategies of the agents are
allowed to shift along with the shift in the status quo.
Second, although the various bargaining solutions provide an account of how agents ought
to divide the gains from transacting if they are rational, they do not provide an account of
how agents ought to divide the gains if they are moral. Consider the five distributions shown
at points n, w, x, y, and z in figure 6.6. As before, distribution n is the distribution that all
three bargaining solutions select as the ‘fair’ distribution. However, suppose that A and B
end up not at n, but at w. Perhaps they agree to trade 10 apples for $10 dollars and then
they each burn half of their gains. If we also suppose that, whatever else they want, A and
B want more money and apples, this behaviour is irrational. But it does not seem unfair.
The proponent of the bargaining principle may concede that this example shows that
fairness does diverge from the maximising assumptions of rationality without granting the
rights proponent’s claim that the entire shaded region of figure 6.6 is fair. If fairness is
concerned with a distribution rather than a particular point, then all that matters is that the
proportion of the distribution denoted by n is maintained. According to a refined version of
bargaining, any distribution on the line segment on is fair.
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Figure 6.6: Fairness and Rationality.
But now suppose that A and B end up at the distribution denoted by x. Perhaps B burns
half of her apples but A keeps all of his money. Is this unfair? If B acts irrationally, does
fairness require that A do so as well? Perhaps if the two have agreed to both burn their
gains, then A has a duty to keep his promise, but short of such an obligation, it does not
seem that there is anything unfair in A’s keeping his money. The distribution is unequal,
but it is not unfair. Suppose the proponent of rights concedes this point. She may make
this further concession without extending fair distributions to the entire shaded region by
arguing for a further weakening of bargaining according to which any distribution within
the dark grey box is fair. If fairness does not require maximisation, then if either agent does
not maximise, the transaction is still fair, provided the other agent does not take more than
they would have received had the other player acted as a rational maximiser.
At this point the defender of bargaining has conceded half of the area to the defender
of rights. As a micro-level supplement to rights, this weakened version of bargaining
is far less restrictive than either the original bargaining or Wertheimer’s fmv. But the
erosion of bargaining is not quite complete. Suppose now that B does not burn half of her
share of the gain, but gives43 it to A so that the distribution denoted by y obtains. Is this
43The bargaining proponent may ask why B would give A a portion of the gain that she could have kept
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distribution unfair? As is the case with x, it is unequal, but it does not seem unfair. And,
since the location of y along the frontier depends on the amount that B gives to A, if y is
fair, then the distribution denoted by z, and indeed the entire shaded area, must also be fair.
It would be odd for B to simply give A some of what she herself wanted. A far more
likely case is one in which A and B are both equally proficient bargainers. Neither is perfectly
rational, but both easily satisfy the conditions of moral agency (no one will be giving away
what they want). However, A is a better bargainer and A and B end up at a distribution on
the Pareto frontier very close to n, but that slightly favours A, perhaps (48, 52). Surely this
is an unfair distribution.
Here the rights proponent will respond with a (by now) familiar trichotomy: B’s having
bargained poorly is either his own fault, someone else’s fault, or no one’s (‘nature’s’) fault.
If it is his own fault, and his ability to bargain has not been unfairly diminished, then there
is nothing unfair about the distribution. If it is someone else’s fault that his bargaining
abilities have been diminished, then he should be compensated for his unjust disadvantage.
The outcome is unfair but not because of the distribution, but rather because we have
not adjusted B’s bargaining power to take into account the past injustice. Finally, if it is
nature’s fault—a random fluke that A receives more—the rights proponent has a number of
options available. He may claim that the existence of insurance schemes turns this fluke into
something for which B can be held responsible, or he may claim that inequalities brought
about by nature should be evenly distributed amongst everyone and, therefore, that the
distribution is unfair. It is unclear what the best response to such a scenario is, but it is clear
that the proponent of rights has at least one response. All differences in bargaining power
and background conditions can be folded into the status quo point.44
That a distribution of the gains from bargaining is fair is not determined by a particular
bargaining solution (as in point n), nor by a range of outcomes that preserve the proportion
of that distribution (as in line segment on), nor even by a range of outcomes in which each
individual receives no more than they would have if the other had acted fully rationally (as
in the dark grey region). Fairness is a process-based notion. In the context of bargaining
problems, provided each individual’s bargaining power is just, any outcome is fair, even if
it is not rational. Therefore, we do not need to supplement rights (and its bargaining
power-based operationalisation) with a micro-level principle of fair transaction. Rather than
providing us with criteria for judging the fairness of outcomes, bargaining solutions provide
us with criteria for judging the rationality of outcomes.
6.5 Chapter 6 Summary
Chapter 5 concluded with a working conception of exploitation that added an ‘awareness’
condition, (A5) ((A5′) and (A5′′) in later formulations), to my revised version of Steinerian
for herself. Surely this behaviour is irrational. This is true. When rational bargainers would have ended up
at n, B’s bargaining to z would be strongly irrational behaviour. It makes sense to ask why she would do
such a thing. Yet, insofar as we can find a reason for her behaviour, we find that it is not irrational, but
rather that the bargaining problem has been mis-characterised. Suppose B does not care at all about apples
and this is why she gives a large portion of her apples to A. In this case, her utility function in the bargaining
problem is mistaken and it does not, in fact, have the shape we see in figure 6.6. When the problem is
re-described, we may find that B acted rationally.
44Christian List has suggested that, at least under certain moral theories, the disadvantages of the would-
be exploited could be caused not by an antecedent rights violation, but rather by (for example) Rawlsian
unfairness. In my discussion of rights I have tried to provide some reasons for thinking this is not the case.
However, it is also possible to replace my fairness condition (F1) with the following condition, which is more
theory-neutral: (F1n) there exists background unfairness that. . . ” The phrase ‘background unfairness’ in
(F1n) can be specified by a particular moral background theory.
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exploitation. In section 6.2 I assessed this working characterisation. I defended its exclusion
of both negligent and mutual exploitation. I also showed how it solves the pervasiveness and
responsibility problems that plagued Steiner’s original account. There I also introduced a
problem for the working conception, the problem of obligation. In certain cases, the fairness
conditions of the working conception of exploitation imply overly demanding obligations for A
that lead to outcomes that are worse for both A and B (and better for no one). In section 6.3
I considered two unsuccessful solutions to the problem of obligation. I argued that the first—
the piecemeal solution—fails to provide proper justification for a secondary obligation that
applies in ‘apple cart case’ scenarios, and the second—a change of scope—is too restrictive
since it introduces restrictions on the working characterisation that exclude cases that we
would ordinarily describe as exploitative. In place of these solutions I proposed a bargaining-
based solution in section 6.4. I argued that by generalising the working conception’s fairness
conditions to (F2′) and (F3′) the problem of obligation can be solved. Here I also argued
that in the context of exploitation, bargaining power should be determined with reference to
the status quo point of bargaining problems. The fairness conditions are updated to (F2′′)
and (F3′′) to reflect this interpretation. Finally, I provided a counterargument to the claim
that rights is insufficient to ensure that a transaction is fair.
At the end of chapter 6 we have a full and informative characterisation of exploitation that
is grounded in the ordinary language account of exploitation as ‘taking unfair advantage’. I
have argued that a transaction is unfair to B when (F1) there exists an unrectified property
rights violation at some point in a history of exchanges leading to the current transaction that
(F2′′) reduces B’s bargaining power by altering her status quo point in such a way that (F3′′)
her preferences are less well satisfied than they would have been absent the rights violation.
A exploits B when (G4′′) his own egoistic preferences are better satisfied by transacting
with B (to a greater degree than B’s are) and (A5′′) he truly believes this is the case. In
the following chapter I argue that this conception of exploitation is the best solution to the
paradox of exploitation.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: Open Questions
7.1 Chapter 7 Introduction
In the first half of the thesis I presented the paradox of exploitation and considered three
kinds of accounts that offer a solution to the paradox. In the second half, I developed my
own solution to this paradox, arguing for the conception of exploitation characterised by
(F1)–(A5′′). However, two questions remain open. One concerns the justification of my
account; the other is concerned with the paradox of exploitation. I address these questions
in the final section of the thesis, section 7.3. First, section 7.2 provides a summary of the
claims I have made throughout.
7.2 Thesis Summary
In the first part of the thesis I argued against existing accounts of exploitation provided by
Steiner (chapter 2), Roemer (chapter 3), and Sample and Goodin (chapter 4). In the second
part, I developed my own account, first arguing for a working conception in chapter 5 and
then a refinement in chapter 6. While this semi-dialectical presentation obviates the logic
of discovery and builds rhetorical support for my account, it somewhat obscures the core
structure of my arguments. In this summary I reconstruct the arguments in favour of my
three main claims.
C1: Exploitation is a negatively moralised concept that involves taking unfair
advantage. Most accounts of exploitation begin with the commonly accepted claim that
exploitation is a negatively moralised concept; however, Allen Wood disagrees. In section
5.2 I consider Wood’s arguments against the orthodox account. Wood claims that both
Nietzsche’s use and ‘wrong because exploitative’ claims provide two arguments against the
orthodox approach, but I argue that neither of Wood’s arguments are conclusive. Nietzsche,
I claim, uses ‘exploitation’ in an inverted comma sense. Wood argues that ‘wrong because
exploitative’ claims cannot be substantive if exploitation is negatively moralised, but since
these claims are substantive, exploitation is not negatively moralised. I agree with Wood’s
first premise, but reject the second and therefore come to the opposite conclusion. Since
Wood cannot provide any argument that speaks conclusively to his heterodox position, and
there are good reasons to think the orthodox position is correct, I conclude that exploitation
is a negatively moralised concept.
In chapter 4 I consider two accounts (provided by Sample and Goodin) that allow for
non-juridical exploitation. In section 4.4 I show that such accounts are either self-frustrating
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or incomplete. In order to avoid the dilemma, Goodin and Sample must either base their
accounts of exploitation on responsibility-sensitive theories of justice or prohibit prudent
risks (subsection 4.4.4). Since the latter is unacceptable, I argue that successful accounts
of exploitation must involve unfairness and be based on responsibility-sensitive theories of
justice.
Both Steiner and Roemer provide juridical accounts that are potentially responsibility-
sensitive. However, both theories fail to incorporate strong advantage taking conditions and
are therefore overextended. Steiner’s account faces two pervasiveness problems, diachronic
and synchronic pervasiveness (section 2.4), as well as the problem of moral responsibility
(section 2.3). Both problems can be solved with the addition of an advantage condition.
Roemer’s basic account is also severely overextended, but many of his problems can be
solved by the addition of the dependence condition and the restriction of his account to
arm’s-length economic transactions (3.4). The dominance condition promises to limit the
account to an acceptable scope, but this condition is not fully formulated. A properly
formulated dominance condition, I suggest, will restrict Roemer’s account in the same way
that the addition of an advantage condition would.
From these three arguments I conclude that exploitation is negatively moralised and
involves transactions in which two necessary conditions are present: advantage taking and
unfairness.
C2: RIGHTS provides the best account of exploitation’s unfairness. Throughout
the thesis, but primarily in chapter 5, I consider five accounts of the unfairness involved
in exploitation including use (section 4.2 and subsection 5.3.1), contribution (subsections
3.3.4 and 5.3.1), rights (throughout chapters 2, 5, and 6), fmv (subsections 5.3.2 and 6.4.3),
and bargaining (subsection 6.4.3). I argue that the micro-level principles of bargaining
and fmv are not necessary to ensure a transaction’s fairness, and use is only plausible when
interpreted in such a way that it becomes equivalent to rights or contribution. I suggest
that certain versions of the remaining two principles are coextensive, but the ease of use
afforded by rights and its ability to capture difficult cases (5.3.3 and 5.3.4) makes this the
preferred principle of fair transaction.
rights claims a transaction is fair iff there does not exist an unrectified property rights
violation in the history of exchanges leading to a transfer φ that makes one party worse off
than they would be. While the first portion of the principle is straightforward (and provides
the first condition for exploitation), ‘worse off than they should be’ must be operationalised.
I consider four interpretations. The first, in section 2.2, is Steiner’s implicit claim that B is
worse off than she would have been when there is a counterfactual transaction between A
and B in which the violation is not present and B values this transaction over the exploitative
one. However, I argue that in some cases there is no appropriate counterfactual transaction.
Thus, rights should be reinterpreted in terms of preference satisfaction. In subsection 2.2.2
I claim that a transaction is unfair to B when: (F2) it makes at least one element of B’s
original (and finite) feasible set, γB , unfeasible, leaving her with a new feasible set, δB (where
δB ( γB) and (F3) B prefers the unfeasible option in γ to her most preferred option in δ.
In chapter 6 I revisit these fairness conditions and show that they are subject to the
problem of obligation (6.2.3). In place of (F2) and (F3) I suggest the following fairness
conditions: A transaction is unfair to B iff there exists an unrectified property rights violation
at some point in the history of exchanges leading to φ that: (F2′) reduces B’s bargaining
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power, and (F3′) the degree to which B’s preferences are satisfied in φ is less than it would
be had B’s bargaining power not been reduced. Although this solution to the problem of
obligation improves on those outlined in section 6.3, it leaves the concept of bargaining power
unanalysed. In section 6.4.2 I provide an account of bargaining power based on the status
quo point in bargaining problems and revise the fairness conditions for the final time. In their
final form, they read as follows. A transaction is unfair to B iff there exists an unrectified
property rights violation at some point in the history of exchanges leading to the transaction
that:
(F2′′) reduces B’s bargaining power by altering her status quo point, and
(F3′′) the degree to which B’s preferences are satisfied in φ is less than it would be had B’s
bargaining power not been reduced (by the alteration of her status quo point).
C3: Conditions (A5′′) and (G4′′) together provide the best account of exploita-
tion’s advantage taking. Since the first characterisation of Steiner’s position in 2.2, the
working characterisation of exploitation has included a gain condition. A exploits B only
if A gains from the transaction’s unfairness and does so to a greater degree than B. Al-
though this condition ensures that advantage taking in the sense outlined by Elster occurs
(both A’s and B’s preferences are better satisfied by transacting), it does not restrict the
scope of exploitation enough to deal with the pervasiveness issues that occur in Steiner’s and
Roemer’s accounts. In order to handle these problems a stronger sense of taking advantage
must be used. In section 5.4 I consider a number of advantage conditions before arguing
in favour of (A5′′), according to which, in the context of exploitation, A takes advantage
of B just in case A truly believes that he engages in a transaction that is unfair according
to rights. Elster’s Pareto conditions are too weak, and stronger intentionality-based (A4)
and opportunistic conditions (6.3.2) are too strong. Thus, I conclude that transaction φ
is a case of exploitation just in case it is in the domain of bilateral voluntary and strictly
Pareto-improving transactions and the following five conditions hold:
(F1) there exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in the history of
exchanges leading to φ that
(F2′′) reduces B’s bargaining power by altering her status quo point, and
(F3′′) the degree to which B’s preferences are satisfied in φ is less than it would be had B’s
bargaining power not been reduced (by the alteration of her status quo point).
(G4′′) A’s egoistic preferences:
(a) are better satisfied in φ because B’s bargaining power is limited and
(b) if (F1)–(F3′′) also hold for A, then the reduction in A’s bargaining power is less
than the reduction in B’s bargaining power, and finally
(A5′′) A truly believes that (F1)–(G4′′) hold for φ.
7.3 Two Open Questions
While arguing for my own account over the alternatives presented in chapters 2, 3, and 4 I
have created a hydra of sorts, introducing many types of normatively interesting transaction—
unfair transactions, coercive exploitation, spiteful transaction, etc.—that are closely related
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to the kind of transaction I have called ‘exploitation’. Of course, in the process of introduc-
ing each individual transaction, I defended its exclusion from the scope of exploitation. Yet,
taken together, these various kinds of transaction seem to make a collective case against my
own characterisation. Many of the normative transactions characterised by conditions that
do not make the cut in my final characterisation of exploitation are involved in cases that
we would ordinarily call exploitative. What, then, licences my exclusion of these cases from
the scope of exploitation? I will take up this open question in subsection 7.3.1.
A second open question concerns the paradox of exploitation itself. Recall that the
paradox claims that engaging in consensual and Pareto-improving transactions cannot be
impermissible and that exploitative transactions that are Pareto-improving and consensual
are impermissible. Although my shift to a bargaining power-based operationalisation of
rights solved the original problem of obligation, a related issue remains. Suppose that in
the apple cart case, contrary to the obligations implied by (F2′′) and (F3′′), A does not act
as if B’s bargaining power had not been reduced: he sells B apples for $1.75. Suppose also
that he knows this is an unfair transaction. Since the conditions (F1)–(A5′′) are satisfied, A
exploits B and, therefore, acts wrongly. Although it is clear that B has a right to a better
price, is it really true—as the rejection of non-worseness seems to imply—that it would have
been morally better for A and B to not transact at all? Even if we think so, A and B are
likely to disagree. I revisit the paradox of exploitation in subsection 7.3.2.
7.3.1 Normative Transactions
In a review of Sample’s (2003) book, Wertheimer makes an important point, which I quote
at length:
I am not particularly sympathetic to Sample’s conceptual ‘essentialism’, to ex-
plaining what exploitation ‘is’. Some argue that if a transaction is beneficial to B
and if B consents, then it cannot be exploitative even if the transaction is unfair
or degrading to B. Sample and I disagree. But does it matter who’s right? For
even if we were to concede the linguistic point, we would still have to ask what
should be said about unfair or degrading mutually beneficial consensual trans-
actions, whether and why they are wrong, and whether or why they should be
prohibited. Those are the important questions. Sample suggests, for example,
that to say that a transaction is exploitative when it is (merely) unfair does not
account for the ‘badness’ of exploitation. . . If Sample wants to say we should not
refer to unfair but not degrading transactions as exploitative, I don’t have any
strong objection, although I think she is wrong as a matter of common usage.
The important task is to identify the way in which transactions can be wrong
and what we should do about them, not what words we should use.1
In my introduction to the first chapter I noted that exploitation is a ‘family resemblance-like’
concept that we use in various ways, in various contexts. If this is really true, it is unlikely
that there is any one correct characterisation that captures all of ordinary use. The most
important task is not the attempt to identify what, precisely, exploitation is, but rather, as
Wertheimer argues, “to identify the way in which transactions can be wrong and what we
should do about them.”2
1Wertheimer (2007, p.259)
2Wertheimer (2007, p.259)
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This thesis has identified a number of ways in which transactions can be morally amiss
(wrongful or morally bad). However, some of these normative transactions are not exploita-
tion (again to quote Wertheimer) “as a matter of common usage”.3 Although restricting the
label ‘exploitation’ to cases satisfying only (F1)–(A5′′), excludes some cases that we might
ordinarily call exploitation, it does so in order to ensure a consistency in our use. Suppose
case α satisfies (F1)–(G4′′) and we ordinarily call it a case of exploitation, but β also satisfies
(F1)–(G4′′) and we do not ordinarily call it exploitation. Here, our uses of ‘exploitation’
across these two cases are inconsistent with one another. Although fit with ordinary use
is a strong desideratum, so is consistency. Any plausible analysis of exploitation must sat-
isfy both. We can, as I have argued, allow these transactions to be normatively important
without also labelling them exploitation; we can simply call them ‘unfair transactions’.
Conversely, if we adopt a more restrictive notion of exploitation, where the concept is sat-
isfied by conditions (F1)–(A6)4, we exclude cases that we would ordinarily call exploitation.
Suppose A accidentally happens upon someone with whom he can engage in a transactions
satisfying (F1)–(A5′′). We would not, I suggest, refrain from calling this exploitation simply
because A did not plan to encounter B. That he did not constrain his actions towards her
when he did transact with her is sufficient to say that he exploited her. Yet, refraining from
labelling transactions satisfying (F1)–(A6) ‘exploitation’ does not mean that we must deny
their normative importance. For example, premeditated exploitations may carry more moral
weight than ‘accidental’ exploitations. So, just as (F1)–(G4′′) fail to ensure the consistency
of ordinary use, (F1)–(A6) fail to assure a maximal fit with ordinary use. The conception
characterised by (F1)–(A5′′) maximises fit with ordinary use while ensuring consistent use.
Interestingly, some paradigmatic cases of exploitation involve conditions that are far
stronger than (A5′′). In many sweatshop cases, multinational corporations in A’s position
actively pursue unfair gain. The property which (perhaps) most exercises us about sweat-
shops is not merely that these groups gain unfairly from labourers, nor that they are aware
that they do so, but that they actively and intentionally seek out those who are unjustly
impoverished and from whom they stand to gain the most. Corporations like Nike or Wal-
Mart do not accidentally hire impoverished workers in Nicaragua; they have a presence in
these countries only because they know they can exploit. These cases of ‘wilful exploitation’
involve an additional ‘premeditation’ condition (A7) that makes the moral weight of their
wrongdoing greater, but which is unnecessary for (mere) exploitation.
As I mentioned in the introduction to this section, my conception of exploitation must
be defended not only against the competing conceptions provided in chapters 2, 3, and 4,
but also against conceptions that are closely related to the one characterised by (F1)–(A5′′).
Table A.1 in appendix A summarises 16 conditions and 17 forms of normative transaction
that have been discussed throughout the thesis and makes a case for the identification of
a core set of characterisations that are candidates for exploitative transactions. There I
argue that transactions characterised by (F1), (F2′′), (F3′′), (F4′′), and (A5′′) are the best
candidates for exploitative transactions.
7.3.2 Solving the Paradox
In chapter 1 I presented the following ‘paradox of exploitation’:
3Wertheimer (2007, p.259)
4Recall, (A6): A modifies the terms of his transaction in response to his true belief that (F1)–(G4′′)
obtain.
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The Paradox of Exploitation
1. In transaction, φ,
(a) (Consent) to φ rather than to not φ is consensual and
(b) (Pareto) to φ rather than to not φ is a strict Pareto improvement.
2. (Impermissibility) φ-ing is impermissible.
3. (Non-worseness as permissibility) It cannot be impermissible to φ, provided:
(a) (Consent) to φ rather than to not φ is consensual and
(b) (Pareto) to φ rather than to not φ is a strict Pareto improvement.
The paradox may be solved by abandoning any of the three premises, but throughout the
thesis I have really only focused on the third ‘non-worseness’ premise. I have assumed that
the transactions we are considering are truly consensual and Pareto-improving and that they
are also wrong. Thus the various solutions to the paradox have presented different ways in
which the non-worseness premise might be false. They explain why transacting on certain
terms can be said to be impermissible.
One way of reading the paradox is to see the non-worseness claim as a (supposedly) com-
prehensive list of properties that are necessary for the permissibility of transactions that is
quite obviously far too short. The accounts of exploitation that I have considered have given
us many other properties that may serve to make transactions impermissible. Transactions
may be impermissible if they involve trade in non-commodifiable goods, contain terms that
deviate too far from the cost of production (or the fair market value, or the labour value
of the commodity), and if they involve gain from past rights violations. Clearly, as a list
of impermissibility generating properties, the non-worseness claim is false. An account of
the exploitativeness of a transaction may be based on any of these other impermissibility-
generating properties; I have argued that the best solution to the paradox of exploitation,
when the non-worseness premise is read in this way, is my rights-based account. Transac-
tions may be impermissible—and indeed, wrongful—when they involve taking unfair advan-
tage, as characterised by conditions (F1)–(A5′′).
However, there is another, more nuanced, way that we can read the non-worseness
premise. It may be seen as offering not a list of impermissibility-generating properties,
but rather a moral ordering of these properties. Read in this way, the claim is not that
transactions involve wrongdoing only if they are either non-consensual or harmful. Rather,
the claim is that regardless of what other wrong-making properties are present in a transac-
tion, if it is consensual and Pareto-improving, then it is morally better than not transacting
even if it is also morally worse than another non-exploitative transaction. Read in this way,
the non-worseness claim is true, or so I argue. Consider the following case (alluded to in this
chapter’s introduction):
C17: The revised apple cart.
As before, suppose that every Saturday C drives his apple cart to B’s village
and sells apples, and B usually buys 10 apples for $1 each. One Saturday C’s
apple cart is stolen, making A, who (lacking economies of scale) charges $2 per
apple, B’s only alternative for apples. Finally, also as before, A’s break even
price for an apple is $1.50, and the most B would be willing to pay for each
apple is $2.50. Now suppose that although A is aware of the circumstances of
B’s situation, he sells B an apple for $1.75.
We can ask three questions about this revised case:
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Q1 Does A act wrongly?
Q2 Does A exploit B?
Q3 Would it have been morally better for A to not transact?
The answer to the first question should, by now, be obvious. A performs a wrongful action
because he is aware that he gains from a transaction in which B’s bargaining power is unjustly
weakened from an antecedent rights violation. All conditions in my final characterisation of
exploitation are satisfied, so the transaction is impermissible, wrongful and exploitative. In
order for the transaction to be fair, and therefore non-exploitative, A should have acted as if
B’s bargaining power had not been reduced by the theft of C’s cart. In this case, A should
have offered B a price of $1.51. That is to say, it would have been morally better for A to
offer the lower price: $1.51 morally $1.75.
The third question asks whether it would also be morally better for A to not transact
with B than to transact with B for $1.75. It is difficult to provide any reason this should
be the case. Both A and B would prefer transacting at $1.75 to not transacting, both
consent to this transaction, both gain from this transaction, and no one else is harmed by
this transaction. Further, in claiming that it is morally better for A to transact, we do not
commit ourselves to the claim that in so doing A avoids wrongdoing. By transacting at
$1.75, A still acts wrongfully by exploiting B. When A transacts at $1.75 he does something
that is morally better than not transacting and morally worse than transacting at the lower
price: $1.51 morally $1.75 morally ¬ transacting.
If (on the second reading) the non-worseness condition is true, there is no paradox to
resolve. We might say that φ-ing (transacting at $1.75) is wrong because transacting at
$1.51 is morally better than transacting at $1.75. And we can make this claim while still
claiming that transacting at $1.75 is morally better than not transacting. Thus, on the
second reading of the non-worseness premise, the paradox is dissolved.
Unfortunately, this dissolution seems to present us with a new problem. If transacting at
an unfair price is wrong because it is morally worse than transacting at a fair price, then it
seems that not transacting must also be wrong because it is morally worse than transacting
at either price. However, if this is true, then the conditional obligation that seems to be
present in most cases of exploitation is false. In most cases—sweatshops, for example—we
think A is obliged to provide B with a fair price only when A chooses to transact with B;
A is not (except in special cases) obliged to transact with B. But if it is wrong to perform
an action because it is morally worse than another, it is not only wrong for A to transact
unfairly, it is wrong for A to fail to transact. In the apple cart case we may say if it is wrong
to exploit B because it is morally worse than offering her a fair price, then it must also be
wrong to fail to transact with her. But this seems clearly mistaken: A is not obliged to sell
B an apple. She is not starving or in desperate need of help; she’s just buying the week’s
groceries.
What we need is a solution that does not equate ‘morally worse’ with an action’s being
wrongful, so that we can explain why it is wrong to choose the morally worse option when A
chooses to transact, but it is not wrong to choose the morally worse option when he does not
choose to transact. This is just what my account of exploitation provides. A’s transacting
at an unfair price is not ‘wrongful because morally worse’, it is wrongful because he is aware
that he gains unfairly from a past rights violation. This is also what makes it morally worse
to transact at an unfair price. Thus, moral worseness does not cause wrongfulness, rather,
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they have a common cause: A’s awareness of his unfair gain from a rights violation.
Wrongful
Awareness of Unfair Gain
Morally Worse
Figure 7.1: The wrongfulness of exploitation.
On the other hand, not transacting is morally worse than transacting at an unfair price
because both A’s and B’s subjective preferences are less well satisfied. They would both
prefer to transact—even at an unfair price—than to not transact. That is, not transacting
is morally worse because there is a loss of welfare. But the fact that there is a loss of
welfare from not transacting does not mean that A and B act wrongly (though they may
act irrationally). There is no reason to think that A and B are morally required to perform
actions (such as apple buying and selling) that provide them welfare, at least according to
my account of exploitation.5
Welfare Loss
Morally Worse
Figure 7.2: The permissibility of non-transaction.
Conclusion
Where does this leave us? On the first reading of the non-worseness claim, my account of
exploitation provides a reason that transactions may be wrongful even when they are Pareto-
improving and consensual. In this case, the non-worseness premise is false, and the paradox
of exploitation is resolved. On the second reading, the non-worseness claim and the other
premises are true. The paradox is not resolved, but dissolved since it is true both that not
transacting is morally worse than transacting and that transacting at an exploitative price is
wrong. However, in order to explain why transacting at an exploitative price is wrong when
not transacting is permissible, we need an account of why the two differ. That is, we require
an account of what is wrong with exploitation that is not wrong with not transacting. This
is provided by my account of exploitation. So on one reading of the non-worseness premise,
my account resolves the paradox of exploitation and on the other it dissolves it.
Although my account dissolves the logical inconsistency between the second reading of the
non-worseness premise and the wrongfulness premise, it does not remove the residual feeling
that there is something odd about exploitation. When we end up with a welfare-based
moral ordering like $1.51 morally $1.75 morally ¬ transacting, we still find ourselves in
a situation in which, by moving from a non-transaction point to a transaction at $1.75, we
increase welfare for A and B and harm no one and yet we move from a morally permissible
state to a morally impermissible state.
5Thanks to Sebastian Ko¨ehler for discussing these points with me.
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In offering a bargaining power-based interpretation of the (relative) harm to B caused by
a rights violation, my account blends consequentialist and non-consequentialist principles.
Such blends often produce counterintuitive—or at least puzzling—moral obligations. Fortu-
nately for my account, there is nothing very puzzling about transactions that take place at
what I have argued are fair prices.
When A and B transact at $1.51 in the apple cart case, B is not worse off (in terms
of bargaining power) than she would be had the rights violation not occurred, and both A
and B are better than they would have been had they not transacted. The satisfaction of
the Pareto condition allays welfaristic concerns and A’s restoration of B’s bargaining power
fulfils his non-consequentialist rectificatory duties. While B’s preferences would be even better
satisfied if A were to offer her the price she would have received absent a rights violation, A
is not obliged to fully rectify the effects of C’s injustice when doing so would harm him. In
this case, A, not B, would be exploited: welfare constrains rights. Similarly, although A’s
preferences could be even better satisfied if he offered B a price of $1.75, to do so would be
to profit unfairly from her disadvantage: rights constrain welfare. The two overarching—and
opposing—moral methods fit together to offer a clear account of a fair price.
There is something puzzling about transactions that take place at exploitative prices. My
account of exploitation explains not only why transacting unfairly is worse than transacting
fairly, but also why doing so is wrong. Consequentialist (welfare-based) considerations tell
us why not transacting is morally worse than unfairly transacting. But if not transacting is
morally worse than unfairly transacting and unfairly transacting is wrong, not transacting
is morally worse than a wrongful action. And yet, common sense morality tells us that not
transacting is not itself wrong.
Above I solved this problem by explaining that the wrongfulness of the exploitative trans-
action is caused by A’s awareness of the fact that he unfairly transacts—a property that is
not present in the non-transaction case. But this solution to the problem does not eliminate
the perplexing fact that we can do wrong while also doing better for ourselves and others.
As Joan Robinson famously wrote, “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing
compared to the misery of not being exploited at all.”6
6Robinson (1962, p.45)
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Appendix A
Kinds of Normative Transaction
Table A.1: Normative transactions.
P C T F1 F2 F2′′ F3 F3′′ G4′′a G4′′b A5′′ A4 A6 A7 O Threat
Unjust Cases
Theft (harmful) 1
Systemic Unfairness 4 4 4 4 4
The Working Conception 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Unfair Transactions
Harmful Transactions 4 4 4 4 4 4
Non-Gainful Unfair Transactions 4 4 4 4 4 4
Attempted Exploitation 4 4 4 4 4 4 2
Mutually Bad Transactions 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Unfairly Gainful Transactions 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Negligent Transactions 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
Core Transactions
Harmful Exploitation 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Spiteful Transactions 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Exploitative Transactions 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Mutual Exploitation 4 4 4 4 5 6 4 4 4
Intentional Exploitation 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Weighty Wrongdoing
Opportunism 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Wilful Exploitation 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Coercive Exploitation 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
1 Thefts are unilateral, not bilateral, transactions.
2 Here A intends to expoit B, but fails to satisfy the gain conditions.
3 In negligent transactions, (A5) is not satisfied, and A is culpable for its non-satisfaction.
4 In spiteful transactions, part of A’s gain is from the satisfaction of non-egoistic preferences.
5 In cases of mutual exploitation, F2′ is satisfied in one dimension for A and another for B.
6 In cases of mutual exploitation, F3′ is satisfied in one dimension for A and another for B.
Strict Pareto Improvement (P) Both A’s and B’s preferences are better satisfied by transacting.
Consent (C) Both A and B consent to the transaction.
Transaction (T) There is a transaction—an exchange of goods—between A and B.
Property Rights Violation (F1) There exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in a
history of exchanges leading to transaction φ.
Feasible Set Restriction (F2) The property rights violation makes at least one element of B’s original
(and finite) feasible set, γB , unfeasible, leaving her with a new feasible set, δB (where δB ( γB).
Bargaining Power Restriction (F2′′) The property rights violation reduces B’s bargaining power by
altering her status quo point.
Welfare Loss from Set Restriction (F3) B prefers the unfeasible option in set γ to her most preferred
option in set δ.
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Welfare Loss from Power Restriction (F3′′) The degree to which B’s preferences are satisfied in φ is
less than it would be had B’s bargaining power not been reduced.
Gain (G4′′a) A’s egoistic preferences are better satisfied in φ because B’s bargaining power is limited.
Relative Disadvantage (G4′′b) If A is also disadvantaged (according to either (F1), (F2), and (F3), or
(F1), (F2′′), and (F3′′)), then A’s disadvantage is less than B’s disadvantage.
Intentionality (A4) A intentionally engages in a transaction in which (F1)–(G4′′) hold.
Awareness (A5′′) A is aware—truly believes—that (F1)–(G4′′) hold for the transaction φ.
Opportunism (A6) A modifies the terms of his transaction in response to his true belief that (F1)–(G4′′)
hold for the transaction φ.
Premeditation (A7) A intentionally seeks out transactions in which (F1)–(G4′′) hold.
Obligatory (O) A is obliged to engage in transaction φ with B.
Threat A proposes to make B worse off relative to the transaction that he is obliged engage in with B.
A.1 Core Transactions
In table A.1 I identify a ‘core’ of five normative transactions that correspond most directly to
the ordinary use of ‘exploitation’. Each of the transactions in the core satisfy the five condi-
tions (F1)–(A5), but only the form of transaction I label ‘exploitation’ satisfies exactly these
conditions, with the exception of ‘harmful exploitation’, which rejects the domain conditions.
Throughout the thesis I have assumed that exploitation is in the domain of Pareto-improving
consensual transactions, but as the debate between Sample and Wertheimer shows, not ev-
eryone shares this assumption. And indeed, unlike the inclusion of (A5′′) or the fairness
conditions (F2′′) and (F3′′), little of importance hangs in the balance. The main reason for
the inclusion of the Pareto and consent conditions is that it is (relatively) easy to explain
what has gone wrong when someone is harmed.
Spiteful exploitation excludes the restriction of A’s gain in (G4′′) to egoistic preferences.
As far as use is concerned, we ordinarily think of the gains from exploitation as material—not
even psychological—but normatively speaking, when A transacts unfairly with B because he
wants to see her preferences less well satisfied, he acts just as wrongfully as he does when he
transacts in order to advance his own material gain.
The existence of mutual exploitation depends on the truth of the claim that there exist
two incommensurable domains of value. While I tend to think that this thesis is false, Sample
disagrees. If incommensurable values do exist, then a greater number of transactions qualify
as exploitative than we (or I) thought. Here something important does hang in the balance,
because determining the wrongfulness of mutually exploitative transactions is complicated.
For example, if A happens to care more about values in dimension α and B cares more
about values in dimension β, then if A is exploited in β and B in α, neither may care much,
provided they gain sufficiently in the dimensions of value that they do care about. And, if
neither is particularly bothered by the ‘exploitation’ involved in mutual exploitation, then
it is difficult to explain how either is harmed without appealing to objective values. But as
we saw in subsection 4.3.3 the defence of particular lists of objective values is controversial.
Nevertheless, ‘mutual exploitation’ does satisfy the five conditions (F1)–(A5′′).
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Finally, intentional exploitation and a weaker alternative, knowing exploitation, adopt a
stronger form of constraint than the awareness condition (A5′′). These conditions require
not only that A is aware (F1)–(G4′′) hold, but also that A either intend to engage in or
knowingly engage in a transaction in which (F1)–(G4′′) are satisfied. The difference in scope
between exploitative and intentionally exploitative transactions is not likely to be great.
Those counterexamples that show the intentional condition (or the knowledge condition) to
be too strong are fairly far-fetched and have—for the most part—only theoretical traction.
Thus, in practice it makes little difference whether we adopt an ‘awareness’ or ‘intentionality’
condition since nearly all real-life cases will satisfy the stronger (A4) condition.
A.2 Other Normative Transactions
Transactions falling into the category of unjust transactions do not satisfy any of the advan-
tage taking conditions (A4), (A5′′), (A6), or (A7). Since these transactions do not involve
‘taking advantage’ in a sense that goes beyond mere Pareto improvement (found in (A1) and
(A2)) they are not in the set of core transactions.1 On the other side, transactions falling into
the category of weighty wrongdoing are transactions that are not only exploitative, but also
involve additional forms of wrongdoing, such as coercion (as in the drowning woman case),
or premeditated and repeated exploitation (as in most sweatshop cases). Although some of
these transactions are exploitative, they include extra conditions that are not necessary for
exploitation.2 Finally, cases falling into the ‘unjust’ category are not linked by a common
theme and do not even necessarily involve bilateral transactions. Here I have placed theft,
systemic unfairness of the kind characterised by Roemer’s (PR1) and (PR2) conditions3, and
the original working conception of exploitation.
Thus, although I have argued that Pareto-improving, consensual and bilateral transac-
tions characterised by the conditions (F1)–(A5′′) are the best candidates for exploitative
transactions, it is possible to slightly weaken (by removing the non-egoistic rider from (G4′′)
or abandoning the Pareto and consent domain conditions), or strengthen (by including the
stronger (A4) or allowing multiple domains of value) the conception without seriously altering
the conception I have provided. Alterations that go beyond these changes either depart too
significantly from ordinary use by overly restricting the concept or by labelling transactions
that are merely unfair ‘exploitation’.
1Harmful transactions are bilateral transactions that are much like harmful exploitation, but unlike harm-
ful exploitation, in the case of harmful transactions, A is not aware that he harms B. Non-gainful unfair
transactions are Pareto-improving, consensual transactions in which a past rights violation means that B’s
preferences are less well satisfied than they would have been in the transaction, but A does not gain from
B’s being worse off (even though he may still gain from the transaction). Transactions that are cases of
attempted exploitation are similar to non-gainful unfair transactions, except that A also intends to exploit
B, but since A fails to gain from the transaction, the exploitation attempt fails. Mutually bad transactions
are the somewhat hard-to-imagine cases in which both A and B do better than they would have because
conditions (F1)–(F3′′) are satisfied, but neither does better relative to the other. Unfairly gainful transac-
tions are transactions that are similar to those Steiner calls exploitation (but here I represent them with the
revised fairness conditions). They are identical to exploitation except they lack condition (A5′′). Finally
negligent transactions are Pareto-improving consensual transactions in which A ought to truly believe that
(F1)–(G4′′) obtain, but he does not.
2Opportunism involves cases of exploitation in which, in addition to the normal conditions of exploitation,
A also intends to exploit B ,and he modifies the terms of his transaction in response to his true belief that B
is unjustly disadvantaged. Willful exploitation involves cases in which, in addition to the normal conditions
of exploitation, A intentionally seeks out exploitative transactions. Finally, coercive exploitation involves
cases in which A both exploits and coerces B.
3Roemer’s account is not strictly characterised by what I have called ‘systemic unfairness’, but it is
compaitble with it when the withdrawal conditions are defined by (F2′′) and (F3′′).
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